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Abstract 
 
 Historians contend that the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), enacted in 
1934 forever changed the direction of federal Indian policy.  The Oklahoma 
Indian Welfare Act (OIWA) passed two years later in 1936 helped transform life 
for Oklahoma Indians.   Scholars have explored and written extensively about the 
IRA.  However, they have focused little attention on the OIWA.  This study 
contends the OIWA proved as transformative for Oklahoma Indians as the IRA 
did for Indians across the country.  To appreciate fully the Indian New Deal, one 
must understand the OIWA.  Indian voice is integral to this study as a means to 
fully appreciate the rapid changes most Oklahoma Indians experienced over the 
short period during the Great Depression and World War II era.  This study 
explores Oklahoma Indians and how the OIWA impacted their social, political, 
and economic institutions, and along with other forces helped propel them into the 
evolving urban and industrialized society that emerged following World War II.   
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        Introduction 
 
In 1836 during the Mashpee Revolt in Massachusetts, William Apes, a 
Pequot religious figure published his famous “Eulogy on King Philip.”  The year 
1836 witnessed implementation of Andrew Jackson’s removal policy. Apes wrote a 
speech Metacom might have given in the 1640s during the King Philip War.  To 
rally his people, Metacom stated,  
Brothers—you see this vast country before us the Great Spirit gave to our 
fathers . . . . and you now see the foe before you, that they have grown 
insolent and bold; that all our ancient customs are disregarded; that treaties 
made by our fathers and us are broken . . . . Brothers these people from the 
unknown world will cut down our groves, spoil our hunting and planting 
grounds, and drives us and our children from the graves of our fathers, and 
our council fires, and enslave our women and children.1 
 
Almost a century later in 1934, Franklin Roosevelt in an effort to build 
congressional support for the Wheeler-Howard Bill sent a message to Congress.  
His words seem a call to restructure the world forced upon Native Americans by 
white Americans during the previous 300 years.  In part, Roosevelt stated,  
It is in the main a measure of justice that is long overdue.  We can and 
should, without further delay, extend to the Indian the fundamental rights of 
political liberty and local self-government and the opportunities of 
education and economic assistance that they require in order to attain a 
wholesome American life.2  
 
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) became law in June of 1934 and 
marked a major shift in federal Indian policy.  The disastrous allotment policy 
                                                          
1 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian County A Native History of Early America, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 147. 
2 U. S. House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 7 June 1934, Washington, DC: GPO, 1934, 
7807. 
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instituted in the 1887 ended.  Indian policy now focused on consolidation of Indian 
land, organization of tribal government, and economic development.  Many 
scholars consider the IRA to have been the most important piece of federal 
legislation dealing with Indian affairs of the twentieth century.  Closely tied to the 
IRA was another piece of legislation enacted in 1936.  The Oklahoma Indian 
Welfare Act (OIWA) brought the benefits of the IRA to Oklahoma Indians along 
with other significant gains.  While the IRA continues to receive a great deal of 
attention by scholars, the OIWA has been virtually ignored.  This study focuses on 
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, its origins, enactment, implementation, and 
impact.   
The Oklahoma congressional delegation exempted Oklahoma Indians from 
most provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.  Yet, just two years 
later, the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act was enacted, providing virtually all 
benefits contained in the IRA and then some.  In 1934, Elmer Thomas, Oklahoma 
Senator, became chair of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, while fellow 
Oklahoman Will Rogers, the Honorable not the humorist, served as chair of the 
House Committee on Indian Affairs.  Senator Thomas proved instrumental in 
blocking application of the IRA for Oklahoma Indians in June of 1934.  Ironically 
just, two years later Thomas and Rogers co-sponsored a “Newer New Deal” for 
Oklahoma Indians in the form of the Thomas-Rogers Bill known after its 
enactment in 1936 as the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act. 
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The OIWA was one of several significant pieces of Indian legislation 
enacted during the 1930s, known collectively as the Indian New Deal.  Other acts 
included the Pueblo Relief Act (1933), the Johnson O’Malley Act (1934), the 
Indian Reorganization Act (1934), the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (1935), and the 
Alaska Reorganization Act (1936).  Except for an article, “John Collier and the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act,” written by Peter M. Wright over thirty years ago 
and a chapter, titled “The New Deal for Indians” written by Carter Blue Clark, and 
contained in a book edited by Arrell Gibson in 1986, little scholarly interest has 
been concerned with the OIWA.  The OIWA has fallen under the radar screen of 
scholarly attention.  Wright offered an excellent legislative history of the OIWA, 
but his article remains just that, a legislative history.  With the passage of over three 
decades, it now seems incomplete and offers little substantive Indian voice.  
Clark’s article is a useful but partial exploration of both the IRA and the OIWA.  
This dissertation will examine the background, enactment, and implementation of 
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.3 
The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, a New Deal measure aimed 
specifically at Oklahoma Indians, provides an important chapter in understanding 
the reform efforts of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, in the Sooner 
state.  Secondly, this dissertation explores the OIWA from several perspectives. 
The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 was a New Deal measure aimed 
specifically at Oklahoma Indians.  Additionally, this dissertation focuses 
                                                          
3 Peter M. Wright, “John Collier and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936,” The 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 50 (August 1972),  
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specifically on Oklahoma Indians, their perspective and involvement with the 
OIWA.  Although Oklahoma Indians remained divided over the issue, with some 
supporting and others opposing the OIWA, they nevertheless were involved in the 
political process in a number of different ways to promote their particular interests 
and viewpoints.  The vast majority of Oklahoma Indians demonstrated little 
concern with the OIWA, perhaps for reasons of daily survival exacerbated through 
the drudgery and hardship of the Great Depression.  This dissertation contends that 
involved or not these Oklahoma natives and their descendents felt the impact of the 
OIWA in a number of ways.  Allotment was formally ended.  Tribes were 
encouraged to organize for political and economic purposes.  Economic 
development was encouraged.  These are all important steps that evolved over 
several decades, helping Oklahoma tribes and individuals to advance.     
This study begins with a brief examination of the conditions of   Oklahoma 
Indians before the New Deal.  In many ways, their situation was unique.  While 
tribes in western Oklahoma were segregated from much of white society through 
confinement to remote reservation areas, the land holdings of many eastern 
Oklahoma tribes became inundated with white farmers, miners, oil people, and 
flourishing white communities.  This unique relationship involved white 
exploitation of Indian land and resources at an intensity seen nowhere else in the 
country.  Whites considered Oklahoma Indians further along the road to 
assimilation with white society than Indians in other parts of the country.  Many 
Oklahoma Indians, especially mixed bloods, shared the belief that the IRA and then 
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the OIWA would transport them backwards on a journey to reservations and 
segregation from white society.  An understanding of the background of Oklahoma 
Indians at the time of the New Deal is critical in helping to provide the context 
against which two questions arise: Why were Oklahoma Indians initially exempted 
from most provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934?  Why just two 
years later was the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act passed which gave Oklahoma 
Indians virtually everything contained in the IRA and then some? 
At the time of the New Deal in the 1930s, almost half of the country’s 
Native American population resided in Oklahoma.  Nowhere else in the nation 
could a wider concentration of tribal affiliations and cultural perspectives be found.  
This study contends that rather than being relegated to a bit part in the shadows of 
the stage, the OIWA is an important chapter in Native American history that 
warrants closer scrutiny because many Oklahoma Indians were actively involved 
during the enactment and implementation phases of the OIWA.  The Indian New 
Deal helped to open the door to self-determination that flourished in the 1960s and 
1970s.  The IRA and the OIWA remain tightly linked.  In many respects, the 
OIWA is an arm of the IRA, but to fully understand the Indian New Deal, one must 
understand that the OIWA was as important for Oklahoma Indians as the IRA was 
for other Indian groups across the nation.   
 A vocal white opposition to the Indian New Deal, concentrated in the 
eastern half of the state, represented a variety of interests, including oil, timber, 
mining, farming, and ranching.    While much of this white opposition masked its 
  6
intentions by professed belief in Indian assimilation and participation into white 
society, they had long participated in what Angie Debo termed “an orgy of graft 
and corruption” with respect to Indian land and resources.4   The Thomas-Rogers 
Bill introduced to Congress in February of 1935 threatened the status quo and they 
reacted vigorously.  Farmers, ranchers, miners, oil magnates, lawyers, judges, and 
state legislators coalesced around Oklahoma Congressman Wesley Disney.  
Disney’s dogged opposition to the Thomas-Rogers Bill throughout the legislative 
process, resulting in several proposals being dropped in order to secure 
congressional enactment, including a proposal to remove control over Indian 
probate matters from the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma county court system and 
place it under the control of the Interior Department, thereby ending the “orgy of 
exploitation” which Angie Debo argued characterized Indian affairs in Oklahoma 
before the Indian New Deal.    
  The Oklahoma congressional delegation was integral in securing passage of 
the Thomas-Rogers Bill in June of 1936 known thereafter as the Oklahoma Indian 
Welfare Act.   Senator Elmer Thomas became chair of the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, while Representative Will Rogers was his counter part in the House.  
Thomas was an assimilationist and fervently opposed the efforts of Indian policy 
reformers such as John Collier.  Thomas knew clearly what side his political bread 
was buttered on.  Oklahoma whites, not Oklahoma Indians, kept returning Thomas 
to Washington.  Why did Thomas, who was responsible for exempting Oklahoma 
                                                          
4 Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run The Betrayal of the Five Civilized Tribes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 91. 
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Indians from the IRA, do an about face in a short period of time and support Collier 
and others in their attempts to bring the Indian New Deal to Oklahoma Indians?  
Oklahoma Congressman Wesley Disney, from the first district in eastern 
Oklahoma, was the political figure that many groups and interests in Oklahoma 
coalesced around to focus opposition to the OIWA.  Why his vehement and 
sustained opposition?  Why would Senator Thomas along with other New Deal 
legislators such as Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler, co-sponsor of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, join together in the early 1940s and push for repeal of the 
IRA/OIWA?   
 John Collier, FDR’s Commissioner of Indian Affairs and arguably the most 
influential person in Indian affairs during the twentieth century, was the chief 
architect for both the IRA and the OIWA.  Collier fought tenaciously to secure 
passage of both legislative proposals.  Just days before congressional approval in 
June of 1934, Senator Thomas checkmated Collier’s efforts and secured exemption 
for Oklahoma Indians from most provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act.  
Shortly after Oklahoma’s rejection of the IRA, Collier visited Oklahoma at the 
invitation of Senator Thomas to develop a legislative proposal tailored for 
Oklahoma Indians, one that would bring them the benefits of the Indian New Deal.  
Collier and Thomas held seven Indian congresses across the state.  The legacy of 
John Collier with respect to enactment and implementation of the IRA is well 
known and continues to be explored by scholars.  Collier's involvement with the 
  8
OIWA is an important factor in this study.  Intertwined in the relationship between 
John Collier and Senator Thomas is a classic American political battle.   
Collier's shadow continues to loom over both the IRA and the OIWA and 
federal Indian policy.  For two decades following the New Deal years, Collier 
provided the widely accepted interpretation of the Indian New Deal.  Collier 
structured his writing to throw a favorable light on himself and his administration, 
nevertheless his work contains valuable insights found nowhere else.  Collier 
definition of assimilation proved quite at odds with the traditional viewpoint of the 
American Indian being incorporated into American society.  Collier promoted, 
“Assimilation, not into our culture but into modern life, and preservation and 
intensification of heritage are not hostile choices, excluding one another, but are 
interdependent through and through.”5  Collier exclaimed, “The New Deal told the 
Indians: you are of the world and the world is of you.  Draw now on your own deep 
powers; come out of your silence; choose your own way, but let your way lead to 
the present and future world.  The huge past in you has a huge future—a world 
future—now.”6  E. A. Schwartz contended Collier aimed at gradually integrating 
Indian groups into modern society rather than continuing “the failed policy of 
promoting the rapid assimilation of Indian people as individuals.”7  In assessing the 
success of the Indian New Deal, Collier believed, “The Indian New Deal was not as 
effective as it could have been, because of “the institutional structure of the 
                                                          
5 John Collier, From Every Zenith: A Memoir and Some Essays on Life and Thought, 
(Denver: Sage Books, 1963), 203. 
6 Ibid.  
7 E. A. Schwartz, “Red Atlantis Revisited: Community and Culture in the Writings of John 
Collier,” American Indian Quarterly 18 (Fall 1994), 525. 
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government’s Indian Service.  That service was no-wise [sic] autonomous; but was 
geared to the Government’s all embracing system of budget-making and 
congressional appropriations, and the Government’s all-embracing system of civil 
service and job classification.”8  Naturally, Collier’s From Every Zenith threw a 
favorable light on Collier and his administration.    
 An important and almost totally unexplored chapter of the OIWA is its 
impact.  Just what effect did the OIWA have on Oklahoma Indians?  What did it 
accomplish?  Did it solve or create problems for Oklahoma Indians?  Angie Debo 
and Theodore Haas both examined the impact of Indian New Deal legislation.  
Their work spanned the late 1940s and 1950s and continues to stand alone.  No one 
has followed them in continuing to explore the impact of the OIWA.  Debo 
conducted research with Oklahoma Indians and the impact of the OIWA.  Her work 
provided case studies of a number of Indian families and for the most part remains 
unpublished.  Haas, an Interior Department solicitor, published a sterile statistical 
report pertaining to the IRA. While Haas's study focused on a nation wide 
perspective, it also included figures for Oklahoma and the OIWA.   At best, both 
studies only partially relate the story of the OIWA and its effect on the Indian 
people of Oklahoma.   
Perhaps of greater importance are abstract influences, factors difficult to 
quantify.  Oklahoma tribal governments were dissolved by legislative enactments, 
judicial reorganization, and executive policy during the 1890s and early twentieth 
century.  The OIWA offered the mechanism whereby Oklahoma tribes could 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 225. 
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reorganize their tribal governments.  While eighteen out of twenty-nine tribal 
groups in Oklahoma would organize tribal governments under the OIWA, and they 
represented only about ten percent of the Oklahoma Indian population.  None of the 
Five Tribes would be included in that group.  In spite of these ‘lesser’ statistics, the 
Indian New Deal affected most Oklahoma Indians significantly.  Carter Blue Clark 
believes the IRA and the OIWA “rekindled a tribal fire of survival that had been all 
but completely extinguished” among Oklahoma Indians and contributed later 
to“Indian nationalism that erupted in the militancy of the 1960s.”9  Historian 
Donald Parman believes the Indian New Deal “planted the seeds of Indian tribal 
autonomy that emerged during the past two decades.”10  These conjectures that 
warrant further scholarly consideration.   
Most of the limited research directed towards uncovering the story of the 
OIWA confined itself to the legislative struggle to secure its passage, focusing on 
the work of white legislators and bureaucrats.  Indian participation relegated to 
fringe shadows was included only for support of white perspective and interests.  
The inclusion of Indian voice is integral in telling the complete story.  With the 
dissolution of tribal governments accomplished by the Curtis Act of 1898, Richard 
Greene, tribal historian for the Chickasaw, found the amount of source material 
from tribal members declined dramatically. 11  However, history detective work can 
                                                          
9 Carter Blue Clark, “The New Deal for Indians,” contained in, Between Two Worlds: The 
Survival of Twentieth Century Indians, Arrell Morgan, ed., (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Historical 
Society, 1986), 80. 
10 Donald Parman, “Twentieth-Century Indian History: Achievements, Needs, and 
Problems,” OAH Magazine of History, 9, (Fall 1994), 11. 
11. Richard Greene’s experience has been source material for the period extending from 
statehood to the New Deal years of the 1930s, that for the most part the only Indian voice he knows 
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still bring to light an understanding of Indian involvement and opinion to help 
answer the nagging question, “So what?”  Historian Donald Parman believes many 
“scholars present strong prefatory promises that their [studies] will reveal the 
Indian perspective, disclose the Indian voice, and portray Indians as active 
participants in the story, but the [studies] deal almost entirely with non-Indian 
actions and policy matters.”12  This study includes Indian perspective and 
involvement in the enactment and implementation of the OIWA.   
Angie Debo remains first in a list of respected scholars to examine 
Oklahoma Indians and the Indian New Deal as it pertains to Oklahoma Indians.  In 
1940, Debo published her path breaking work And Still the Waters Run: The 
Betrayal of the Five Civilized Tribes.  Debo’s work, thoroughly researched and 
written in the formal prose of the day, focused on Oklahoma Indians from the latter 
part of the nineteenth century to the 1940s.  However, Debo’s work is a product of 
an earlier period of historical methodology.  The titles of several of her works, The 
Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic, And Still the Waters Run: The Betrayal of 
the Five civilized Tribes, and The Road to Disappearance: A History of the Creek 
Indians, exemplify a bygone perspective of Indians as defeated and helpless.   
In case study analyses, Debo examined the impact of legislation and court 
decisions such as the Curtis Act of 1896, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 1903, and the 
Burke Act of 1906 upon Oklahoma Indians.  By the time of statehood 1907, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of is contained in the papers of Douglas Johnston, the long serving tribal governor and two or three 
white lawyers occasionally hired by the tribe.  Greene concludes, “There was just no one who kept 
records for the Chickasaw at this time.”  Phone conversation with the author, September 5, 2003.      
12 Parman, 14. 
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land holdings of Oklahoma Indians had dwindled by ninety percent.  Thousands 
were left with virtually no land on which to subsist.  Resources such as lumber and 
oil were subject to an “orgy of exploitation” by white interests.13  Writing in the 
1940s and 1950s, Debo decried the lack of scholarly attention to the plight of the 
Indians at that time.  She believed this was caused by the fact that “the Indians had 
been forced to accept the perilous gift of American citizenship and they were 
despoiled individually under the forms of existing law; hence no writer of 
American history devotes even a sentence to their wrongs.”14  
  Debo believed the experience of Oklahoma Indians was “only one 
episode—although the most dramatic episode “ in a series of similar events which 
transpired with almost every Indian tribe in the western United States as a result of 
federal Indian policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."15  While 
her focus was on the Five Civilized Tribes of eastern Oklahoma, Debo contributed 
great amount of material pertaining to reservation tribes of western Oklahoma, 
including the Comanche, Kiowa, and Cheyenne. 
Respected scholars such as Kenneth Philp, Lawrence Kelly, and Elmer 
Rusco have provided important insights into our understanding the Indian New 
Deal.   Both Philp and Kelly focused their efforts on John Collier with biographies 
that examine Collier the reformer and his efforts to enact and implement the Indian 
Reorganization Act.  Elmer Rusco, a specialist in Nevada politics, explored in his 
policy study, A Fateful Time, "the IRA's impact on the restricted ability of Native 
                                                          
13 Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run, x. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 243.  
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Americans to govern themselves."  While Rusco contended a small group of 
"Indian policy elites" over saw the enactment and implementation of the IRA, he 
also believed, "Most Indian policy takes place not at the national level but on 
reservations and other settings where significant numbers of Native Americans live.  
At this level Indians were and are the main actors."16  While Rusco's attention is 
directed to the IRA nationwide, this writer agrees with Rusco's positions that only 
in more recent scholarly work have Native Americans begun to be recognized for 
their involvement in the political and administrative functions of the IRA/OIWA.  
However, these newer works are small in number and take the form of journal 
articles or a chapter in a book, focusing on broader nationwide perspectives.  A 
broader and more thorough examination is needed.  
Most scholarly work today credits Native Americans with involvement in 
determining their future and emphasizes the importance of uncovering Indian 
perspective and voice.  Two works focus on Oklahoma Indians.  Erik Zissu’s Blood 
Matters: The Five Civilized Tribes and the Search for Unity in the Twentieth 
Century examines factors such as blood quantum and indigenous community as 
being wielded effectively by Oklahoma Indians over the twenty-five year period 
following statehood to promote their interests.  Circe Sturm’s Blood Politics 
focuses on contemporary Cherokee society and explores how various tribal groups 
have utilized race and culture to define the Cherokee nation.  Sturm, an 
anthropologist of Cherokee descent, focuses her study on Indian identity, claiming, 
                                                          
16 Elmer R. Rusco, A Fateful Time the Background and Legislative History of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2000), ix-xiv. 
  14
"Federal Indian policy and Cherokee national policy have both fetishized and 
objectified Native American blood."17   
This study explores the involvement and contributions of Oklahoma Indians 
during and after the New Deal era as the OIWA was enacted into law and then 
implemented into practice.  This writer endorses Zissu's claims that “tribal 
members did not relinquish the political initiative; they were not reduced to 
helplessness.  Instead, they undertook political activity and fashioned a renewal of 
their collective identity.”18  The truth of William Cronan's statement, “Being 
overpowered is not a sign of passivity,” is verified in this study.19  Oklahoma 
Indians may have lacked political sophistication, but did not roll over and play 
dead.  Though limited in their access to power in white society, and often 
seemingly blocked in diverting the path of white encroachment, Oklahoma Indians 
struggled against the tide of change in a variety of manners.  This study will 
explore that Indian involvement.  While Erik Zissu’s study examines the Five 
Tribes during the twenty five years following statehood in 1907, this dissertation 
focuses on Oklahoma Indians during and after the New Deal era.   
Philp, Kelly, Rusco, and many other scholars focused on the IRA from a 
national perspective.  They examined four basic criticisms of the IRA: the limited 
effect of economic programs, the limited effect of political programs with respect 
                                                          
17 Circe Sturm, Blood Politics Race, Culture, and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 28. 
18 Erik M. Zissu, Blood Matters: The Five Civilized Tribes and the Search for Unity in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2001), 4. 
19 William Cronan, Changes in the Land Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New 
England, 
 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 165.  
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to establishing Indian self determination, the bureau’s forcing of IRA constitutions 
upon tribes, and the issue of factionalism found in many Indian governments.  In 
their studies, the OIWA receives scant attention even though Oklahoma Indians 
represented a wide variety of tribes and over one third of the nation's indigenous 
population.  The OIWA was indeed “Oklahoma’s Newer New Deal” for its native 
citizens.   
Developing the full story of the OIWA requires a number of questions and 
issues be examined.  The OIWA is located under the broad reform umbrella of the 
Indian New Deal.  Oklahoma Indians exempted from most provisions of the IRA in 
1934 became the focus of a broader reform measure, the OIWA, just two years later 
in 1936.  Oklahoma Indians demonstrated divisions over their support for a “Newer 
New Deal.”  These divisions certainly affected the development and 
implementation of the OIWA.  Additionally, a number of forces helped to 
transform the nation during the 1930s and 1940s, including the Great Depression, 
World War II, industrialization, and urban growth.  Oklahoma Indians were not 
exempt from these forces and they are a vital part of the story.  Most importantly is 
the issue of the impact of the OIWA on Oklahoma Indians.  While most scholars 
recognize the IRA as a watershed event in twentieth century Indian affairs, can the 
same be said for the OIWA and Oklahoma Indians?  This study will focus on 
examining these issues and questions.  They underscore the Indian story behind the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Indian Territory 
 
For what crime then was this whole nation doomed to this perpetual death?  Simply 
because they would not agree to a principle which would be at once death to their 
national existence . . . [which would] set aside the authority of the national council 
& principal chief . . . and dispose of the whole public domain, as well as the private 
property of individuals, and render the whole nation houseless & homeless at 
pleasure.1 
           Rev. Daniel Butrick 
            December 31, 1838 
 
 Daniel Butrick served as a Methodist missionary among the Cherokee in 
Georgia for twenty years prior to their forced removal during the winter of 1837.  
He accompanied the Cherokee on their journey to Indian country and penned the 
above words on New Years Eve, while the group hunkered down, waiting for a 
raging snow and ice storm to dissipate.  Butrick wrote these words as he reflected 
on events among the Cherokee over the year that was ending.  Looking forward 
over the following century, much of what Butrick wrote seems prophetic.  All 
Oklahoma Indians, not just the Cherokee, not just the Five Tribes, but also tribal 
groups from the Great Plains removed to Indian Territory over the balance of the 
nineteenth century, would suffer the fate predicted by Butrick.2 
 The subject of this study is the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 
(OIWA) designed to relieve the deplorable situation that many Oklahoma Indians 
                                                 
1 Vicki Rozema, ed., Voices from the Trail of Tears, (Winston Salem: John F. Blair Publisher, 
2003), 147. 
2 Ibid. 
  17
lived under by the 1930s.  The OIWA represents much more than just a particular 
legislative act.  It is one of several pieces of reform legislation dubbed the Indian 
New Deal, which marked a dramatic, though not necessarily rapid shift in direction 
for federal Indian policy.  Understanding the OIWA and its impact on Oklahoma 
Indians, necessitates presenting an overview of events and forces occurring during 
the period from the 1830s to the 1930s.  This chapter is not designed as a 
comprehensive overview of Oklahoma tribal groups but instead provides a 
selective history of their experiences showing a people uniquely forged by removal, 
the Civil War, reconstruction, the rapid influx of whites into Indian Territory, as 
well as industrialization and commercialization during the latter years of the 
nineteenth century.  Forces, events, and circumstances that shaped their character, 
both as individuals and as tribal groups molded the Oklahoma Indians during this 
time period.  Oklahoma Indians stood apart from other Native American tribal 
groups.  The OIWA was both created and implemented with that uniqueness in 
mind.   
 A portion of the expansive Louisiana Purchase designated as Indian 
Territory, eventually became the state of Oklahoma.  Tribal groups including the 
Osage, Quapaw, Wichitas, Caddos, Comanches, and Kiowa inhabited this area for 
generations.  Several tribes from the East--bands of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and 
Cherokee--seasonally undertook hunting expeditions into what is now eastern 
Oklahoma.  During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, a number of 
Kickapoo, Delaware, Shawnee, Sauk and Fox, all from north of the Ohio River, 
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voluntarily removed themselves to lands west of the Mississippi in the face of 
white westward expansion.  However, with rapid expansion of the cotton culture, 
the “Indian problem” became particularly acute across the Deep South, involving 
those Indians designated as the Five Civilized Tribes.   
 Andrew Jackson’s exploits as an Indian fighter created in part his national 
image.  Jackson, a southerner and a strong nationalist, lived also as a disciple of 
Jefferson’s dream of the American nation firmly resting on the backs of self-
sufficient prosperous yeoman white farmers.  Indians represented loathed obstacles 
in the path towards that dream.  As president, Jackson was instrumental in 
influencing the course of federal Indian policy, pushing the Indian Removal Act 
through Congress in 1830.  This legislation provided the mechanism by which the 
federal government accomplished removal and opened former Indian lands to white 
settlement.  The Five Civilized Tribes, the Choctaws, Cherokees, Creek, 
Seminoles, and Chickasaws, endured a dramatic removal from the old southwest to 
Indian Territory during the 1830s.  In a number of contrived agreements and 
treaties, these tribes ceded their valuable eastern lands for huge tracks of land, sight 
unseen, in Indian Territory.  The treaties promised the lands would remain theirs as 
long “as the grass grows and the rivers run.”3 
 Removal forced upon the Five Tribes in the southeast proved a divisive 
factor.  A deep division occurred among the Cherokee in late 1835 when one 
                                                 
3 Wayne Moquin and Charles Van Doren, ed., Great Documents in American Indian History, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 150.  The Creek chief Speckled Snake spoke these words to his people in 
1830, attempting to “sell” them on Andrew Jackson’s offer of lands in what became Oklahoma in exchange 
for their holdings in the southeast.   
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faction signed the Treaty of New Echota, thereby relinquishing their homeland in 
the southeast for $5 million and accepting removal west of the Mississippi River.  
This group led by Major Ridge and known as the Treaty Party vehemently opposed 
John Ross and the National Party.  They fought tenaciously in the court system to 
reverse what they believed was a sellout of not only their lands, but their tribal 
history and culture as well.  Relinquishing property and possessions, thousands 
forcibly marched to Indian Territory over what the Cherokee called “The Trail of 
Tears.”  Most experienced horrendous physical and psychological suffering.  In 
1838, the Reverend Daniel Butrick lamented the Indian experience, “O what a year 
it has been!  O what a sweeping wind has gone over, and carried its thousands into 
the grave, while thousands of others have been tortured and scarcely survive, and 
the whole nation comparatively thrown out of house & home during this most 
dreary winter.”4  Thousands died along the way from disease, starvation, or 
exposure.  Disgruntled tribal members executed several leaders of the Treaty Party, 
including Major Ridge, John Ridge, and Elilas Boudinot shortly after their arrival 
in Indian Territory in 1839.5  By the 1930s, few if any of the Indian participants in 
the removal of the 1830s were alive.  However, generation upon generation passed 
down the legacy of hardships, losses, and sufferings were passed down from 
generation to generation.  The experience of forced removal became a bitter part of 
the collective tribal memory, continuing to play a decisive role Indian-White affairs 
as well as Indian-to-Indian relations for generations.   
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 During the interlude between removal and the Civil War, the Five Tribes 
traveled in Indian Territory, isolated from the influences of white civilization to the 
east.  These stoic groups proved resilient and in a little over a generation, 
rebuilding a lifestyle in Indian Territory comparable to one they lost in the East.  
However, the Civil War launched a watershed event in Indian Territory.  Native 
Americans found themselves caught in the middle of a confrontation that tore the 
nations into warring factions, with each side fighting for dominance and survival.  
Many of the Five Tribes were prosperous slave owners and felt closely linked to 
the cotton culture of the South.  Other groups within the Five Tribes directed their 
loyalty to the North.  The Civil War became a divisive and emotional issue among 
the Five Tribes.  The Civil War affected no other groups in the nation as those in 
Indian Territory.   
 During the Civil War, both the South and the North placed a strategic value 
on Indian Territory for several reasons.  In order to help sustain their war effort, the 
South obtained much needed agricultural products including beef, wheat, corn, 
horses, and minerals, such as salt and lead for ammunition, from Indian Territory.  
Southerners viewed Indian Territory as part of the gateway for southern 
expansionist plans into the American West.  Indian Territory served as a buffer 
between Texas and Union Kansas and provided a base of Confederate operations 
for launching invasions into the southwestern territories.  The North took a 
decidedly opposite view point on these issues, which resulted in Indian Territory 
becoming a battle ground during the war.   
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 Among the tribes, factionalism existed between Union and Confederate 
sympathizers.  While the Choctaw and Chickasaw remained fairly united in their 
support of the Confederacy, several hundred “unionists” fled to Kansas and Union 
security.  “Although their national [tribal] governments signed treaties with the 
Confederacy, the majority of [individual] Cherokee, Creek, and Seminoles seem to 
have favored the Union cause.”6  Some of those who fled to Kansas formed guerilla 
with others united against Confederate occupation.  After 1863, the Union gained 
control of the war effort in Indian Territory and these pro-Union Indian guerilla 
units became attached as regulars to Union forces, while the Confederate Indians 
disbanded from formal military units to guerrilla units.   
 The Civil War effort in Indian Territory seriously impaired much of the 
Indian population.  By 1865, widows constituted one third of the population in 
Indian Territory.  Sixteen percent of the children were fatherless with fourteen 
percent orphaned.7  Tremendous physical destruction affected farm buildings, 
crops, and livestock.  Nearly 1,000 members of the Five Tribes displaced by the 
war died in refugee camps.  Marauding troops from both sides drove off an 
estimated 300,000 head of cattle.  Many farms remained idle or even vacant during 
the war years and suffered physical deterioration.8  With the weakening of tribal 
governments, disorder and lawlessness infiltrated Indian Territory.  Tribal 
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governments lost annuities from the federal government; and being cash strapped 
they weakened and  could not function effectively.   
As the war ended, Reconstruction treaties descended upon Indian Territory 
with dire consequences for all tribal groups.  These treaties struck at both Indian 
land base and tribal sovereignty.  James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior and chief 
architect of the reconstruction policy for Indian Territory, claimed his policy aimed 
at “territorialization: tribal unification under federal direction and with such a 
degree of subordination to Washington that white settlement of the Indian 
Territory, reallocation of tribal lands, and Statehood must soon follow.”9  Forced to 
cede varying amounts of land that collectively totaled over five million acres, the 
Five Tribes forfeited lands originally granted to the Indians by treaties for as “long 
the grass grows and the rivers run.”  The government asserted its authority to settle 
tribal groups from other parts of the country in west central Indian Territory on 
lands ceded by the Cherokee.  For example, the Lane-Pomeroy Plan obligated the 
Five Tribes to surrender part of their land holdings to Indians removed from lands 
in southern Kansas coveted by whites.  Federal officials viewed “Indian Territory 
[as] a conquered province and the people must submit to the terms set by the 
conqueror.”10 
 Most of the Reconstruction treaties dealt a blow to tribal courts by allowing 
for “a court of courts [federal] to be established in said Territory with such 
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jurisdiction and organization as Congress may prescribe.”11  Supplanting tribal 
courts inaugurated an important first step in disarming Indian courts in preparation 
for total dissolution.  Jeffrey Burton confirms judicial reform as an important step 
implemented by the federal government to bring Indian Territory under its full 
authority; and “by the late 1890s, all the real authority in Indian territory lay with 
the federal courts.”12  Reconstruction treaties included stipulations designed to aid 
industrialization and business expansion in Indian Territory.  The tribes were 
required to grant rights of way to railroads.   
Railroads helped to transform Indian Territory during the balance of the 
nineteenth century.  By 1890, nine different railroads operated on 1,000 miles of 
track.13  By authority of the federal government and not of their volition, tribes 
granted rights of way to railroads across their land.  As noted in other areas of the 
developing West, railroads were active in boosterism and drew more whites into 
Indian Territory.  The railroads, a powerful lobby, joined other business groups in 
exerting pressure on the government to break up Indian communal land holdings 
and open these areas for settlement, development, and exploitation by the westering 
white settlers.  More settlers and commercial development meant more revenue for 
the railroads.  By the time of statehood in 1907, operating rail track in Indian 
Territory had increased by more than 500 percent to almost 5,500 miles.14   
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 Railroad construction helped foster the growth of commercial farming and 
ranching, timber, mining, and manufacturing while also helping to open the 
floodgates of white settlement in Indian Territory.  H. Craig Miner correctly argues, 
“The most important force in destroying tribal sovereignty was the industrial 
corporation.”15  With the introduction of railroads after the Civil War and the 
accompanying influx of whites, many Indians discerned a pending threat to their 
way of life and survival.  Cyrus Harris, Choctaw governor, stated: “But we, with 
any degree of certainty, continue with the hope of holding lands in common, when 
railroad agitators and land speculators are using all available means to open our 
country to the settlement of the whites.”16   
 The growing division between traditionals and progressives underscored a 
disruptive factor among territorial tribal groups.  Full bloods eschewed interaction 
with whites and struggled to maintain the values of communalism and tribal 
culture, while mixed bloods often characterized a readiness to assimilate white 
culture.  Traditionals clung doggedly to their heritage and elements of indigenous 
religion, and often practiced subsistence agriculture on communal land holdings 
isolated from contact with whites.  On the other hand, many progressives received 
education, Christianity, embraced the Euro-American concept of private property, 
and entered into mixed marriages.   Being bilingual, many often found themselves 
elevated to positions of leadership within the tribal political system because of their 
ability to interact with whites.  Oklahoma Indian recognized this dichotomy.  Jim 
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Padgett, Chickasaw, in speaking of the influx of whites, the railroads, and 
commercialization said, “One side was in favor of progress, of accepting the white 
man’s ways and opening up the country.  What if Statehood came, they argued, 
wouldn’t it be a good thing?  The other side wanted this country for the Indian way, 
the land held in common by the tribes.”17  Edmund McCurtain, a Choctaw chief, 
attempted to bridge the separation between traditionals and progressives.  He 
recognized the dangers of factionalism proclaiming, “Union is strength.”18  Over 
time, these divisions inhibited “tribal members from effectively confronting non-
Indian settlement and federal authority.”19  Between statehood in 1907 and 1930, 
progressives dominated most tribal councils among Oklahoma Indians.   
 Following the war, westward expansion resumed with a frenzy.  Veterans, 
freed Blacks, immigrants, speculators, cattlemen, miners, farmers, and 
entrepreneurs descended on Indian Territory over the next several decades seeking 
opportunity.  By 1890, 19,000 freedman and 110,000 whites outnumbered 50,000 
Indian inhabitants, representing thirty-nine percent of the population.  By 1907, 
Native Americans comprised only nine percent of the state’s population.20  Indians 
became a small minority in their own territory.  White political, economic, and 
social institutions defined and controlled all facets of life in Indian Territory.  
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Oklahoma Indians remained unique from the experience of many other tribal 
groups around the country.   
 A wide gulf existed between tribal groups removed from the American 
southeast, and Plains Indians relocated to reservations in the western half of Indian 
Territory during the last half of the nineteenth century. White interests encountered 
two dissimilar groups.  The Five Tribes experienced decades of partial assimilation 
of Euro-American thinking and practices.  Whether classified as traditional or 
progressive, these tribal groups firmly based their economy in agriculture.  In the 
western half of Indian Territory, groups including the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Apache, 
Kiowa, and Comanche tribes rooted their life style in the hunter gatherer culture.  
Many former plains hunters maintained their traditional cultural practices and 
shunned most contact with whites as well as the Five Tribes in the eastern half of 
the territory.  Historian David La Vere recounted that these two groups “existed as 
two wholly different peoples . . . [and] instead of creating a middle ground of 
cooperation and unity, they remained different, suspicious, and separated.”21  Creek 
chief, Roley McIntosh expressed the general perspective of the Five Tribes towards 
the Plains Indians stating, “These wild Indians depend almost altogether upon the 
chase for support, and their glory is war.  We are anxious to pursue a different 
course.  Our object is to cultivate the land, to support our families . . . and to 
preserve the peace not only with our white, but with our red brothers.”22  On the 
other hand, the Plains Indians looked upon the southeastern tribes as Indians, but 
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not as brothers.  They viewed them as weak and as invaders of their lands.  
Avoidance of one another, characterized their relationship during this period.  This 
gulf between these tribal groups began to be healed only in the years following 
WWII. 
 Unlike much of the West, whites in Indian Territory gradually mingled with 
the Indians rather than following a policy of removing or exterminating them. Even 
though whites dominated Indians in sheer numbers, most tribal governments 
enforced a variety of restrictions.  Communally held Indian land thwarted white 
ownership of the land they farmed.  Whites paid for work permits, fees and taxes, 
with most Indians exempt from such charges.  The annual permit fees, $2.50 for 
laborers and $5.00 for mechanics and farmers, became important sources of 
revenue for the Five Tribes.  Indian schools prohibited the attendance of white 
children.  With no vote and almost no political voice in the territory, whites often 
found it virtually impossible to collect debts or settle most types of civil disputes.  
Lawlessness escalated as criminals used Indian Territory as a hide out from formal 
law exercised in the neighboring states of Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, or Texas.23   
 Disgruntled whites, experiencing back seat citizenship, sought relief from 
the federal government.  Federal administrators and Congress recognized the 
problems in Indian Territory as a nagging impediment in the path of white progress 
and domination of the American continent.  Many of the whites echoed the 
sentiments of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, J. D. Atkins, who in 1886 
addressed the situation concerning the Five Tribes in Indian Territory saying, 
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“These Indians have no right to obstruct civilization and commerce and then set up 
an exclusive claim to self-government, establishing a government within a 
government.”24  As the number of whites increased, so too did the call for 
abolishing communally held tribal lands and tribal governments.  The clarion call 
for “individual land ownership and political reorganization of the territory into a 
state” was directed towards Washington.25   
 Imbued with the concept of private ownership of the land, whites viewed 
“unused” Indian land as an impediment to development and progress.  By the 
1880s, land hungry westering settlers joined forces with “friends of the Indians” to 
promote privatizing Indian lands.  Congress enacted the Dawes Act on February 8, 
1887, referred ever after as “Indian’s Day.”26  This legislation distributed plots of 
land to individual Indians to farm and opened up millions of acres of “excess” 
tribal land to white settlement.  With the Five Tribes exempted from the Dawes 
Act, allotment proceeded with the western tribes in Indian Territory.  In 1889, the 
Unassigned Lands, a tract of approximately two million acres purchased from the 
Creeks, opened for white settlement with a land run in which over 100,000 settlers 
participated.  Other areas of Indian land opened to white settlement by either land 
runs or lotteries.27  Tribal land in the Oklahoma Territory shrank tremendously 
between 1890 and statehood in 1907.  For example, the land holdings of the 
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Apache, Kiowa, and Comanche plummeted from over 1,000,000 acres to 3,000, 
over a ninety nine percent loss.28 
 As Indian land holdings shrank, so too did tribal sovereignty.  Indian legal 
scholar F. Browning Pipestem claimed “the real loss was evidenced by a 
congressional restriction of tribal powers.”29  Over a dozen pieces of congressional 
legislation enacted between 1890 and 1907, systematically whittled away at tribal 
sovereignty in Indian Territory.  The Organic Act of 1890 established government 
and courts for non-Indians in the territory, a major blow to the effectiveness of 
tribal court systems.  The Appropriations Act of 1897 subjected tribal laws to the 
approval of the President.  Federal as well as borrowed Arkansas state law became 
the law of the land in Indian Territory.  The Curtis Act of 1898 instituted allotment 
of the Five Tribe’s land base and removed jurisdiction from tribal courts to federal 
courts.  In 1901, the federal government declared all Indians in the territory, U. S. 
citizens.  The Five Tribes Act of 1906 allowed the President to remove tribal 
chiefs; they now served at his pleasure and Indian court systems dismantled, with 
Federal and state laws imposed over all Indian Territory, and Indian court systems 
dismantled, tribal law fell prey to presidential prerogative.  Whites witnessed their 
interests enhanced and protected by the federal government.  Indian legal scholar 
Rennard Strickland labeled these laws and governmental actions as a “genocidal 
thrust” directed towards destroying tribal structures and contends that these efforts 
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constituted “legal genocide.”30  Indian political institutions were not just 
emasculated by these governmental actions; they were for all practical purposes 
destroyed. 
 The struggle for control of the land and its resources was at the core of the 
conflict between Indians and the burgeoning white population.  Indian Territory 
like other areas of the West became caught up in the forces of white settlement and 
commercial growth.  Settlers wanted to develop farms from the land they viewed as 
not being utilized by tribal groups.  Ranchers wanted grazing lands free from 
Indian leasing fees and taxes.  The timber industry hoped to exploit rich stands of 
pine, hickory, and oak located in the southeastern area of the territory that could 
satisfy any number of needs in the developing territory, including the burgeoning 
demand for railroad ties.  Mining interests sought opportunity to exploit coal and 
oil reserves, as well as other minerals such as lead and zinc.   
 By the end of the nineteenth century, federal Indian policy, focused on 
allotment and assimilation.  Allotment became a cornerstone of federal Indian 
policy in 1887 with the enactment of the Dawes Severalty Act.  Allotment 
attempted to instill the concept of private property in the minds of Indians.  
Communalism replaced with individualism, provided a path for assimilation into 
white society.  Working hand in hand, allotment destroyed tribal land holdings, 
while assimilation destroyed tribal cultures.  Allotment became a cornerstone of 
federal Indian policy in 1887 with the enactment of the Dawes Severalty Act.  
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Tribal lands across the United States were quickly allotted; the process would 
follow a different path in Indian Territory.     
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Chapter 2 
 
Life in the New Home 
 
Allotment proceeded quickly with tribal groups in the western region of 
Indian Territory underwent allotment quickly the Five Tribes in the eastern region 
adamantly contested the concept.  They voiced opposition to the idea of allotment 
even before 1887, with enactment of the Dawes Act.   The Choctaw registered a 
formal tribal response opposing allotment stating, “The history of every Indian 
tribe that has allotted their lands has been the same: The Indian got the allotment 
and deed and the white man got the land.”1  ”The Cherokee Advocate counseled its 
readers, “Not just because we so vehemently oppose and dread allotment, but 
because it now seems so imminent we should put greater and more serious attention 
and if there is any possible way for us to escape such an event, let us discover 
wherein it is.”2  The Five Tribes remained strongly opposed to any plans to cede or 
open any of their lands to white settlement, one of the primary objectives of the 
allotment policy.   
For five years, the Five Tribes effectively maneuvered white legal 
institutions to fight against and delay the allotment process they feared.  A 
Cherokee leader counseled his tribe that, “It is by conventions, speech making, 
passing resolutions, and running newspapers that the whites control everything, and 
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I think the Indians should adapt the same methods.”3  The Five Tribes showed 
themselves capable of using the white legal system to delay allotment but incapable 
of stopping the tide of allotment from eventually sweeping over Indian Territory.  
Finally in 1893, Congress established the Dawes Commission "to work for the 
allotment of Indian lands and the dissolution of tribal governments" in Indian 
Territory.4 
The Dawes Commission became the vehicle which eventually implemented 
allotment among the Five Tribes.  When giving the Dawes Commission their 
instructions prior to being sent to Indian Territory, President Grover Cleveland 
uttered a prophetic statement: “Be careful gentlemen, lest in elevating the Indians 
to a higher civilization you do not pauperize them.”5  Former Senator Henry L. 
Dawes, who considered himself a “friend of the Indian,” stood as a strong 
proponent of assimilation, with the claim that to be civilized was to "wear civilized 
clothes...cultivate the ground, live in houses, ride in Studebaker wagons, send 
children to school, drink whiskey [and] own property."6    Almost immediately, the 
commission met an unqualified negative response from the Five Tribes during 
initial discussions. 
 One agreement surfaced after five years of continual negotiations with each 
of the five tribes.  In 1896, the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations signed the Atoka 
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agreement, but it was “decisively defeated in a referendum by Chickasaw voters.”7  
The prophetic handwriting was on the wall concerning the inevitability of allotment 
of the Five Tribe’s lands as early as 1894.  In early March, the Globe-Democrat 
reported that in response to the legal foot-dragging of the Five Tribes, “Sentiment 
in both the House and Senate is ripe for the dissolving of tribal relations.”8   A 
frustrated Congress passed the Curtis Act in 1898; which like a relentless tornado 
forever changed the landscape of Indian Territory.   
The Curtis Act abolished tribal legislatures and rendered tribal courts 
impotent.  By 1906, control over Indian affairs in Indian Territory “transferred 
from the Redman to the white man, with the United States government absorbing 
the governments of the Five Civilized Tribes.”9  The Curtis Act ended “tribal 
[common] tenure without the Indian’s consent.”10  Contractors surveyed and 
incorporated towns within Indian Territory.  All townspeople acquired voting 
rights.  Communities provided public schools for both Indian and white children.  
Indians received citizenship. All people in Indian Territory, white, black, or Indian, 
became subject to federal law and the laws of the State of Arkansas.  The president 
approved appointments to tribal governments with tribal affairs now orchestrated 
and approved by the Secretary of the Interior.  
 The Curtis Act empowered the Dawes Commission to prepare tribal 
membership rolls in preparation for allotment of Indian lands.  By 1907, the tribal 
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rolls of the Five Tribes enumerated a little over 101,000 people.  Allotment reduced 
the 19,525,966 acre land base of the Five Tribes by 15,794,000 acres.11  
Reluctantly, the Indians realized they could not fight the inevitable and chose to 
obtain the best deal possible.  The Creeks signed an agreement in May of 1901 
which eased, though did not change, the application of the Curtis Act upon their 
nation.  Their chief, Pleasant Porter recounted “I was conscious that I was 
compelled under the advance of civilization to sign the paper now that I know took 
the lifeblood of my people.”12        
The Curtis Act accomplished several objectives.  First it established a 
timetable for the dismantling of the functioning governments of the Five Tribes, a 
direct blow to tribal sovereignty.  Secondly, it provided the mechanism needed for 
allotment of the Indian land.  The Curtis act gave teeth to the Dawes Commission, 
allowing it to proceed unimpeded.  The provisions of the Curtis Act allowed for a 
gut wrenching transformation of the Indian lifestyle.  Rolly McIntosh, Creek Chief, 
referred to the Curtis Act as “a law repugnant to our people, and in which they have 
had not hand or work in the making.”13  The Curtis Act closed the door to Indian 
legal resistance and silenced Indian voice, while helping to prepare the territory for 
statehood.     
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Not all members of the Five Tribes blindly accepted their fate.  A number of 
full bloods from each tribe refused to be enrolled or accept their allotments.  A 
wide variety of resistance groups formed among several tribes.  Among the 
Cherokee, a secret order called the Keetoowah refused to accept their allotments.  
By 1901, an estimated 1,400 full blood Keetoowah who refused to enroll with the 
Dawes Commission.  They were not moved even after “the threat of U.S. troops 
from Ft. Gibson was threatened.”14  A pan tribal group, the Four Mothers Society, 
embraced members from the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Cherokee tribes.  
They wanted to return to the old life that existed before the Dawes Commission and 
the Curtis Act.  This society was formed about 1895 and operated for some ten 
years, claiming almost 24,000 members at its zenith. These separatist groups 
offered a means of unifying their protest against the more progressive mixed bloods 
who proved more accepting of allotment.   
 A Creek group, called the Snakes and led by Chitto Harjo, boldly defied the 
changes forced upon the Five Tribes.  The Snakes adamantly demanded that 
removal treaties signed during the 1830s be honored.  Harjo told Alex Posey, the 
Creek writer and poet, “the agreement between the white man and the Indian gave 
the Indian the right of undisturbed possession and enjoyment of this country as long 
as the grass grows and the rivers run.  I notice the grass is still growing and the 
water in the North Canadian is still flowing. . . . I see no reason why that treaty 
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should be abrogated.”15  The Snakes formed an ad hoc government based on the 
old tribal models of communal life, passing laws which forbade the acceptance of 
allotments, rental of land to non-Indians, and the use of white labor.  They 
organized light horsemen, a quasi police force, to enforce their laws.  They arrested 
and whipped several Creeks who had accepted allotments.  In recounting their 
dedication, Alex Posey stated, “I met one old Snake Indian who said he would 
rather see his children dead than enrolled and their land parceled out to them.”16  
Finally, cavalry from Fort arrived to put down this “Indian Uprising” and arrested 
almost 100 Snake followers.  Of sixty tried and convicted and facing prison 
sentences, they reluctantly disbanded and accepted their allotments.17   Although 
Indian resistance to allotment eventually failed, the turmoil exacerbated 
longstanding fissures within tribal groups, which negatively affect relationships 
over the next several decades.   
 By 1905, the transformation of Indian Territory was well underway.  The 
allotment process broke up communal tribal lands.  Predictably statehood and 
formal admittance into the Union followed.  Whites favored a plan that would join 
the Indian Territory with the Oklahoma Territory and produce one unified state.  
Many leaders within the Five Tribes opposed this idea, believing forming two 
states better enhanced their interests, one from the Oklahoma Territory and another 
from Indian Territory called Sequoyah.   
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 On August 21, 1905, almost 200 elected delegates from the Five Tribes 
gathered in Muskogee to draft a constitution for a new Indian state.  Pleasant Porter 
was elected as the president of the convention, with a vice president elected from 
each of the Five Tribes accomplished their objective within three weeks and 
produced a document similar in many respects to the U.S. Constitution.  Some view 
the Sequoyah convention as the consummate example of Native Americans 
embracing American republicanism.   Others discerned the convention as a 
stepping-stone that ambitious white politicians used in order to gain stature.  
Charles Haskell, a white delegate and Oklahoma’s first governor claimed, “It [the 
Sequoyah Convention] was largely a struggle for political power and supremacy . . 
. by those [whites] who were seeking political position in the new state.”18  While 
Congress, pressured by white business interests and boomers, rejected the 
constitution, it did make them aware of the need to speed up the statehood process 
for the Indian Territory. 
 On June 16, 1906, Congress adopted the Hamilton Statehood Bill now 
commonly referred to as the Oklahoma Enabling Act.  It called for delegates from 
both the Oklahoma and Indian Territories to meet in conventions and draft a single 
constitution for one state.  The project took almost eight months.  On November 16, 
1907, President Theodore Roosevelt signed the proclamation which admitted 
Oklahoma as the forty-sixth state.  With statehood, old institutions vanished; the 
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inception of white dominated agricultural and commercial development arrived in 
Oklahoma.   
 As the allotment process ended, “There were no surplus lands within the 
Five Civilized Tribes to be returned to the public domain and opened to 
homesteading.”19  The allotment of tribal land affected members on the tribal rolls.  
Lands possessing timber, coal, or other valuable minerals were put into reserve and 
held in trust by the Department of the Interior.  The lack of surplus land presented 
an obstacle for land hungry settlers and commercial interests.      
However, one of the oft quoted rules of success in the American system, 
"find a need and fill it," seemed to be very much in play at this time.  In the early 
1900’s, a new class of entrepreneur, the grafter, began expending a great deal of  
effort to part the Oklahoma Indian from his land and its resources.  Simply put, 
grafting was “the name given to [the] business of locating whites on Indian 
allotments,” and it quickly became, “the chief and most thriving industry in the 
whole community.”20  Grafting involved the leasing and selling of Indian land in 
order to spur economic development, while clearing a profit for the grafter.  
Grafters took advantage of the Indian’s ignorance of property rights and values, 
real estate contracts, deeds, leasing arrangements, and probate.  Guy Cobb, a grafter 
from Ardmore testifying before a congressional hearing in 1906, described his view 
of the Indian allottee in the following way: “He is an ignorant man.  He does not 
know anything.  He is poor, ignorant, and illiterate, and does not know one single 
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step of the process.  He does not know how to act for himself, to say nothing of his 
children.”21  Many accepted grafters as conveyers helping Oklahomans realize 
mutual goals of acquiring personal wealth while helping to promote the commercial 
development of the state.  Oklahoma grafters would come to occupy almost the 
same societal position as slave traders in the antebellum South, a necessary evil 
tolerated to achieve desired ends.  No where else in the country befell such an 
unscrupulously intense and sustained effort by whites to obtain control over Indian 
land and its resources by whatever means necessary from legal maneuvering to 
systematic murder.  Donald Parman described the situation as “something awesome 
in its scope.”22  This situation continued for the next twenty five years.23   
 In order to protect Indian allotments from exploitation, the Interior 
Department placed restrictions on many individual allotments.  The department 
utilized blood quantum, a form of biological determinism to determine whether an 
Indian’s allotment should have restrictions placed upon it.  In short, the idea behind 
blood quantum determined that the higher percentage of Indian blood, the “more 
prone [an individual] was to the negative aspects of the typical Indian character, 
characterized by “ignorance, laziness, and thriftlessness.”24  Those with fifty 
percent or more Indian blood were categorized as “incompetent” to handle their 
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own legal affairs and restrictions, preventing the sale of their allotment for twenty 
five years.  However, in most instances allotted land could be leased with the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior Department.  This policy opened a door for 
grafters to acquire the land and resources of Oklahoma Indians.   
Unlike the rest of the country, local county courts in Oklahoma handled the 
legal administration of restricted allotments, including those of minors.  Oklahoma 
handled the legal administration of restricted allotments, including those of minors.  
Local courts appointed a guardian, usually a white lawyer or real estate person, to 
administer the allottee’s land holdings and its resources.  Angie Debo’s research 
revealed that between the enactment of the Curtis Act in 1898 and the institution of 
a state government in 1908, the majority of Indian allotments passed into white 
hands.25  Debo claimed an “orgy of plunder and exploitation probably unparalleled 
in American history began” during this time.26  John H. Moore described this time 
period of grafters as “ . . . a dark and terror-filled period in Oklahoma history, a 
period in which those who merely stole from Indians were regarded as upright 
citizens,” strongly asserting that “from about 1887 to 1920 the employees of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in Oklahoma, the politicians of the state, and the 
non-Indians who lusted after Indian land and minerals were not three different and 
discrete self-interested groups; they were largely the same people.”27  
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 James West, an Oklahoma real estate dealer testifying before a Senate 
committee in 1907, was asked if the Indian understood anything about his 
allotment.  West responded, “No sir; he will part with his land just as readily as he 
will with his money, and he has no more conception of the value of one than of the 
other.”28  Almost two decades later in 1923, S. E. Wallen, BIA Superintendent at 
Muskogee stated in a letter that “within less than ten years 75 or 80 per cent of the 
race [Indian] of land lords, through their own inexperience and lack of appreciation 
of thrift . . . have been transformed into a race of tenants.”29  While the 
complexities and legalities of the allotment process, including rentals, leasing, 
mineral rights, sales, and inheritance issues confounded the inexperienced Indians; 
white speculators and grafters easily navigated these forums.    
 Unwittingly, Congress gnawed away at restrictions, and pushed open the 
door for grafters allowing loopholes, which grafters took advantage of to gain 
control of individual allotments.  On April 21, 1904, Congress passed a measure 
allowing an allotee to bypass the twenty-five year period with approval from the 
Secretary of the Interior by way of a competency certificate.  This effectively 
removed all restrictions against allotments, held by whites and freedmen, with the 
exception of “homesteads” and the allotments of minors.   Over 1.5 million allotted 
acres became available to land hungry whites.30  An act passed in 1905 authorized 
the Department of the Interior to investigate cases of reported fraud.  Ironically, the 
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same act excluded the investigation of leases or rental agreements assigned to court 
ordered guardians.     
The Burke Act of 1906 characterized by Randolph Downes as the 
“offspring” of the Dawes Act of 1887, streamlined and expedited the allotment 
process.  It abolished the twenty-five year trust period completely for all Indians 
except those classified by blood quantum as full bloods.  The Burke Act 
accomplished this by certifying that the allottee was “competent” to understand the 
legal technicalities of land ownership and, theoretically, at least, be able to conduct 
his affairs in a proper manner and retain and develop his allotment.  Full bloods 
having the least familiarity with white ways and often not able to read, write, or 
speak English were considered “incompetent” and the trust status or the 
inalienability of his allotment remained in place.31  In May of 1908, Congress 
enacted a law, nicknamed “the Crime of 1908,” ensuring “the removal of 
restrictions from part of the lands of allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes.”32  The 
“Crime of 1908,” in addition to removing the restrictions from a larger number of 
Indians, also removed jurisdiction of restricted Indian children and minors from 
federal to Oklahoma probate courts.  This measure separated Indian children from 
the protection of the federal government and exposed them to the will of county 
and state courts, courts often “friendly” with grafters and guardians.33     
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A circuit court decision in 1903 further opened the door for grafters to 
exploit Indian land holdings.  It established procedures whereby individuals were 
appointed by the court as legal guardian to Indian minors and children.  Labeled 
incompetent with respect to their own allotments, full bloods also lost control of 
their children’s allotments as well.  Terry Wilson documents a situation in which a 
grafter, appointed as a legal guardian, charged a $1,200 annual fee against his 
ward’s estate valued at $4,000.34    Utilizing many of the same techniques that 
worked so well with incompetent Indian adults, guardians reaped a whirlwind of 
economic gain from Indian children as well.  They negotiated fraudulent lease or 
rental contracts.  One grafter filed with the court and received “at one time the 
custody or guardianship of 161 children.”35  Some of these individual ended up 
controlling thousands of acres of allotted land.  In one case, the grafter controlled 
between 75,000 and 100,000 acres of allotted Indian land.36  The grafter leased out 
most of the land with the Indian allottee often receiving none of the lease income.     
In 1902, Pleasant Porter, the Creek chief, “estimated that [grafters] had 
acquired control of almost one million acres . . . under leases that virtually 
amounted to deeds.”37  With only eight judges and inundated with criminal and 
other types of civil cases, the courts found neither the time nor the resources to 
monitor the activities of almost 12,000 court appointed guardians.  Periodic reports 
required by the court verified the existence of proper lease or rental contracts by 
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guardians.  However, they were not required to submit any type of record as to how 
and to whom rental and lease fees were distributed.  Twenty years later, the Meriam 
Report characterized the Oklahoma probate system as “a flagrant example of the 
white man’s brutal and unscrupulous domination over a weaker race.”38  
During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the oil boom in 
northeastern Oklahoma fueled a particularly insidious chapter in the exploitation of 
the resources of Oklahoma Indians.  The discovery of valuable oil deposits under 
the surface of primarily allotted Osage lands resulted in an unprecedented effort by 
speculators and grafters to gain control, including a reign of terror and murder.  The 
power of these interests extended into congressional hearings for the Thomas-
Rogers Bill in the spring of 1936.  A last minute political compromise exempted 
Osage County from the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, breaking a deadlock that 
otherwise would have spelled political death for the bill.  The Osage were 
permitted to maintain a tribal governmental structure with at least a degree of voice 
in their affairs and resources.  This “uniqueness” of the Osage in contrast to other 
Oklahoma tribes remained an influencing factor in Oklahoma Indian affairs and 
contributed to their exemption from the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act thirty years 
later, in 1936.   
                                                                                                                                                                                
36 Ibid. 1031. 
37 Goble, 78. 
38 Lewis Meriam, ed., The Problem of Indian Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
               Press, 1928), 798.  
 
 
            
  46
In 1906, the year before Oklahoma statehood, the Osage reservation 
underwent allotment.  Each of the 2,229 Osage received 658 acres of land broken 
down into 160 acres for a homestead and 498 acres held as surplus.  Unlike other 
tribes, only the surface land was allotted.  The Osage maintained control over 
subsurface mineral rights.  When a tribal member received an individual allotment 
of surface land, he also received an inheritable “head right” to share communally in 
the tribal profits from any subsurface wealth.   
Almost simultaneously, large deposits of oil were discovered beneath Osage 
land.  A production boom quickly followed to meet the growing demand for oil 
from not only expanding American industries but also the advancement of the 
automobile.  From then until the mid 1920s, Osage fortunes burgeoned due to oil 
royalty checks:   “By 1919, a family of five, for example, was paid about $20,000 
annually.”39   With the discovery of the Burbank oil field in 1920, royalty payments 
increased substantially.  In 1923, the Osage were paid twenty-seven million dollars.  
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, northeastern Oklahoma 
became the scene of unparalleled efforts by grafters to cash in on the Osage's good 
fortune. 
The Osage, possessing neither experience with nor understanding of the 
white economic system, became easy targets for any number of schemers 
attempting to cheat the Indian out of his royalties and his head right.  The most 
extreme case involved a plot masterminded by William K. Hale to systematically 
murder an Indian family in order to obtain an estate already worth one half million 
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dollars, with head rights providing an income of a quarter of a million dollars per 
year.  Hale and his accomplices would eventually be charged with over fifty counts 
of murder engineered in a blood bath termed “the Osage reign of terror.”40  In 1929, 
Osage chief, Fred Lookout, a full blood, lamented, “My people are not happy.  
Some day this oil will give out and there will be no fat checks every few months 
from the great white father.  There will be no more fine motorcars and new clothes.  
Then, I know, my people will be happier.”41   By the early 1930s oil production 
plummeted as wells ran dry.  The bubble burst and for most Osage their wealth 
disappeared almost as quickly as it appeared.  
Over the almost forty year period from the creation of the Dawes 
Commission in 1893 to the Indian New Deal in the mid 1930s, Oklahoma Indians 
experienced a level of exploitation by whites unmatched by any other tribal groups 
in the nation.  Indian land holdings shrank from 15,000,000 acres to 1,500,000, a 
ninety percent reduction.  By 1914, of the original 102,209 enrolled members of the 
Five Civilized Tribes, only 36,000 remained in the restricted category.   
The loss of their land holdings during the period from 1893 to the early 
1930s, banished tribal sovereignty, and a tribal court system replaced by federal  
courts.  Effectively silenced Indian voice in Oklahoma.   Congress facilitated this 
process with the Curtis Act of 1898, the Burke Act of 1906, and the "Crime" of 
1908.  Oklahoma statehood in 1907 drove the final nails in the coffin.     
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Winds of Change 
 
 
 During the 1920s, a new era of reform began in Indian affairs.  Social 
scientists, politicians, bureaucrats, business and commercial interests, “friends of 
the Indians,” idealists, reformers, and Indians themselves would explore, discuss, 
and debate the continuing deteriorating situation of Native Americans.  A wide 
variety of approaches and proposals would be offered as solutions to the “Indian 
problem.”  Oklahoma due to its large Indian population and the number of tribal 
groups came to garner significant attentions from these reformers. 
 An understanding of this era of reform debate is key to understanding the 
origins and legacy of both the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936.  It was during the 1920s that the seeds were 
planted for the Indian New Deal, which represented a dramatic course change for 
federal Indian policy during the 1930s and 1940s.  This chapter examines the 
reform movement during the 1920s.  By focusing in the issues and individuals 
involved with an emphasis on Oklahoma, circumstances leading to the IRA and the 
OIWA and their impact on Oklahoma Indians becomes clearer.   
 Those involved in reform comprised a disparate group with no national 
organization or leadership; many focused only with a specific issue affecting a local 
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tribe or band.  Many had religious roots.  Woman actively engaged in the reform 
movement, primarily through the Central Federation of Women’s Clubs.  Native 
Americans involved themselves in organizations including the Indian Rights 
Association, the American Indian Association, and the Association of Oklahoma 
Indians.  One individual, John Collier, increasingly dominated the Indian reform 
movement in the 1920s and early 1930s.  In 1923, Collier founded the American 
Indian Defense Association, one of the most vocal groups which began lobbying 
for a wide variety of Indian issues across the nation, including Oklahoma. 
 In 1923 as Indian Reformers lengthened their stride, Charles H. Burke, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs assigned the superintendent of the Five Tribes, S. 
E. Wallen, located in Muskogee, to investigate probate affairs in Oklahoma 
involving Indian estates.  Wallen submitted his findings to Burke on December 31, 
1923 and concluded that “bad management and great waste of the estates have been 
the rule; . . . guardians’ and attorneys’ fees are excessive, and in many cases 
unconscionable.”1  Wallen believed that “the care and protection of the interests of 
the Indians is a national duty,” and recommended legislations be passed that would 
give “exclusive supervision and control over the estates and funds of . . . restricted 
Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes” of Oklahoma to the Secretary of the Interior.2  
In effect, this was a call to reverse policies and court decisions dating back to the 
“Crime of 1908.”  Just days before submitting Wallen’s report to Commissioner 
Burke, the Oklahoma Bar Associations published a statement in which the bar, 
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“noted for its many able and outstanding members,” took great steps to distant 
itself from probate practice, which they viewed as “essentially political” and with 
which “the better class of lawyers are seldom found connected.”3  Perhaps they 
sensed a coming storm in Oklahoma Indian affairs. 
 Right on the heels of the Wallen investigation in 1924, a scathing report 
concerning the results of another investigation into Oklahoma’s county probate 
system, with respect to Indian allotments and resources, was published.  The report 
entitled, “Oklahoma’s Poor Rich Indians,” carried the subtitle, “An Orgy of Graft 
and Exploitation of the Five Civilized Tribes—Legalized Robbery.”  The report 
published by the Indian Rights Association (IRA) represented a joint venture 
involving Gertrude Bonnin of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, Charles 
H. Fabens of the American Indian Defense Association, and Matthew K. Sniffen of 
the IRA.  All three were recognized leaders in the Indian reform movement of the 
1920s.   
 The report proved clear and brazen in its accusations.  Focusing on six 
counties in eastern Oklahoma with significant Indian population, the investigators 
examined 14,229 probate cases.  The report charged “the average cost of 
administration [of an Indian probate case] to be twenty percent and in some 
instances [as] high as seventy percent [of the total value of the estate].”4  In other 
areas of the United States, the costs for probating Indian estates “cannot exceed a 
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total of $75.  In most cases the cost is not over $20.”5  One eastern Oklahoma 
attorney, who never once appeared in court, absconded with $35,000 for handling 
one Indian probate case.  The report continues for almost forty pages citing 
example after example of Oklahoma Indians blatantly defrauded from their 
allotments and resource income.  It revealed land speculators, grafters, court 
appointed guardians, lawyers, and judges took unscrupulous advantage of Indians 
time and time again.  For example, in 1918, a Creek, Sina Battiest, die.  She 
miraculously appeared four years later in the Stephens County courthouse as a man 
and in front of two witnesses affixed her/his signature to a lease for her allotment.  
The report concluded, “Thus, it will be seen that the grafters can bring the dead to 
life, and even change her sex!”6  The report blamed the fact that Oklahoma county 
courts had jurisdiction over Indian probate matters.  Since statehood, Congress, 
through several pieces of legislation, beginning with the Act of 1908, the “Crime of 
1908”, and continuing on into the 1920s, “vested exclusive jurisdiction over 
probate matters in the county courts of Oklahoma.”7  This left the Interior 
Department “powerless . . . to protect these Indians from . . . wholesale 
plundering.”8  Some likened the situation in Oklahoma Indian affairs to giving the 
fox the key to the henhouse door. 
 The report contended that the only hope for the remaining 18,000 restricted 
Oklahoma Indians did not lie in reforming the existing system, with probate affairs 
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controlled solely by county courts, but in a restricting of the entire system.  The 
report concluded that, “legislation should be enacted at once giving the Department 
of the Interior as complete control of all Indian property and Indian minors and 
incompetents as constitutional limitations will permit, and this should apply to all 
Indians of Oklahoma.”9  The report urged all “friends of the Indians” to pressure 
their congressmen to secure passage of such a bill.  However, a decade passed 
before Congress considered the type of overhaul the report recommended. 
 Several circumstances fed the deteriorating situation of Oklahoma Indians 
which the 1924 report exposed.  The prevailing assimilationist ideology fused a 
paternalistic attitude on the part of whites towards the need for Native Americans to 
be incorporated into American society at a position somewhat below whites10  
Compounding the situation was the inability of native Americans to operate from a 
position of unity.  Most tribal groups were factionalized into a number of strongly 
held view points and perspectives that seemed to defy attempts at forming 
workable coalitions which would permit a stronger influence in their own affairs.  
Factionalized tribal groups lacking unity found it difficult to challenge a variety of 
white economic and political interests united under the banner of assimilation.  The 
void between traditional and progressives remained universal among most tribal 
groups.  Many Indians did not possess the skills or experience to maneuver in white 
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dominated social and political structures.  Whites owned and controlled the playing 
field and continued to successfully promote their interests and dominate the 
Indians.  Indian affairs in Oklahoma during this time period reflected these 
circumstances.  
The charges outlined in the IRA’s report produced an angry storm of protest 
and accusations from all sides involved in the issue.  The loudest voices came from 
the Oklahoma congressional delegation.  In late 1924 and early 1925, the House 
Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings in Oklahoma to investigate the charges 
made by the IRA report.  In effect, congressional investigations belittled the 
various charges.  The committee included Oklahoma Congressman William 
Hastings remained united in its defense of the individuals within the probate system 
of Oklahoma.  The congressional report accused the IRA of “sensationalizing” a 
small handful of county attorneys and court appointed guardians.11  The committee 
stated “. . .the principle author [Matthew K. Sniffen] has evidently acted on the 
belief that it was necessary for him to make sensational statements about the 
wrongs suffered by Indians in order to justify his position which he holds in that 
association [IRA].”12  Finally, the commit concluded, “the wholesale charges made 
against the judges, attorneys, business and professional men of Oklahoma are not 
sustained by any evidence, and are libelous in their character.”13 
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The committee condemned “unconscionable attorneys and persons who 
make it a profession to obtain appointments as guardian.”14  It also recognized 
deficiencies within the Burke Act of 1906 and subsequent legislation by stating 
there existed “ . . . much uncertainty in the law relative to the jurisdiction of the 
administration of the affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes . . .”15  The report also 
proposed legislation to correct deficiencies in these earlier laws.  In effect, the 
committee found “problems” with the administrative system as it was structured, 
but not with the individuals at federal and state levels who operated the system. 
This caustic refutation of the IRA’s original accusations brought about an 
equally vehement rebuttal by the IRA.  In a pamphlet titled, “Out of Thine Own 
Mouth,” the IRA called the congressional investigation a “whitewash.”  It further 
stated that the committee published its report before “all the available evidence had 
been heard and considered.”16  Finally the report laid a large portion of the blame 
on Congress decrying, “THIS IS AS SEVERE AN INDICTMENT OF 
CONGRESS BY THE COMMITTEE AS ANYTHING SAID IN OUR REPORT 
[sic], for that authority [probate matters in the hands of county courts] was granted 
by Congress.”17  Several Oklahoma newspapers jumped on board.  The Tulsa 
World boldly stated, “The Committee all but called liars of everyone who intimated 
that conditions in some Probate Courts have been bad.  It gave the courts a clean 
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bill of health and departed.”18  The Bartlesville Examiner declared, “Indian affairs 
are in the limelight, and no amount of whitewashing will end the persistent charges 
made against certain Oklahomans.”19  Finally, the Muskogee News exclaimed, “Is it 
not to be wondered at that citizens of other States express doubt that Oklahomans 
have any sense of justice.”20  This intense public furor subsided in a short period of 
time, but reformers maintained continued agitation.  A sustained effort to remove 
restrictions from full bloods and those Indians declared legally incompetent 
continued through the 1920s and into the early 1930s, until the appointment of John 
Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  By the late 1920s, the amount of 
allotted land in Oklahoma diminished considerably.  Yet a sizeable number of both 
progressive mixed-bloods and whites with interests continued to push for an easing 
of restrictions, so more Indian land and resources could be opened for sale and 
exploitation.  
The passing of a measure tied to an appropriation bill in 1928 marked the 
beginning of a turning point in Indian affairs in Oklahoma.  This provision changed 
the superintendent of the Five Tribes based in Muskogee from a political 
appointment to a merit position, falling under the civil service.  This removed under 
influence from the spoils system and at the same time placed more direct control 
with the Commissioner and the Secretary of the Interior. 
In 1928, Herbert Hoover was elected President.  Hoover appointed Charles 
J. Rhodes as Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Joseph Scattergood as his 
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assistant.  These wealthy philanthropists were expected to usher in an era of reform 
of the federal government’s handling of Indian affairs.  Rhoads had served as 
president of the Indian Rights Association.  Benay Blend characterized the 
commissionership of Rhoads and Henry Scattergood as “committed to 
humanitarian programs, but incapable of altering Indian affairs, they lacked the 
political muscle to push legislation through Congress.”21  Many believed that if 
anyone could bring significant reform to the conduct of Indian affairs, it would be 
Rhoads and Scattergood.  Conservative, hard-line assimilationists and proponents 
of the allotment of Indian lands, both in Congress and in the Indian Bureau, 
blocked the way to effect substantive change.  Appropriations for Indian affairs 
increased during the Hoover administration, but the onset of the Great Depression 
and its impact on Native Americans, as well as the rest of the country, soon negated 
much of the effect of increased appropriations.  Rhoads and Scattergood were 
successful in bringing a greater degree of professionalism to the Bureau, as well 
increased diplomatic relations with the Indians themselves.22Other factors would 
mitigate their effectiveness in substantially altering the path of Indian affairs.   
During the 1920s, the most notable event in Indian affairs remains the 
publishing of the Meriam Report in 1928.  Hubert Work, the Secretary of the 
Interior under Calvin Coolidge commissioned the Brookings Institute to perform an 
independent investigation of the conduct of federal Indian affairs.  Their findings 
formally published in The Problem of Indian Administration in February of 1928, 
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examined eight areas including “policy; health; education; economic conditions; 
family and community life; the activities of women; migration; legal aspects; and 
missionary activities.”23  This report revealed the allotment policy had failed and 
that the Indian Bureau addressed virtually no areas of the lives of Native 
Americans. 
The Meriam Report devoted considerable attention to Oklahoma Indians.  
The report declares, “The exploitation of Indians in Oklahoma has been 
notorious.”24  Speaking of federal legislation directed specifically towards 
Oklahoma Indians, the report attests, “In some instances acts of Congress have 
resulted in the wholesale exploitation of the Indians.”25  This assertion is a direct 
reference to the Act of 1908, aka “the Crime of 1908,” which among other things 
transferred jurisdiction for probate matters involving Indian lands in Oklahoma 
from the Department of the Interior to Oklahoma county courts.  Continuing to 
chastise state politicians, the report stated, “Oklahoma, which has evidenced a great 
desire to get control or possession of Indian property, has evidenced little tendency 
to protect the Indians or provide requisite developmental work.”26  The report 
continued, “The present “guardian system” in operation among the Five Civilized 
Tribes has caused much well founded complaint . . . effort should be made to 
abolish the guardian system and place the administration of Indian property and 
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income in the hands of thoroughly competent national government officers.”27  
Finally, the Meriam report referenced the deteriorating condition of many of the 
Five Tribe members who had become impoverished since Oklahoma statehood, 
through the loss of their land and resources; “They are in a forlorn condition, 
neglected both by the national government and by the state.”28  The report 
continued, “The national government should oppose the removal of restrictions 
until the state of Oklahoma has shown as much interest in the social welfare of its 
Indians as it has shown in securing control of their property.”29 
The Meriam Report sparked ongoing congressional hearings in the latter 
part of the 1920s and into the early 1930s.  These hearings, conducted by both the 
House and Senate committees on Indian Affairs, investigated the conditions of 
Indians by geographical area.  Considerable time was spent in looking into the 
situation of Oklahoma Indians, both the Five Tribes in eastern Oklahoma, as well 
as the former plains Indians in the western part of the state.  The results showed 
depressed and deplorable circumstances in a number of areas, including general 
living conditions, health, education, and the administration of Indian policy.  
Oklahoma Indians found themselves in dire straits as the Depression set in during 
the early 1930s.   
General living conditions seemed to be poor and declining in the 1930s.  V. 
M. Locke, a former principal chief of the Choctaw spoke of living conditions 
among the Choctaw and stated, “Their living conditions are the worst I ever saw.  
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No colored persons of the most poverty stricken type could be in worse 
condition.”30  For three years, Oklahoma experienced a severe drought.  Speaking 
of the financial condition of many Indian farmers, Jim McCurtain, a Chickasaw 
testified, “We full-bloods . . . have had several years of crop failure, and especially 
this year [1930] it has all been burned up and nothing made . . .”31  Conditions for 
many Indians for the coming winter looked bleak as well.  A. L. Irvine, a Bureau 
field clerk from Idabel, stated, “It looks to me about 00 [Indian families]; pretty 
nearly all of them are going to have a pretty hard time to get through the winter.”32  
Speaking of the desperate conditions many Indians faced, one witness testified, 
“Many of your Choctaws over there don’t eat but once or twice and the meal is 
corn bread and water.”33  Their situation had been escalating for decades as they 
lost their allotment and resources through all manner of swindle and effort by white 
business interests, grafters, and a government unresponsive to their interests.  The 
Great Depression and the Dust Bowl exacerbated the deteriorating condition of 
Oklahoma Indians.   
During these hearings, several Indian leaders made recommendations that 
tribal monies being held by the Department of the Interior be released in the form 
of per capita payments as a form of immediate relief.  W. A. Durant, a Choctaw 
from Oklahoma City, advocated that 306,230 acres of unleashed coal and asphalt 
deposits be sold at the appraised value [determined by the Interior Department] of 
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$9,5,786.29.34  The funds received by the tribe would be distributed to the members 
on a per capita basis.  Durant also suggested the tribes be allowed to borrow from 
the federal government using their land holdings as collateral to the amount that 
would allow an immediate relief payment on a per capita basis of $200.  This 
amounted to a little over $5,000,000 against holdings valued at over $23,000,000.  
These recommendations made to the investigating committees were never carried 
out.  However, they demonstrated the extreme measures tribal leaders sometimes 
embraced in order to receive some form of aid for their suffering tribal members.35  
The condition of Oklahoma Indians had become desperate.   
Poor health conditions among Oklahoma Indians prevailed as the rule rather 
than the exception.  A Creek, when questioned about the health condition of the 
Indians stated, “The health conditions have been poor for 20 years. . . .There is 
tuberculosis;” and when asked if it was increasing, responded, “Yes, sir.”36    about 
50 percent of the children or more are afflicted with trachoma.”   Additionally, 
Laphan stated that eleven out of 123 students had confirmed cases of contagious 
and usually fatal tuberculosis.37  Most Oklahoma Indians could not afford even 
minimal medical care and many Indians lived in remote areas far from the few 
doctors, clinics, or hospitals that might serve the area.   
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The Senate investigation closely examined Indian education.  William 
Tidwell, a county judge from Idabel, testifying before the Senate committee, 
estimated that “between 25 and 50 percent “ of Indian children did not attend 
school, compared to, only about “10 percent” of white children who did not 
attend.38  D. H. Johnston, governor of the Chickasaw nation, attributed the high 
dropout rate among Indians to the fact that Indian children represented a minority, 
“Everything is for the majority.  Consequently the Indian children get dissatisfied 
and they quit after they get up to 12 or 13 years old.”39  Many of these Indian 
children spoke little if any English, most having only a minimal understanding of 
white society and culture.  Some spoke of more piratical reasons for Indian children 
not attending school, including living too far from school, undernourishment, and 
parents that were “. . . so poor they cannot provide clothing and necessaries with 
which to attend school.”40  Johnston confirmed what many other Oklahoma Indians 
knew and had experienced that “ . . .the financial difficulty [of their parents] bars 
most of them from an education.”41 
While Oklahoma Indian children benefited little from such education, 
almost all Indian leaders recognized the need for education efforts to continue.  
Will Durant decried, “We recognize our tribal schools as having been the most 
beneficial influence in our tribal life. . . .We favor and recommend the policy of 
placing our children in the public schools, where they will mingle with and become 
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accustomed to the ways of other children.”42  Another Choctaw, A. P. Matthews 
saw that “the greater portion of the full blood Indians are clearly at a disadvantage 
when dealing with the white people.  Time, experience, and education will finally 
remove this disadvantage.”43  Forbes Cravat, a Chickasaw leader from Pontotoc 
county, pleaded with the committee stating, “If you want to save us, take our 
children and try to educate them better.”44  Choctaw principal chief, Ben Dwight, 
strongly urged governmental assistance so children could be equipped with, “. . . 
suitable and sufficient clothes and books and such other school supplies as are 
useful to enable them to attend the school and feel themselves on equality with 
other children attending the school.45 
Many criticized the administration of federal Indian policy.  Durant 
believed that while, “The majority of the acts of Congress have been favorable to 
the Indians . . .it is the execution of the policies of the Government I object to . . 
.”46  Grady Lewis, a Choctaw tribal attorney, singled out a particular Bureau field 
agent as representative of many and said of him, “He does not have any 
sympathetic understanding of the [Indian] people.  He deals with them in terms of 
320 acres of land and $500 in cash rather than with human beings . . .”47  A table of 
delinquent royalty payments by the Department of the Interior for Choctaw and 
Chickasaw coal leases totaled $20,748.28 and included payments from as far back 
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as 1921.48  Because of poor inter-office communications, an agent from the BIA 
office in Muskogee was often unable to tell how much money the government was 
holding in trust for a specific Indian.  A medical field agent at the Muskogee when 
asked whether tubercular cases in the preceding three years had increased or 
decreased stated, “It is mighty hard for me to say.  It would not be anything but a 
guess.”49  County judge William Tidwell testified that the system for sending 
royalty checks for an Indian to his guardian should be stopped as, “If you let an 
Indian guardian get hold of the money, they spend it.”50  These testimonies point to 
an unresponsive Bureau in which the head did not know what the tail was doing. 
Noted Oklahoma Indian historian Muriel Wright, a Choctaw and 
contemporary of Angie Debo, examined the conduct of Indian affairs in eastern 
Oklahoma in the late 1920s.  She characterized the BIA in Oklahoma as led by a 
political appointee in Muskogee, but staffed by civil service employees that 
“whether they be white men or Indians, when they take a position in the bureau, 
they lost their identity as individuals and become a part of the great machine.”51  
The BIA had the power to “make arbitrary rulings for the administration of law 
passed by Congress.” And “. . . its present policies are in many instances obsolete.”  
Wright spoke of tribal leaders holding “. . . their positions through the patronage 
system of the party in power in Washington, largely in the hands of the senators 
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from Oklahoma, approved by the bureau, and appointed by the president.”52  
Wright alluded strongly to a bureaucratic monolith greased by politics and not 
responsive to the Indians it was created to serve, but to the government politicians 
and bureaucrats who maintained it.  
The intermingling of Indians and whites contributed another factor affecting 
the conditions of Oklahoma Indians during the tough years of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s.  Though intermingled, these two groups were far from assimilated.  
For decades, whites intermingled with the Indians.  Indian land holdings lay 
checker boarded with white holdings.  Restricted Indian land holdings were exempt 
from state and local taxes.  Government services such as roads, passed over both 
Indian and white land, though only the white land was taxed to support such 
services.  Public schools provided another government service that included many 
Indian children.  While the federal government paid the state twelve cents per day 
for each Indian public school student, white educational administrators complained 
that this in no way covered the complete cost, and white taxpayers were forced to 
make up the difference.  In 1933, Oklahoma county administrators estimated “the 
tax loss to the Oklahoma counties, plus expenditures on behalf of the Indians, is 
more than $2,280,000.”53  As the depression wore on, Oklahoma became more and 
more cash strapped.  Local leaders viewed Indians as wards of the federal 
government and not the responsibility of state or local governments, a view which 
contributed to an already acute situation among most Oklahoma Indians.  Virtually 
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no state or social welfare services became available to Indians.  As it became 
increasingly difficult for local governments to function as the depression worsened, 
local government resorted to using the long accepted policy of placing Indian 
affairs strictly under the domain of the federal government to their advantage, 
thereby saving their limited resources for taxpaying white citizens.   
All that transpired during the 1920s with respect to Indian affairs in 
Oklahoma informed conclusions.  The allotment policy failed, destructive to 
Oklahoma Indians.  They lost ninety percent of their land holdings, with tribal 
governments ostensibly abolished,  Indian culture endangered, and the overall 
conditions of Oklahoma Indians deteriorated to dangerously low levels.  The BIA 
proved unable to administer effectively or in the best interests of Oklahoma 
Indians.  An assimilationist perspective fused with condescending paternalism 
pervaded white relations with their Indian neighbors.  The Oklahoma congressional 
delegation, BIA administrators, as well as state and local officials were steeped in 
this paternal outlook.   These attitudes helped to promote an open season on Indian 
land and resources, which remained relatively unchecked particularly in the Five 
Tribes area of eastern Oklahoma.  Oklahoma Indians were not in a position to 
bargain from a position of strength.  Ongoing congressional investigations, the 
work of reform organizations such as the Indian Rights Association, and the 
Meriam Report presented a clear picture of the plight of Oklahoma Indians during 
the 1920s, but fell short of effecting legislation or substantive change in Indian 
affairs to remedy the situation.  As the decade ended, the depression continued to 
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lambaste Oklahoma and rendered an already desperate situation among Oklahoma 
Indians even more critical.   
The presidential election of 1932 constituted a turning point for Oklahoma 
Indians.  They directed much of their frustration and anger over their deteriorating 
situation towards the federal government and in particular, the BIA.  Many 
Oklahoma Indians feeling the Bureau abandoned them became “convinced that 
politics was the source of their problems, decided that political action was the only 
way to solve them.”54  An Oklahoma Pottawatomie captured the feeling of 
Oklahoma Indian on the eve of the 1932 election when he said, “Because 
Republicans believe in depression, the Indians are praying for a Democratic 
administration.”55  Over ninety percent of the state’s Indians who voted cast their 
ballot for Roosevelt in the 1932 election.56  With their overwhelming electoral 
victory, Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrat majority in Congress held center 
stage commissioned to prove themselves to the economically depressed, socially 
marginalized, and highly skeptical Oklahoma Indians.  Like most Native 
Americans, Oklahoma Indians needed relief not only from the effects of the 
Depression, but from their position at the bottom rung of American society.   
The election of 1932 remains a watershed event in twentieth century 
American history, nowhere more evident than with Oklahoma Indian history.  The 
Depression exacerbated an already poor economic situation, making poverty and 
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food shortages a constant companion for many Oklahoma Indians.  By 1933, the 
annual per capita income of members of the Five Tribes was $47.00.  The majority 
of Oklahoma Indians lost their allotments and were landless.  Members of the Five 
Tribes had originally received 110,000 allotments.  However, by 1933, 72,000 
members owned no land at all.  With the easing of restrictions many Indians who 
already struggled to hold on to their land now became subject to state taxes, and 
property taxes that most could ill afford.  Some landless Indians squatted on public 
land while many crowded onto small allotments of relatives, rendering them 
incapable of supporting even a subsistence existence.  With hunger or starvation 
not far from the door, many depended on meager handouts from kin or tribal 
members.57  Many Oklahoma Indians mirrored the feelings of Curt Holtin who 
stated to Senator Elmer Thomas in a letter in late 1931, “Personally I have very 
little confidence in Mr. Hoover as far as the common people are concerned.”58   
Senator Elmer Thomas appeared to have been a “good ole boy” 
conservative Oklahoma Democrat intent on retaining his senatorial role and life in 
Washington, where he eventually retired and died.  Thomas was often found at the 
forefront of debates and legislative struggles involving federal dollars or assistance 
for Oklahoma.  He became involved in politics during the 1896 election when he 
stumped for William Jennings Bryan.  During the Depression years, Thomas 
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grounded in populism, constantly promoted raising commodity prices for 
agricultural products and an inflated money supply as the answers to the economic 
woes of Oklahoma farmers.  During his years in the Senate, Thomas spent 
considerable time and effort in educating himself on the money issue.  Many in 
government and in banking circles considered him somewhat of an authority on the 
issue.  Thomas apparently took great pride in this recognition.  It is interesting to 
note that during his long senatorial career, Thomas served on agricultural, Indian 
affairs, and banking committees.  From the standpoint of this study, Thomas 
remains a key player in the course of both the IRA and the OIWA.  At the end of 
his career in the early 1950s, Thomas wrote two books an unpublished 
autobiography, Forty Years a Legislator and Financial Engineering. Outside of one 
bill Thomas introduced in 1923, there is absolutely no mention of his role in Indian 
affairs.  Perhaps this omission reflects a lack of importance Thomas placed on this 
chapter of his public career.   
Senator Thomas’s assimilationist thinking underscored his views on Indian 
affairs and legislative proposals such as the IRA and the OIWA.  Thomas emulated 
the nineteenth century role as a “friend of the Indian.”  He viewed Oklahoma 
Indians as unique to other tribes across the nation, believing that Oklahoma Indians 
were further along the road to civilization.  Thomas often made statements to the 
effect that Oklahoma Indians were not reservation Indians and should not be 
grouped with tribal groups in the West and southwest.  Thomas’s actions with 
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respect to the legislative battle surrounding both the IRA and the OIWA, often 
reflected this viewpoint.   
Early in his congressional career, Thomas honed legislative skills required 
to push legislation through Congress.  Fighting a seemingly uphill battle against a 
Republican controlled Congress, he was able to obtain appropriations to build two 
fish hatcheries in Medicine Park, the community he had established in 1904 along 
with approval for two retention ponds to provide water to a growing and thirsty 
nearby Lawton.  Thomas was even able to obtain labor from federal prisons in 
McAlester and Anadarko to build the necessary roads and dams in the area.  Like 
many politicians of the era, he was not opposed to pork barreling to keep his 
constituents happy and supportive. 
From 1929 to Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933, Senator Thomas like many 
other legislators found it difficult to secure relief for Oklahomans from a laissez-
faire administration controlling the executive branch.  Herbert Hoover, a fiscal 
conservative, appeared to have been almost totally unprepared for the severity of 
the economic depression that commenced in 1929.  Hoover believed that economic 
recovery was dependent on an uninhibited business and manufacturing community.  
In 1931, Hoover stated, “Nothing can be gained in the recovery of employment by 
detouring capital away from industry and commerce into the treasury of the United 
States, either by taxes or loans.”59  With respect to aid to individual citizens during 
this time, he found the idea of government aid, or doles, abhorrent.  Hoover 
determined the role of aid to the poor belonged with churches and private charities 
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not the government.  Unable to provide assistance early in 1931, the Indian Bureau 
appealed to the Red Cross for aid (food, shelter, clothing, and medical care) for 
almost 10,000 Indians in eastern Oklahoma who did not own land and therefore not 
considered the responsibility of the federal government.60  In August of 1931, 
Senator Thomas complained that although Oklahoma contained over one third of 
the Indian population in the United States, only $3,000,000 of the $28,000,000 
appropriated for Indian affairs was earmarked for Oklahoma.61  By 1932, Senator 
Thomas himself was discouraged with the lack of response by the Hoover 
administration, clearly demonstrated when he told Frank Davis, a Creek, “It is 
impossible to get much help under the present administration. . . . I am in hopes 
that March, 1933 will see a change in administration and . . . then we can look 
forward to helping the Indians.”62  Between 1929 and 1933, the federal government 
allocated only $817,968 for emergency relief measures across the state of 
Oklahoma, with the vast majority going to whites.63  Frank Mauhuchu, a Choctaw, 
wrote Elmer Thomas and spoke of Oklahoma Indians being in a “suffering 
condition.”  He further stated, “We have been to the county and elsewhere for help 
and they refuse to help us because we are Indians they told us to go to the [federal] 
govt. [sic] for support.”64   
Oklahoma Indians directed much of their frustration and anger towards the 
federal government and the Indian Bureau in particular.  Many Oklahoma Indians 
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“convinced that politics was the source of their problems, decided that political 
action was the only way to solve them.”65  Zack Miller, owner of the 101 Ranch, 
wrote to Senator Thomas in the spring of 1932 and stated that the Indian 
Association of Oklahoma would be in the position to “deliver not less than one 
hundred thousand Oklahoma votes . . . [to] the party that will promise to deliver the 
best service to the Indians of this state.66  Over ninety percent of the state’s eligible 
Indian voters cast their ballots for Roosevelt in the 1932 election.67  Franklin 
Roosevelt and an overwhelming Democrat majority in Congress now held center 
stage confronting the opportunity to prove themselves to the economically 
depressed and highly skeptical Oklahoma Indians.   
Many Oklahoma Indians took a keen interest in Roosevelt’s selection of the 
next Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  The Choctaw Chickasaw League endorsed 
Gabe Parker, a Choctaw and former superintendent of the Five Tribes.  In response 
to their endorsement, Parker stated, “I will not seek the appointment unless the 
Indians of Oklahoma are united behind me.”68  With this statement, Parker touched 
on an ongoing obstacle Oklahoma Indians faced as they attempted to make their 
presence felt in all levels of the political system.  A strong effective Indian voice in 
politics was diluted, often to the point of “inaudibility” due to factionalism within 
and among tribal units.  In this situation, a small group or handful of individuals 
often offered little political effort or strength to promote and sell their favorite son.  
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This situation points to either a lack of understanding on the part of the Indians to 
effectively maneuver through the American political system or adherence to deeply 
ingrained principles within indigenous social and political systems. 
Oklahoma Indians supported a wide variety of candidates for the 
commissionership.  In February, fifty Ottowa met in Miami to form a tribal 
government that represented viewpoints and desires of all Ottowa.  This group 
endorsed former Oklahoma congressman, E. B. Howard, a white, for Indian 
commissioner.  The Osage tribal council endorsed Thomas J. Leahy.  The Creek 
nation waffled between supporting Gabe Parker or Edgar B. Merritt, a white 
congressman from Missouri.  A mixed group of over 400 Indians meeting in 
Oklahoma City split over support for A. F. Snyder, a Pawnee, or E. B. Howard, a 
white.  Several members of the Oklahoma congressional delegation such as 
William Hastings, a Choctaw, and Wesley Disney kept their fingers on the pulse of 
Indian support for the commissioner’s appointment, but argued that, “Oklahoma 
[remains] too divided over a group of favorite sons and cannot rally enough support 
for anyone individual.”69  
On February 8, 1933, Utah Senator William H. King delivered a speech on 
the Senate floor in support of John Collier’s nomination as the new Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs.  Direct his comments to President-elect Roosevelt, King 
counseled, “We suggest that your administration represents almost a last chance for 
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the Indians.”70  Senator King also referenced a petition, signed by over six hundred 
prominent educators, social workers, and reform minded citizens, sent to President-
elect Roosevelt.  This petition begged Roosevelt to employ careful consideration in 
his choice for Commissioner of Indian Affairs stating, “If there are any 
appointments in the Government service which deserve to be lifted above the 
political considerations, the appointments to the Indian Bureau are such.71   
Members of the Oklahoma and Missouri congressional delegations exerted 
a degree of political wrangling and maneuvering in promoting their “favorite sons” 
for the position of Indian Commissioner.  Oklahoma Senator Elmer Thomas 
opposed Collier’s nomination as commissioner in lieu of political ally, Edgar B. 
Merritt of Missouri.  The Senate majority leader, Joseph T. Robertson from 
Arkansas, also pushed Merritt’s name with President-elect Roosevelt.  However, 
Harold Ickes, the new Secretary of the Interior sold Roosevelt on John Collier as 
his choice for Indian Commissioner.  In speaking of Collier Ickes said, “John 
Collier, with whatever faults of temperament he may have, has to a higher degree 
than anyone available for that office, the point of view towards the Indian that I 
want in the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.”72  Thomas vowed to do all in his 
power to block Collier’s appointment to the post and promised to “oppose his 
confirmation” in the Senate.73  Roosevelt told Senator Robertson, “Well you see 
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Joe, every highbrow organization [reform] in the country is opposed to Merritt, and 
Secretary Ickes, under whom he would have to work doesn’t want him.74  
Disappointing the politicians, Roosevelt chose John Collier, the most vociferous of 
past Indian policy and the Indian Bureau.  Senator Thomas, a consummate 
politician, apparently tested the political winds and grudgingly swung his support 
to Collier during the confirmation vote.  He later explained he felt “continued 
opposition was futile and that he had to work with the new commissioner in the 
future.”75   
John Collier the product of a genteel Georgian family, was raised in “a 
constant atmosphere of ‘public work,’ underscored by the social pressure of 
“nobles oblige.”76 His father served as mayor of Atlanta, Georgia.  Both his parents 
died tragically in Collier’s youth, his mother from addiction to a painkiller and his 
grieving father from suicide three years later in 1900.  Collier entered Columbia 
University in 1902 and soon became an idealist exploring socialism, social 
Darwinism, and psychology.  While at Columbia, Collier met Lucy Crozier who 
introduced him to New York City’s salon life and ultimately social reformation 
through social work.   
In 1908, Collier became associated with the People’s Institute; a progressive 
organization dedicated to helping immigrants build a sense of community in 
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Manhattan neighborhoods.  Over the next eleven years, Collier converted to the 
principles of social engineering by exploring and testing a wide variety of 
progressive, utopian, and sometimes socialistic ideals in the community laboratory 
of cosmopolitan New York City.  During these years, Collier threw himself 
wholeheartedly into his endeavors, growing in knowledge and experience, which 
aided him in later years.  
Collier left New York in late 1919 and moved to the Los Angeles area 
where he accepted a position with the state’s adult education commission.  There 
he focused his attention on immigrant groups.  However, Collier  soon found 
himself under suspicion and investigation by the Justice Department over 
comments he made in several classes concerning the Russian Revolution.  The Red 
Scare was intensifying in 1920 and Collier found his salary cut from the state 
budget.  Collier resigned his position and left California with his family for an 
extended trip into the Mexican wilderness to reorient himself.77   
At this time, Providence took a hand in Collier’s life as he and his family 
diverted from their Mexican destination to Taos, New Mexico.  In December of 
1921, Mabel Dodge, a wealthy New Yorker and former associate Collier knew 
invited him to Taos.  Through letters and telegrams, Dodge lured Collier “repeating 
her stories of the magical habitation there of six hundred magical Indians.”78  
Collier quickly immersed himself into the cultural and religious life of the Pueblos.  
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He believed the Pueblo “were still the possessors and users of the fundamental 
secret of human life—the secret of building great personality through the 
instrumentality of social institutions.”79  Collier’s faith in the principle of 
community as a building block to effect positive social change germinated in New 
York and evolved in Taos.  Over the next nine months, Collier and his family 
stayed in Taos and with the Pueblos.  They believed the cultural survival of these 
tribes were keys to their successful endurance as a people.  They also believed 
Euro-American civilization would spell their eventual doom.  Indian culture had 
much to offer in Collier’s judgment for “modern” white civilization, but at the 
same time needed protection from the danger of being sacrificed in the path of 
white progress.  Collier believed,  
These tiny communities [pueblos] of the red men, archaic, steeped in a not- 
rational world view of magic and animism . . . might live on, that they  
might use the devices of modern economic life, and pragmatically take over 
the concepts of modern science, and yet might keep their strange past of  
theirs. . . . And if the Pueblos lived on, could white civilization acquire any- 
thing from them?80 
 
 It was during this time period that Collier formulated basic understandings 
and beliefs about Native Americans that shaped his thinking over the remainder of 
his life.  E. A. Schwartz argued that “Collier’s depiction of his Taos experience was 
more drama than fact.”81  Granted, Collier was dramatic.  This is demonstrated in  
much of his writings throughout his career.  However, Collier’s “The Red Atlantis” 
contains the embryonic thoughts that become important planks in the Indian New 
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Deal within the next decade.  Collier focused on the failure of allotment and the 
dissolution of tribal governments, stating “Today the non-citizen Indians are 
“wards” of Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. . . . The guiding policy 
down to the present has been to deprive the Indian of his land and trample out his 
community [tribal] life.” Secondly, “the dwindled reservations . . . must be 
conserved,” and “some form of cooperative land holding” must be established.  
Finally, Collier explained, “the Pueblos as agricultural and industrial communities 
must be given advantages equal to . . . those claimed by white farming communities 
all over the country.”82  These proposals evolved into the push for tribal 
organization, the end of allotment, the consolidation and enhancement of tribal land 
holdings, and economic programs and cooperatives. 
 Collier left Taos in the early fall of 1921 to accept a teaching position at San 
Francisco State College.  He spent considerable time talking with anthropologists, 
Bureau officials, and reading “every report by each successive Indian 
Commissioner since 1852.”83  Collier taught one year before being drawn fully into 
the Indian reform movement.  He quickly became allied with Stella Atwood and 
the General Federation of Women’s Clubs.  Their first battle focused on the 
Bursom Bill, introduced in July of 1922.  Aimed at settling the ongoing feud over 
land claims between the Pueblos and white squatters, the bill favored the latter.  
They were opposed by Warren Harding’s Secretary of the Interior, Albert B. Fall 
and the influential Arizona Senator, Dennis Chavez.  By August, Collier, Atwood, 
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and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs waged a sophisticated media 
campaign against the bill.  Collier was soon thrust to the head of this complex 
factional group of reformers.  He published an article in Sunset Magazine in 
November of 1922 and became a regular contributor over the next year.  A letters 
to the editor campaign was directed at newspapers all across the nation.  Collier and 
Atwood both testified before congressional hearings.  Their efforts were successful 
and in the spring of 1923, the proposed Bursom Bill died in committee, much to the 
chagrin of Secretary Fall and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Charles H. Burke. 
 In 1923, John Collier formed the American Indian Defense Association 
(AIDA).  Collier served as the executive secretary for the next decade.  Collier 
moved to Washington, serving as a lobbyist for Indian reform.  During these years, 
the underlying ideology of the Indian New Deal evolved.  The basic tenants 
included preservation of Indian civilization and culture, promotion of Indian arts 
and crafts, opposition to the government’s long practiced allotment policy, freedom 
for Native Americans to practice indigenous religious beliefs, self-government, and 
a type of credit system to provide capital for economic development.  Years later in 
writing his memoirs, Collier claimed that by 1922, he had “formulated ideas to end 
allotment and that by 1924, what was to become the Indian New Deal had become 
rather thoroughly formulated.”84  Some accused Collier of promoting a form of 
assimilation wrapped in another package.  However, Collier claimed be promoted, 
“Assimilation, not into our culture but into modern life, and preservation and 
intensification of heritage are not hostile choices, excluding one another, but are 
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interdependent through and through.”85  Collier formulated a line of thinking which 
can be traced back to progressivism, and dubbed “the tribal alternative,” by Graham 
Taylor.86  This multicultural approach would bring Native Americans into full 
political and economic participation in white society while maintaining their 
indigenous cultural heritage.   
 Historians, Lawrence Kelly and Kenneth Philp studied extensively on the 
pre-New Deal era of John Collier’s life.  Both presented an extremely complex 
individual.  There is the idealistic reformer motivated by a belief in the goodness 
and purity of Indian culture, religion, and philosophy.  The public person, the John 
Collier most people knew, confronted the status quo and initiated fundamental 
change in Indian affairs.  Many became inspired with his unwavering zeal.  On the 
other hand, both scholars presented a private man sometimes troubled with doubt 
who often escaped the pressure of public life with retreats into the solitude of 
nature from which he emerged refreshed, determined, and ready to resume battle.  
Both breathed life into this important historical figure in contemporary Indian 
affairs.  They both correctly presented the decade of the 1920s as an important 
antecedent for the Indian New Deal of the 1930s.  Randolph C. Downes 
characterized much of the Indian reform efforts of the 1920s as “muckraking 
journalism, pressure group politics, and governmental investigations,” which 
served as a means of education and as the “impetus for change” in Indian affairs in 
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the 1930s with the New Deal.87  With Collier’s confirmation as Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, the stage was set for the ideas of reformers to now reach fruition.  
What resulted was a fascinating struggle of reform ideas in conflict with political 
reality, resulting often in expected outcomes.  This study will examine many of 
those outcomes as they influence Oklahoma Indians through the Oklahoma Indian 
Welfare Act of 1936. 
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                Chapter 4 
 
         The Indian New Deal 
 
John Collier was sworn in as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on April 
21, 1933.  On that date, he issued a press release which gave a glimpse into the new 
philosophy that would now guide the Indian Bureau.  Collier spoke of the need not 
only for increased expenditures to expand a number of programs designed to aid 
impoverished Native Americans but also for a reorganization of the Indian Service.  
Collier stated, “I strongly believe that the responsibility of the United States, as 
guardians of the Indians, ought to be continued.,” [but] . . . “In the long run, the 
Indians must be their own savers and their own helpers.”  “It means decreasing the 
paternalism of the Government and extending civil rights and the facilities of 
modern business enterprise to the Indians.”1  Collier envisioned the day when, “The 
Indian Bureau becomes a counselor rather than the responsible agent.”2 
Collier brought a new perspective on Indians and Indian affairs to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs along with four basic objectives he hoped to promote.   
These objectives included the rebuilding of Indian tribal societies, enlarging and 
rehabilitating Indian land holdings, fostering Indian self-government, and 
preserving and promoting of Indian culture.3   The ideology of forced assimilation 
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of the Native American into white society served as the bedrock of Indian affairs 
for two generations.  John Collier’s Indian New Deal introduced a new ideology 
with progressive origins.  Graham Taylor termed this new set of ideas the “the 
tribal alternative.”4  Elmer Rusco contends the tribal alternative “abandoned the 
goal of assimilation in favor of the belief that Native American societies had a right 
to exist on the basis of a culture different from the dominant one in the United 
States.”5  Much of John Collier’s reform program rested on this idea, including 
ending the allotment policy, preserving Indian culture and promoting self-
government and incorporation.  The ideology of the tribal alternative clashed with 
the entrenched ideology of assimilation.  The tension and conflict between these 
two schools of thought can be found at the core of the many struggles Collier found 
himself in during the reform battles of the 1920s and during his tenure as 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1933 to 1945.    
Having been an outspoken critic of the BIA and its policies for over a 
decade, Collier had to “contend with the entrenched and selfish outside interests 
that have controlled and exploited the bureau for so many years at the expense of 
the Indians.”6  Over the years, Collier irritated a number of people both in Congress 
and in the Indian Bureau.  This tendency plagued his working relationship with 
Congress throughout his commissionership.  Deeply entrenched in the 
assimilationist ideology many career bureaucrats worked within the BIA.  
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Assimilation had underscored federal Indian policy  formally since 1887 and 
enactment of the Dawes Act.  To them it seemed obvious that Indians must give up 
their culture and fully “Americanize” by becoming land owners and embracing 
white culture and Christianity.   Assimilationists viewed Collier and his proposals 
for revolutionizing Indian policy as a direct threat to all they had worked for over 
the years.  Various church missionaries opposed Collier recommended, “The Indian 
must be saved by a process of Christian assimilation of American life, not by 
carefully guarded and subsidized segregation.”7  Senator Burton K. Wheeler, co-
sponsor of the Indian Reorganization Act, declared it was Congress’s responsibility 
to “aid Indians as nearly as possible [to] adopt the white man’s ways and laws.”8   
  In addition, the American public accepted assimilation as the compulsory 
path Indians must follow.  Indians must accept, adopt, and be incorporated into 
American society, though their rights and position in American society remained 
unclear.  Racial and cultural superiority remained important factors in the 
assimilation ideology.  Frederick Hoxie captured the underlying sentiment of many 
whites when he wrote, “The white protestant majority continued to imagine that its 
values and the nation’s were identical.”  Traditional Indian culture, with its 
emphasis on communalism and what seemed for many to be archaic culture 
practices, stood in the path of America’s destiny.   
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Within the Oklahoma Indian population were many who also endorsed the 
idea of assimilation into white society.  Often these people were referred to as  
progressives.  Many claimed mixed ancestry.  Often educated at federal Indian 
schools, many also embraced Christianity.  This group often interacted with whites 
either as neighbors or through involvement in the white economic system.   They 
believed a promising future came with incorporation into white society.  William 
Chadick, a Choctaw, told the Cherokee Advocate at the onset of the Dawes 
Commission in 1894, “The best thing the Indians can do is to allot their lands and 
then every man, women, and child in the territory will know exactly what justly 
belongs to them.”9   James Kawauypla, a Ft. Sill Apache, stated, “Reservation life 
will retard and eventually prevent us from adjusting ourselves to fit in the white 
civilization in which we live.”10   For both whites and many Indians, assimilation 
by Native Americans into the dominant white society made sense and seemed the 
only path to follow.   
In May of 1933, such fears were confirmed when Collier, with the aid of 
Secretary Ickes, persuaded FDR to issue an executive order abolishing the Board of 
Indian Commissioners.  This group had existed as an advisory board on Indian 
affairs since the days of Ulysses Grant’s Peace Policies.  Collier viewed the Board 
as a citadel of assimilationist thinking within the Indian service. Several former 
commissioners, such as Flora Warren Seymour and Dr. C.C. Lindquist, continued 
to oppose Collier and his reform agenda.   
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On August 12, 1933, in a bureau order signed by Secretary Ickes all but 
ended the allotment policy stating Collier directed that, “Due to existing economic 
conditions and the very poor market for Indian owned restricted lands, it is hereby 
ordered until further notice that no more trust or restricted Indian lands shall be 
offered for sale.”  Collier specifically mentioned the unique situation of Indians and 
their land holdings in Oklahoma when he said, “The foregoing shall apply to the 
Osages and the Five Tribes Indians insofar as the sale of their land is subject to 
control by this Department.”11  This in effect ended the government’s allotment 
policy.12  Collier’s appointment convinced numerous individuals “for the first time 
in many years the Indians have a right to expect justice and sympathy from their 
guardians in Washington."13  
The evolution of the Indian New Deal mirrored the general direction taken 
by the Roosevelt administration with respect to the New Deal as a whole.  First 
came relief measures, then reform.  Collier wasted little time in getting to work.  
He spent much of his first few months developing stopgap measures to provide 
immediate aid for economically depressed Indians.  Early on, Collier finagled 
various agencies and departments to get Native Americans included in existing 
New Deal programs.  This saved considerable time, preventing duplicating efforts, 
not to mention conserving Bureau appropriations for other programs.  He worked to 
establish the Indian Civilian Conservation Corp which eventually supplied 3,200 
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jobs for Oklahoma Indians.  Collier proved instrumental in helping the Oklahoma 
Indians receive benefits from a variety of early New Deal programs, including the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Public Works Administration, the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, and the Works Progress Administration.14  
Collier displayed a great deal of fervor towards rectifying the many wrongs he saw 
in federal Indian policy through most of the 1920s and into the 1930s.  It was 
obvious that Collier’s objectives extended much further than piecemeal patching of 
the Indian Bureau or Indian policy.  Collier’s policies sought to achieve “Economic 
rehabilitation of the Indians, principally on the land; organization of the Indian 
tribes for managing their own affairs, and civil and cultural freedom and 
opportunity for the Indians.”15   Collier adamantly believed the allotment policy 
followed by the federal government for almost sixty years symbolized the main 
obstacle to Indian economic advancement.  During the period of allotment, Collier 
also believed the Indian Bureau maintained near despotic control over the Indians.  
Both these two evils must be destroyed.16  Collier realized many of his proposals 
required Congress to pass reform legislation.  
After witnessing Roosevelt’s legislative success during his first “hundred 
days,” Collier decided to incorporate his reform objectives, including overturning 
the allotment policy, into an omnibus piece of legislation.  Throughout the summer 
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and fall of 1933, Collier, Felix S. Cohen, Nathan Margold and other legal staff 
members of the Interior Department hammered out a legislative proposal.17  In 
September of 1933, Indians across the country, including those in Oklahoma, got to 
see the proposed legislation first hand as the BIA circulated drafts of the bill in 
order to obtain Indian opinion and support. These drafts were sent to tribal councils 
through the bureaucratic pipeline.  It is questionable how many Indians actually 
saw these drafts and probable that even fewer were able to wade through forty eight 
pages of technical legal phraseology and arrive at a clear understanding of the 
proposed measure and its aims.   
In early January of 1934, Collier held a conference at the Cosmos Club in 
Washington D.C.  Collier sought support for his legislative proposals from various 
reform groups, including the National Association on Indian Affairs, the American 
Indian Defense Association, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the 
Indian Rights Association (IRA).  Collier worked with these organizations through 
most of the 1920s and early 1930s.  At this meeting, all the groups supported to one 
degree or another Collier and his proposals.  The IRA supported with certain 
reservations.  Collier left the conference elated, feeling he had achieved a mandate 
for his proposals.   
Opposition to Collier’s Indian New Deal appeared almost immediately in 
Oklahoma, almost all of it originating in the eastern half of the state.  The 
Muskogee Daily Phoenix became the mouthpiece for Oklahoma opposition to 
Collier and his “new” policy proposals.  The Daily Phoenix carried on an ongoing 
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verbal onslaught against John Collier and the Indian New Deal.  An abrasive 
editorial from November 18, 1933 characteristic of many, announced: 
Oklahoma’s Indians, more than one entire number in the United States, 
want no tribal reservations, no communal fishing and hunting grounds 
. . . . Oklahoma will hope that Mr. Collier will not be permitted to erase 
all the great progress and void all the achievement of the last two decades 
in betterment of the American Indian in this state.18   
 
Eastern Oklahoma remained the center for ongoing opposition to Collier, the 
Wheeler Howard Bill, and later the Thomas Rogers Bill which would become the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act in 1936.  On February 9, 1934, John Collier 
introduced his new policy proposal to Oklahoma.  Collier spoke to 300 Oklahoma 
Indian employees of the Indian Bureau in Oklahoma City who represented almost 
every tribal group in the state.  Collier outlined a two-step program.  First he 
proposed, “the Indians must be organized and then given land that is fit to live on;” 
secondly, “the government must provide credit for [economic] rehabilitation.”  
Collier cautioned his audience by saying, “We don’t intend to drive the Indian back 
to the farm but if he wants to go, and most of them do, land must be provided for 
them and they must be taught modern farming methods.”  In concluding, Collier 
warned that his proposal offered no quick fix.  He continued, “It will take years to 
bring the Indian to their proper level.  After ten years under our program we should 
begin to make a showing and it will take years more to bring it to a conclusion.”19  
 Collier’s proposals marked a radical change in the direction of federal 
Indian policy.  This new direction quickly fostered controversy from many 
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different quarters.  A significant form of opposition to Collier and the Wheeler-
Howard bill appeared both on the national and the local Oklahoma scene.  Several 
former members of the Board of Indian Commissioners, dissolved by Roosevelt 
early in 1933, claimed the proposed legislation to be socialistic or communistic in 
nature.  Most vocal was Flora Warren Seymour.  In a series of magazine and 
newspaper articles, Seymour described the proposed legislation as “the most 
extreme gesture yet made by the administration in this country toward a 
Communistic experiment.”20  Another former member of the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, Dr. Charles Lindquist, said, “Collier’s plan is socialism and 
communism in the rankest sense.”21  The Daily Oklahoman picked up on this 
charge and brazenly editorialized “. . . the similarity of what is purposed to the 
soviets of Russia is strong enough to be noticeable.”22  This charge of Collier’s 
proposals being a “Communistic experiment” or smacking of Soviet influence 
continued over the time period in which both the IRA and the IOWA were debated, 
amended, and enacted.  Originating from more cosmopolitan eastern Oklahoma, 
these charges often received national press coverage.  
Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana and Representative Edgar Howard 
of Nebraska introduced the bill into Congress in February 12, 1934.  Collier dubbed 
the proposed legislation, the “Bill of Indian Rights.”23  A bulky forty-eight-page 
proposal contained most of Collier’s key objectives for Indian policy formulated 
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during his involvement in the Indian reform movement during the 1920s and early 
1930s.  Title I allowed the Indians “to organize for purposes of local self-
government and economic enterprise . . . [with] powers common to all municipal 
corporations.”  It authorized a $500,000 annual appropriation for organizing Indian 
tribal governments.  Title I also authorized a $5,000,000 credit loan fund to aid 
tribes pursuing economic and agricultural development.  Title I eased civil service 
requirements so that the BIA could employ more Indians.  Title II concerned itself 
with education and established, among other things, scholarships and loans for 
vocational training and college for Native Americans.  Title III not only ended land 
allotment but also provided for the return of previously allotted lands to Indian 
tribes.  Indian lands held in trust by the federal government were also to be returned 
to tribal control.  Title III further established the policy of “a constructive program 
of Indian land use and economic development, in order to establish a permanent 
basis of self-support for Indians living under Federal tutelage [on reservations].”  
This title also authorized an annual $2,000,000 appropriation for purchasing land to 
enlarge reservations.  Title IV created a Court of Indian Affairs possessing original 
jurisdiction and conducted in accordance with Indian traditions for tribes who 
organized under Title I, thereby removing them from the jurisdiction of state and 
local courts.24  This proposal represented not only “a new approach, [but] also an 
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attempt to streamline the archaic and complicated system of Indian law.”25 Collier 
felt that with this legislation, a new foundation for Indian law would be established.   
However, strong opposition arose within Congress to the Wheeler Howard 
Bill.  This opposition was centered in a handful knowledgeable about federal Indian 
policy, including many from states with significant Indian populations.  Collier’s 
radical reform proposals ran counter to the assimilationist thinking which had 
dominated Indian policy for fifty years.  Lack of knowledge of Indian affairs and 
plain indifference also influenced congressional support.  Native Americans 
contributed such a small percentage of votes that for most legislators Indian affairs 
took a back seat to more immediate challenges facing Congress in the depths of the 
Great Depression.  An indifferent though sometimes hostile Congress delayed 
passage of the Wheeler Howard bill for months.     
Commissioner Collier fought the hostility and apathy in Congress by 
embarking on a nationwide publicity campaign to promote the Wheeler-Howard 
bill. He hoped to develop public support that would pressure Congress for passage.  
Mailings requesting support were sent to thousands of religious leaders, university 
presidents, newspaper editors, celebrities such as Will Rogers. Magazines, 
scholarly journals, missionary groups, the Kiwanis Club, and the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs received the same.  It is interesting to note that at the 
bottom of one page of a mailing list used by Collier and the bureau is the notation, 
“I wonder if it would be possible for you to ask Father Coughlin to speak of [the] 
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bill over radio.  He has an immense audience.  It would not do harm to try.”26  
Clearly the Bureau left no stone unturned in efforts to promote the Wheeler-
Howard Bill.  
Collier, a prolific writer, authored a number of articles promoting the 
Wheeler-Howard bill that were published in popular American magazines. Good 
Housekeeping interviewed Collier in April of 1934 as the battle in Congress to 
secure passage of Wheeler-Howard heated up. He elevated the struggle to a moral 
level when he compared his proposed land restoration proposals which affecting 
“perhaps only 200,000 Indians”, while at the same time “Mexico, a very poor 
country, has assumed as a moral obligation the restoring of land to more than 
2,000,000 Indians.”  Collier continued that “unless this is done more than two 
hundred thousand of our allotted Indians . . . are increasingly going to become 
tramps, as many of them are already.”  He warned, “That is a public menace a 
hundred times graver than investing some money now in colonizing these homeless 
Indians and putting them on their feet permanently.”27 Vera Connolly, the author, 
made an impassioned plea to American women stating, “The Indians are doomed 
unless it is changed [Indian policy].  Congress is the arbiter.  Will you women of 
                                                 
26 Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, n.d., John Collier Papers, Western 
History Collection, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Reel 31. 
27 Vera Connolly, “The End of a Long, Long Trail,” in Good Housekeeping, 98, April 
1934, 252. Collier is referring the land redistribution program of Mexican President Lazaro 
Cardenas in the 1930s.  During that period, the Mexican government distributed 17.9 million 
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proposals from well-entrenched conservative land holding elites.  For more on Cardenas’s land 
redistribution programs see Ben Fallow’s Cardenas Compromised or Nora Hamilton’s Limits of 
State Autonomy in Post Revolutionary Mexico. 
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the United States help? . . . The outcome of that battle will depend—to an 
enormous degree—on you!”  The plaintive pleadings of Indian women reached out 
to their white sisters and implored, “Help us! Help us! white women of America! . . 
. We starve.  We shiver in rags.  We drop with disease.  We are being robbed, by 
our Federal guardians, of all we have left.  Help us.  Save us!”28  Finally, the article 
concluded with an urgent request from the editor: “Readers of Good Housekeeping 
help Commissioner Collier!  Write your Senators and Representatives, urging them 
to sponsor this proposed Indian legislation.”29  The tenor of many other articles and 
interviews published in magazines and newspapers at the time as part of the broad 
publicity campaign to gain popular support for the Wheeler-Howard Bill were 
similar.  Collier demonstrated an ability to employ the media in order to gain public 
support. 
Many Oklahoma Indians felt assimilated into the white society and resented 
the attempt to re-institute tribal controls over their property and lives.  Some 
“assimilated and semi-assimilated Indians [opposed] the reimposition of tribal 
controls over their property and lives.”  The second problem arose from a 
contradiction that “despite the emphasis in the act on Indian self-determination, few 
Indians were consulted while the bill was being drafted.”30  In commenting on the 
proposed Wheeler-Howard Bill, Joseph Bruner, a Creek from Sepulpa, Oklahoma 
and founder of the American Indian Federation said, “As I see it, it would segregate 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 50, 260. 
29 Ibid., 260. 
30 Kelly, “The Indian Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality,” 296. 
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us.  We have taken our place with white people and helped build up this country.  
I’m against this bill.”31 
 Oklahoma Indians believed Collier understood the Navajo and Pueblo 
Indians from the 1920s and early 1930s.  Many also felt Collier apparently 
“concluded that Indians everywhere would wish to return to tribal communal 
life.”32  They felt Collier lumped together all Indians as sharing the same cultural 
heritage and facing similar challenges.  Many Oklahoma Indians believed 
themselves to be unique from other Indians around the country.  The vast majority 
of them were landless, and the tribe possessed little communally held land.  
Individual land ownership among the Indians remained the rule rather than the 
exception.  Many believed the Wheeler-Howard bill proposed a return to communal 
land ownership and the reservation system.  Joseph Bruner, a Creek who was also 
president of the National Indian Confederacy, summed up his views in a letter 
addressed to both the Senate and the House: “We do not want—we will not 
voluntarily or cheerfully accept separate schools, separate communities, separate 
courts, or additional impeding obnoxious interference from Washington.”33   
 Like Native Americans across the nation, most Oklahoma Indians never 
read the bill and possessed little understanding of its various proposals.  This factor 
coupled with the general mistrust of the actions of the federal government led 
initially to large cross-state opposition to the proposed bill by many Oklahoma 
Indians.  
                                                 
31 Muskogee Times Democrat (Muskogee, OK), 17 March 1934, 15. 
32 Kelly, “The Indian Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality,” 296. 
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Eastern Oklahoma newspapers attacked both Collier and his legislative 
proposals. The Tulsa Tribune countered, “It [the Wheeler-Howard Bill] is not so 
attractive to Oklahoma Indians of the five Civilized Tribes, who are as competent 
for the duties of citizenship as the average white citizen of Oklahoma, and who lead 
the same kind of lives as their white neighbors.”34  The Tribune criticized Collier 
by saying, “It is doubtful if the commissioner himself quite understands that the 
Indian problem in Oklahoma is not the same as that of the Blackfoot or Apache 
reservation.”35  The Bartlesville Examiner suggested, “The secretary of the interior 
and the commissioners of Indian affairs should make an exhaustive first hand study 
of the Indian situation in Oklahoma.  They should both spend considerable time in 
the state . . . “36   
After initially announcing support for Collier’s legislative proposal during 
the Cosmos Club conference in January, the Indian Rights Association came out 
against the Wheeler Howard bill in March of 1934.  In that month’s issue of Plain 
Truth, Matthew K. Sniffen decried what the IRA considered to be “revolutionary 
departures in Indian policy.”37  The Indian Rights Association vehemently opposed 
the Wheeler-Howard proposal claiming, “It perpetuates segregation under the guise 
of self-government.  It jeopardizes individual Indian property rights, and shifts the 
incentive which the authors of the Allotment Act had in mind for individual  
                                                                                                                                                    
33 Ibid., 12 May 1934, 6. 
34 Tulsa Tribune (Tulsa, OK.), 10 March 1934, 5. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The Bartlesville Examiner (Bartlesville, OK), 12 March 1934, 6.    
37 Matthew K. Sniffen, “Stop, Look—and Consider,” Indian Truth (March 1934), 1. 
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ownership of property leading towards citizenship.  The policy is a reversal of the 
past.”38  Though a well-respected and long time advocate of reform in Indian 
policy, the Indian Rights Association’s ideological framework was rooted deeply in 
the assimilation of the Native American into white society.  Vine Deloria, Jr. and 
Clifford M. Lytle attributed the IRA’s shift from support to opposition to an 
internal power struggle between conservative and moderate factions within the 
organization.39 
Within the BIA, there arose pockets of resistance to the proposed Wheeler-
Howard Bill. Many longtime employees, deeply entrenched in assimilationist 
policies, feared Colliers new ideas and the prospect of change.  Evidently, this 
resistance reached a level where it aroused not only the attention of John Collier 
but also Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior.  Both men moved quickly to 
stifle internal opposition.  Ickes issued a blunt memo to all BIA employees: “If any 
employee wishes to oppose the new policy, he should do so honestly and openly 
from outside the service.  This would mean his resignation.”40  Collier and Ickes 
might have to deal with opposition from without, but it was not going to be 
tolerated from within.  
Collier tied his success as Indian Commissioner to enactment of the 
Wheeler-Howard Bill.   He believed expressed Indian support would influence 
Congress in a positive manner.  In order to garner Indian support, Collier visited 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
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40 Department of the Interior, Office of the Interior, Harold Ickes all employees of the 
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ten reservations scattered across the United States in the spring of 1934 to promote 
the bill.  Possessing a large percentage of the country’s Indian population, Collier 
considered the support of Oklahoma Indians key.  In March of 1934, he 
crisscrossed the state, conducting three congresses with representatives from more 
than thirty tribes.  Several thousand Indians attended large daylong meetings held 
in Anadarko, Muskogee, and Miami Oklahoma.  It is apparent that a cross section 
of tribal communities attended each congress, from articulate and business savvy 
mixed bloods to full bloods who required interpreters.   
Over 2,000 Indians from the western plains tribes attended the first congress 
held in Anadarko on October 15, 1934.  Collier conducted this meeting in much the 
same fashion as other congresses.  First he launched into a detailed explanation of 
the bill.  He decried the allotment system saying, “It is correct to say that the 
allotment system intends for all Indian allotted lands to pass to whites.”41  He 
intermixed into his explanations a “sales pitch” designed to gain Indian approval 
for the bill.  During the Anadarko congress, a member in the crowd asked Collier 
what would happen to Indians who “don’t come in.”  Collier replied, “The tribe 
which does not want to come into this bill at all will go on just the way it is now 
until all of the land is lost and then I suppose it will come back and ask for a charter 
and some new land.”42  At all three congresses held in Oklahoma, most discussions 
and questions from the Native Americans centered on the issue of land.  In 
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Anadarko, Collier discussed the fact the “four out of every six Indians [in western 
Oklahoma] . . . are landless. . . . Seventy-two thousand of the Five Civilized Tribes 
are totally landless.”  Collier concluded, “The basic fact is that there is not enough 
land belonging to the Indians.  We have got to get more land to supply the landless 
Indians.”43  Questions ranged from specific inquiries to broad concerns.  At 
Anadarko, Morris Bedoka, a Kiowa, asked, “Now to secure a charter, as I 
understand it, you would have to have the recommendation of the local agent with 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.  Is that correct?”  Jasper Saunkeah, 
chairman of the Kiowa-Comanche tribal council wondered, “Would this bill take 
away the voting privilege we have in state and national affairs?”44   Henry Roe 
Cloud, speaking for an Indian outside of the meeting, all worried about the fear 
many Indians seemed to have that the bill would establish “colonies” [land 
holdings purchased by the federal government for the tribes and opened to group 
settlement by tribal members] which “would segregate the Indians—put them all by 
themselves.”45  At all three congresses, Collier communicated his belief that the 
allotment system intended “for all Indian allotted lands to pass to whites.”46  
At second Oklahoma congress held in Muskogee on March 24, 1934,  
Collier spent considerable time talking about the need for the Five Tribes to 
organize.  With tribal organizations abolished around the time of statehood in 1907, 
Collier found it “strange to find the biggest group of Indians in the country without 
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organization to speak for it officially or authoritatively.”47  Finally, Collier believed 
that Oklahoma Indians, especially in the eastern part of the state, could wield 
considerable political power in the state by organizing.  Collier stated, “I think that 
their use of the franchise would in the long run be made ten-fold in effectiveness by 
this bill.”48  While Collier discussed most aspects of the bill at each Congress, at 
Muskogee he attempted to “sell” members of the Five Tribes the idea that by 
working together as a group organized under provisions of the Wheeler-Howard 
bill, the tribes would be able to enhance their political voice both with Congress 
and with the Indian Bureau.  
The Miami congress, held on March 26, 1934, again focused on the issue of 
land.  Collier discussed hidden costs of administering the allotment system.  Using 
the Five Tribes as an example, Collier pointed out that the Five Tribes Agency in 
Muskogee was spending roughly eight percent of its annual $300,000 
appropriation, or $240,000, to cover administrative costs for Indian allotments.  
Collier spent time discussing and answering questions concerning Indian access to 
credit.  Collier stated ”Indians are handicapped because they have no access to 
credit.”49  Collier promoted the $10,000,000 revolving system of credit set up in the 
bill.  The revolving credit fund allowed a tribal government, an economic 
development organization, or merely a group of independent tribal members who 
joined together under a charter to take out federal loans to finance a business  
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venture.  An Osage at the Miami congress asked, “Could a tribe now rejecting the 
bill, now requesting to be excluded from it, ever get a chance to apply for a charter, 
that is, ever get a chance to be let into it again?”50    
At each congress, the audience received time devoted to answering their 
questions.  Collier responded to the bulk of the questions himself, only deferring to 
staff members for questions involving technical legal points or as his voice tired in 
the evening after a long day.  At each congress, Collier emphasized the fact that he 
was there to explain the proposed bill and gain Indian input.  In order a supportive 
action, various Indian groups pressured Collier, resulting in over thirty amendments 
to the Wheeler-Howard Bill.  Many of these amendments addressed Indian concern 
over the possibility of individual allotments being returned to the tribe as 
communal property.  Many Indians drew a line in the sand over this proposal.  
Historian Francis P. Prucha correctly contended that with these amendments, 
“Collier wisely retreated to what he thought he could get enacted.”51  Though 
Collier is considered by many to be an idealist with his head in the clouds, he 
exercised a keen sense of knowing when to fight, when to compromise, or when to 
retreat in political battles.  These amendments were important for two reasons.  
First of all, they demonstrated Collier’s determination to see Wheeler-Howard 
passed, even if he had to compromise on some points.  Most important, Collier not 
only listened to the input from Indians, but he acted on it as well.  Amendments to  
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the bill reflected Collier’s including Indians directly the give and take of the 
legislative process. This is a radical departure from Indian policy of the previous 
fifty years.   
Collier believed that American Indians should play a greater role in 
determining their own futures.   The heart of the Wheeler-Howard Bill reflected his 
deeply held beliefs, with provisions for Indians to organize themselves for the 
purposes of self government and economic development.  However, Collier very 
much represented a part of the system in which he operated.  During the previous 
fourteen years, Collier had been deeply involved in the Indian reform movement.  
Most of his colleagues were white.  His limited direct contact with Native 
Americans limited his influence among Indians.  Few Indians were directly 
involved in the movement.  Those involved had become acculturated to a large 
degree and often seemed distantly removed from their Indian brothers and sisters.  
Whites led the battle for changes in Indian policy.  Whites who proposed changes 
and struggled with white legislators and bureaucrats to see their proposals enacted 
and implemented.  Whites might consult with Indians to determine their needs and 
desires, but whites expressed those needs and targeted which ones to pursue and the 
course of action follow.  Professionals such as anthropologists or sociologists 
helped provide understanding of Native American social and cultural nuances.  
White reformers often seemed to believe they knew the needs and desires of Native 
Americans better than the Indians themselves did.  Often reformers such as Collier 
appeared paternalistic and condescending towards Native Americans.   
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All three of the Oklahoma congresses were daylong events that extended 
late into the evening.  After the session was formally concluded, Collier and his 
staff held several small group meetings for those interested, to further explain 
topics and to respond to additional questions.  For example, Collier himself might 
cover the subject of tribal organizations.  Felix Cohen or Nathan Margold might 
conduct a session and cover legal aspects of guardianships and heirships.  Ward 
Shepherd, a bureau specialist in land policies, might cover the subject of land 
acquisitions.  Unfortunately, no records were kept for most of these types of 
“extracurricular” meetings as the bill was being drafted.   
The Indian congresses proved beneficial to Collier and the Indian bureau as 
well as to many of the Native Americans who attended.  A charge that Indians were 
not included in the drafting of the Wheeler-Howard bill remained one of its chief 
criticisms.  There are no records of Collier, his staff, or the congressional sponsors, 
Senator Burton Wheeler or Representative Edgar Howard contacting or being 
contacted by any Indian, individual, or group to seek their input or take their 
suggestions as the bill was being drafted, unfortunately silenced Indian voice.   
However, Collier recognized the absolute necessity of obtaining a 
substantial degree of Indian support for this proposal that originally contained such 
a large part of his overall goal of reforming Indian affairs.  He placed great 
emphasis on making these congresses successful.  Many Indians attended the 
congress with only a sketchy idea of the legislative proposal.  More than likely 
most never saw or read a draft of the bill.  Many received misinformation about the 
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proposal thinking, for example, allotment holders might give their allotments to the 
tribe and resort to communal land holdings.  To some degree or another, all Indians 
held a degree of doubt and mistrust concerning the proposed Indian New Deal.  
Based on past experience in dealings with whites and the Indian Bureau, most 
hesitated to accept Collier and his proposal as the answer to all their problems.  
Most Indians did not share John Collier’s zeal in restructuring federal Indian 
affairs.   
Clearly, Collier realized the situation he faced as he entered into these 
congresses.  Patiently, he repeatedly sought Indian input into the proposed 
Wheeler-Howard Bill.  He gave full and clear explanations.  He did not dodge 
tough questions or the abrasive and apprehensive attitude on the part of some 
Indian attendees.  He gave the impression to many that he cared about the Indians.  
For the most part, these efforts paid off for Collier.  Concerns were addressed and 
often eliminated.  Doubts and mistrust were mitigated.  While not all Indians left 
supporting the Wheeler-Howard Bill, Collier garnered a greater deal of support 
from these congresses.  Perhaps most importantly, Collier planted seeds in the 
minds of many Indians that a new era with a brighter dawn in federal Indian affairs 
was now opening up.        
Nevertheless, the congresses obtained mixed results in Oklahoma.  Indian 
support or opposition for the Wheeler-Howard Bill remained divided, with neither 
an overwhelming acceptance nor rejection of the bill by the Indians.  Contained in 
the minutes of the three congresses held in Oklahoma were resolutions and verbal 
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pronouncements introduced by twenty tribal groups from across the state.  The 
tribal business committee for the Pawnee, Ponca, Kaw, Otoe, and Tonkawa brought 
a resolution to the Anadarko congress which simply stated the “sentiment of the 
various tribes was opposed to the bill.”52  Thomas W. Alford, a Shawnee registered 
his qualms, “We are willing to take anything that we believe to be for the best 
interest of our people.  This is a program that is a puzzle to us.”53  The Sac and Fox 
approved the bill stating, [We] believe that a long sought opportunity has come to 
the Indian people through this bill.”54  The Cheyenne and Arapaho rejected the bill 
and appealed to John Collier “to retain the present status of rights and privileges 
given the Indians comprising the Cheyenne and Arapaho reservation.”55  Three 
groups, the Quapaws, the Osage, and the Delawares, tabled any endorsement or 
rejection by opting to “think it over.”  The Muskogee Creek tabled consideration 
because they felt they lacked an official organization to make such a decision.  The 
Creek Emigrant Indian Committee sent a resolution “asking you [Collier] to get our 
Treaty [1835] back just like it was before and let us run it ourselves.56  While it is 
impossible from this information to determine the number of individuals who either 
favored or disapproved of the proposed legislation, it is quite evident that in 
Oklahoma a wide spectrum of both support and opposition for the bill existed 
among the Indians.   
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A BIA document entitled, “Analysis of Official Vote of Indian Tribes On 
Wheeler-Howard” tells a different story.  It reports that nationwide 139,824 from 
51 tribes approved of the Wheeler Howard Bill, while 12,364 Indians from 11 
tribes opposed the bill.  For Oklahoma, this report shows that a total of 29,925 
Indians representing four of the Five Tribes (the Seminole and the plains tribes of 
western Oklahoma are not included) voted issued by either the Bureau or Interior 
Department.  A number of scholars used the figures from this report in their 
studies, but their accuracy seems questionable at best.57 
Almost immediately after Collier’s return to Washington from the Indian 
congresses, both Senate and House committees on Indian Affairs resumed hearings 
on the Wheeler-Howard bill.  With both committees, Collier faced a conservative 
group of legislators who remained rabid assilimationists in their sentiments and 
considered Collier’s legislative proposal as a return to communal property with 
Indians segregated from the main society.  In the Senate, Collier faced a “troika” of 
opposition from Senators Wheeler who now waffled on the legislation he had 
sponsored, Elmer Thomas from Oklahoma, and Henry Ashurst from Arizona.58   
Senator Wheeler, chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and 
co-sponsor of the proposed bill, proved an ongoing antagonist for Collier 
throughout the senate hearings.  A die hard assimilationist, who felt Indians were 
not capable of governing themselves, questioned much about the original proposal.   
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He viewed the section involving the proposed Indian Court of Affairs marked a 
return to the blanket for many Indians when they lost their allotments to the tribe.  
Senator Ashurst wanted to spar with Collier over his continued opposition to 
provisions included in the Pueblo Relief Act passed almost a year earlier in May 
1933.59   
Senator Thomas was enraged over comments Collier made to the Indians at 
the Anadarko conference.  Collier had stated, “You know that at the present time 
President Roosevelt controls both Houses of Congress.  When President Roosevelt 
wants a piece of legislation, he gets it from Congress.”60  Thomas acidly responded, 
“You told my Indians down at my home that it made no difference what Congress 
thought about it, that you would pass the bill if you wanted to, and would pass it 
quickly . . . you have the opinion then, that you [Collier] can pass this bill through 
quickly, whether or not the Congress wants the bill?”61  This type of exchange was 
sprinkled throughout the hearings and demonstrates a gulf of enmity separating 
John Collier from many congressional leaders.  Senator Ashurst wanted to spar 
with Collier over his continued opposition to provisions in the Pueblo Relief Act 
passed almost a year earlier in May of 1933.   
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The minutes of both the House and the Senate meetings are readily 
available and have been examined by scholars in finite detail.  Few have offered 
much more than a cursory look at Indian testimony and viewpoints offered at these 
hearings.  While it is impossible to neglect any part of the hearings in order to gain 
an understanding of what groups and thinking molded the bill, the primary focus 
here is on Indian contributions to the committee hearings.   
Both the House and Senate hearings began in late February of 1934, just 
days after the bill was formerly introduced on February 12.  Both held several 
initial sessions and then adjourned until April when Commissioner Collier attended 
the ten Indian congresses.  During both sets of hearings, Collier or close aids such 
as Nathan Margold, Solicitor for the Interior Department, or his assistants, Charles 
Fahy or Felix Cohen, spent considerable time and effort explaining in detail the 
forty-eight page bill.  Both senators and representatives grilled them on any number 
of technical or legal points.  Congress wanted to know the specifics of Collier’s 
proposals for land purchases, self-government, the revolving credit fund, the 
proposed court of Indian Affairs, and educational benefits.  Most of the legislators 
operated from a deeply ingrained assimilationist ideology.  Collier’s proposals 
seemed radical and threatened the status quo in federal Indian affairs.  Many 
accused Collier of moving the direction of Indian affairs backwards.  In the 
Wheeler-Howard bill, they feared a return to the reservation system and segregation 
of the American Indian from white society.  Two schools of thought assimilation 
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and a new ideology, the tribal alternative, battled for dominance through the course 
of these hearings.  
Native Americans found themselves in the middle of this legislative 
struggle, most tribal people being well acquainted with congressional proceedings.  
During the 1920s, a number of congressional committees as well as private 
research foundations examined Native Americans.  This time, however, things 
seemed different.  Instead of merely investigating the “conditions” of Native 
Americans, the government was now seeking their viewpoints and suggestions on a 
legislative proposal under consideration.  This was unprecedented.  In general 
many Indians were distrustful and justifiably so.  They had experienced a long 
history with whites of broken treaties, unfulfilled promises, and almost a complete 
disregard and respect for their interests and culture.   
An examination of the minutes of both the Senate and House hearings 
makes it  readily apparent that many Native Americans had little if any 
understanding of the proposed bill.  They held misconceptions concerning the 
overall intentions of the bill.  Vern E. Thompson representing the Quapaw from 
Oklahoma presented a resolution to the House Committee on Indian Affairs on 
Tuesday March 13, 1934.  The resolution, adopted by the Quapaw tribal council on 
the previous Saturday, March 10, requested that the Quapaw be excluded from the 
Wheeler-Howard bill.  The council had first seen the forty-eight page Wheeler-
Howard bill the day before on Friday March 9.   It is difficult to understand how 
the Quapaw tribal council could digest and fully understand a complex lengthy 
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legislative bill in twenty-four hours and formulate a reasonable position on the 
bill.62    
 The Quapaws requested exclusion from the Wheeler-Howard Bill.  They 
considered their situation b unique from other tribal groups.  In 1895, the Quapaws, 
with congressional approval, instituted their own allotment program.  The granted 
each tribal member was given 200 acres of prairie land, which was “practically all 
alike, there was no distinction in quality.”63  Each member received 40 acres of 
timberland as well.  The Quapaws feared they might lose their allotments.  Their 
resolution argued, “These Indian people have, in good faith, attempted to do what 
the Government is asking them to do, amalgamate with the white citizenship. . . . 
These Indians . . . in good faith have attempted to adopt the laws and customs of 
the white men.”64  They expressed contentment with their situation and asked to be 
left alone.   
Thompson appeared before the House committee once again on Thursday 
April 9, after the congress held in Miami on March 24, 1934.  Approximately two 
hundred Quapaw attended the congress, including the tribal council.  At the 
conclusion of the conference they submitted a second resolution and again 
requested exclusion of the Quapaws from the Wheeler-Howard bill.  They also 
submitted several questions to Commissioner Collier, which he answered to their 
satisfaction.  They came to believe that the bill was a good measure and would 
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prove “to be of great benefit and assistance to certain of our Indian brethren,” but 
they “respectfully request[ed] that said bill be amended so as to exempt the 
Quapaw.”65 
James Saluskin, a full-blood Yakima expressed a fear common with many 
tribal groups.  Saluskin testified  “it is the landless Indian, the Indian that has sold 
his land; they are going to rule as a majority.”66  Saluskin spoke of the division 
between full bloods and mixed-bloods.  He said “it is the landless Indian, the half-
breed and from there up, they take things upon themselves and exercise their rights, 
without the knowledge of the tribal council.”67 
Testimony during the congressional hearings from Oklahoma Indians 
demonstrated a wide divergence in viewpoints towards the Wheeler-Howard bill.  
The Fort Sill Apaches opposed passage of the Wheeler-Howard bill.  Taking what 
many would consider a pro-assimilationist viewpoint, they believed “It will check 
our economic and social advancement.  Reservation life will retard and eventually 
prevent us from adjusting ourselves to fit in the white civilization.”68  On the other 
hand, the Comanches of Oklahoma opposed Wheeler-Howard, but from a more 
traditional perspective and stated, “We however would much prefer to have our 
affairs looked after in the manner they have always have.”  They opposed the idea 
of self-government and change in general.  By contrast, the Cherokees, from 
eastern Oklahoma, focused on the idea of obtaining land and seemed excited about 
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the bill, believing “it gives the Indians a permanent home and stops the allotment 
system, gives the rising generation a home that they call their own.”69 
Ute Arapaho, of the Oklahoma Cheyenne and Arapaho tribe like many 
other Indians, was also concerned about land issues.  Speaking through an 
interpreter, Arapaho testified to the House committee that he was concerned that 
“the landowner [Indians holding allotments or holding land in fee simple] would 
[be forced] to give his title and right to his allotments for the benefit of landless 
Indians.”70  Arapaho also wanted to see provisions in the bill concerning heirships 
be amended so that rather than being placed in the tribe’s communal land holdings, 
allotees could to pass their holdings on to their descendents.    
Jesse Rowlodge, representing the Oklahoma Cheyenne-Arapaho before the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, gave four disparate reasons why the 
Cheyenne-Arapaho remained reluctant to endorse the bill.  First, “It is so technical 
that no member of the tribe is able to interpret it.” Second, with almost two-thirds 
of the 2,800 Cheyenne-Arapaho landless, there was tribal concern as to where those 
members would go when the government provided land for them.  Rowlodge 
mused, “Many of them [landless tribal members] seem to think that they are going 
to be drifted back to some arid land where no one else would be able to make a 
living.”71  Third, the Cheyenne-Arapaho expressed concern over the continuity of 
the proposed legislation once enacted in the event of a change of administration.  
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Lastly, the Cheyenne-Arapaho questioned the “right of the government to take 
away from the Indians [U.S. citizens since 1924] their lands [allotments] entrusted 
to them [by allotment in 1887].”72  Obviously, the Cheyenne-Arapaho gave careful 
and thoughtful consideration to the proposed bill.  They came to the hearings 
prepared to give their input and were expecting answers to their concerns before 
they would consider endorsing the bill.   
Federal Indian policy often stifled Indian independence by creating a 
dependency on the dominant society.  Whites subordinated and thus Indians lacked 
control over their lives, cultures, and destiny.  During the Senate hearings, Sam La 
Point, a Sioux from the Rosebud reservation spoke on this issue is his testimony.  
La Point discussed the educational features of the bill, specifically of the fund that 
individual Indians could borrow for vocational, trade school and college education.  
Because of limited educational opportunities on the Rosebud, La Point felt the 
Sioux were not ready for self-government.  He said, “We do not like to become a 
government of our own. . . Let us grow into it . . .Educate our younger generation, 
our young girls and boys,  Give them an educational opportunity. . . If you will give 
us a chance to do this, we will gradually work into self-government.”73  Indian 
leaders such as La Point were concerned with the immediate burning issues 
surrounding land, looked ahead and saw education as a path that might help them 
gain control of their lives and destiny once again.   
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Open Indian opposition to the Wheeler-Howard bill appears limited in both 
the House and Senate hearings.  Most opposition expressed in resolutions from 
various tribal groups, and was presented to the committees and included as 
attachments to the minutes.  One main exception to this pattern was the opposition 
of  Joseph Bruner, a Creek from Sapulpa, Oklahoma.  The committee minutes 
contain a body of correspondence from Bruner to individuals such as John Collier, 
Senators Thomas and Wheeler, and Representative Will Rogers.  Bruner, principal 
chief and founder of the Indian National Confederacy, conducted an ongoing attack 
against Collier and most of his Indian New Deal proposals.  In a letter to 
Commissioner Collier, Bruner expounded, “Without consulting them you had a bill 
prepared and then undertook to choke it down their throats and make them like it.”  
He further stated that the Indian congress in Muskogee had been “thoroughly 
packed” by Collier.  Finally, Bruner vented against landless Indians by saying, “I 
take the position that an Indian who ha In a letter to Senator Thomas, Bruner wrote, 
“I challenge the Commissioner to point to one word in the Collier bill which says 
any Oklahoma Indian tribe will be given 1 foot of land if the bill in its present form 
is enacted into law.” squandered his land or money is no more to be pitied than any 
other sucker.74   
 Collier made great efforts to respond thoroughly to Bruner’s caustic 
accusations.  He did so in a methodical and unemotional manner.  Many of 
Collier’s responses to him are included in the minutes.  However, on occasion even 
Collier could not contain his frustration with Bruner and lashed out.  Writing a 
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response to one of Bruner’s letters, Collier concluded by saying, “You are an 
interesting human and social type, Mr. Bruner. . . . you have Indian blood and yet 
some inward compulsion makes you frenziedly active to prevent Indians from 
receiving the help and protection which they need and for which they are 
petitioning.  Why?”  Bruner, attempting to have the last word in this verbal sparring 
match, responded to Collier stating, “You are also an interesting human and social 
type Mr. Commissioner . . . .You never were in Oklahoma in your life, you said, 
until you came here to tell us in picked assemblies what we want.  You have not 
redeemed any of your promises to us.  Why?”75  Wisely, Collier let the issue drop.  
As mentioned before, Bruner and the American Indian Federation, based in eastern 
Oklahoma, conducted ongoing state and national campaigns opposing both Collier 
and the Indian New Deal. 
From the testimony and resolutions introduced by Native Americans during 
both the House and Senate committee hearings on the Wheeler-Howard bill, several 
conclusions can be drawn.  Though Indians had no input during the drafting of the 
original version of the bill, they certainly had input during the congressional 
hearings.  Tribal groups from all around the nation gave testimony and furnished 
resolutions.  Several amendments proposed by various Indian groups made both 
during the Indian congresses and the congressional hearings were acted upon.  It is 
also apparent that concerned Indians he immediate bread and butter issues 
concerning land, credit, and education concerned most Indians.  Very few 
supported John Collier’s long range ideals for transforming Indian policy.  They 
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focused on bettering the destitute circumstances in which they found themselves 
living.  There appeared no general consensus among Indians either for support or 
opposition to the bill, a fact readily apparent among Oklahoma Indians who 
appeared divided over supporting or opposing the measure.  Some traditional 
groups opposed the measure for specific reasons while other more progressive 
groups also opposed it for their own reasons.  Particular circumstances seemed to 
dictate a group’s support or opposition for the bill.  Regardless, many took 
advantage of the opportunity to express their viewpoints.         
The Oklahoma congressional delegation, led by Senator Thomas, stolidly 
opposed the Wheeler-Howard Bill.76  Thomas felt that with Oklahoma Indians well 
on the road to assimilation, the re-imposition of the reservation system would only 
set them back.  He specifically criticized Article IV as an “effort to repudiate the 
judiciary of my state.”  Senator Thomas said of the bill, “It is not meeting with 
general favor among our Indian citizens . . . It is not suited to Oklahoma, and will 
not pass Congress.”77  He also declared that “there isn’t a chance for its passage in 
my judgment,” and he added that he had never been consulted about the matter by 
the Indian bureau.78   
 Congressman W.W. Hastings, a mixed blood Choctaw, represented part of 
eastern Oklahoma, remained a vigorous opponent of the Wheeler-Howard Bill.  He 
feared local control being replaced with direction from disinterested agency  
bureaucrats in Washington.  Hastings objected to provisions in Title IV allowing 
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Indian courts to handle probate cases, thereby wresting that authority from county 
courts and placing it hands of “the Secretary of the Interior.”79  He also objected to 
provisions in Section 7 which gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to 
determine the “quantum of blood” which served as a determining factor in 
inheritance matters and restrictions on land holding.80  As a result, the Wheeler-
Howard Bill faced a long and problem strewn path as it made its way through the 
legislative process.  During the period from the end of Senate hearings on the 
Wheeler Howard bill on May 28, 1934 to July 18 of the same year when it was 
enacted, Senator Thomas worked behind the scene proposing amendments to the 
bill.  He responded not only to his constituents’ opposition but also to his own.  
One amendment excluded most Oklahoma Indians from sections in the bill 
permitting new reservations and Indian corporations and tribal governments.  
Another Thomas amendment allowed the Bureau of Indian Affairs to purchase land 
for Oklahoma Indians on an individual as well as on a tribal basis.  Senator Thomas 
believed, “My state is different from the other Indian states . . . Our Indian 
reservations have heretofore been allotted, and there are left in Oklahoma no great 
Indian reservations.”81  Finally, Senator Thomas believed, “Under the amendments 
passed in the bill, the Oklahoma Indians get all the benefits of the legislation and 
are not required to suffer any of the objectionable features.”82  On June 12, Thomas 
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moved to have Oklahoma Indians exempted from several “objectionable” features 
of the bill, including the provisions for self-government and incorporation as well 
as the section, which extended restrictions on Indian allotments indefinitely.  
Thomas’s motive for opposing the extension of restrictions stemmed from the fact 
that state tax revenue  would not be realized.  He justified his actions by stating, 
“At this time, without conferring with the Indians of Oklahoma, I am unwilling to 
agree that they shall come under [those] provisions so I have exempted them.  
During the summer, if the bill shall pass now, I will confer with the several tribes in 
my State.  If those Indian tribes desire to come under the provision[s], then I may 
come back at the next session and move to amend [the bill].  I make that statement 
in fairness to the Indians of my State.”83  Thomas’s words reflect an assumption 
clearly silencing Indian voice. 
Many Oklahoma Indians continued to lobby for protection under the IRA.  
By July 12, 1934, fifty-five Oklahoma tribes, with a population of around 140,000 
formally endorsed the legislation while twelve tribes representing around 14,000 
rejected the bill.84  Jasper Saunkeah, council chairman for the Kiowa tribe, felt, 
“Our only chance is to procure an extension of the restrictions so we may have 
governmental supervision until such time as our people become capable of 
handling their property wisely, and conducting business for themselves.”85  
Saunkeah feared the impact of the withdrawal of the government’s trust protection 
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over Oklahoma Indians scheduled for 1936 and strongly supported the IRA.  He 
believed many Indians would quickly lose what little of their original holdings they 
now possessed without it. 
The Wheeler-Howard Bill became law on June 18, 1934, with Collier’s 
original proposal cut from forty-eight to five pages.  Known as the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA), this act specifically excluded Oklahoma Indians from 
six sections of the act, including section 16 allowing for organization of tribal 
governments, and section 17 permitting tribal incorporation under charters issued 
by the Secretary of the Interior.  The IRA did allow Oklahoma Indians to 
participate in several provisions of the law, including an annual $2,000,000 
appropriation for land purchases, exemptions from many civil service requirements 
necessary for jobs within the BIA, and participation in an annual fund of $250,000 
for vocational training and college scholarships.86 
In theory, it would appear that Oklahoma Indians received financial benefits 
from the IRA while being excluded from having to establish reservations, form 
tribal governments. or incorporate.  In practice, the IRA did little for Oklahoma 
Indians.  Exempted from provisions in the act allowing for tribal governments and 
tribal incorporation, these people did not qualify for access to the $10,000,000 
revolving fund for economic and agricultural development tied to those provisions.  
This exemption prevented Oklahoma Indians from access to capital for 
improvements required by the BIA before funding land purchases for individual 
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Indians.87  In the end, no clear victor emerged.  The assimilationists suffered 
crippling blows.  Allotment was dead, with the dream of moving Native Americans 
into the mainstream of white American society severely questioned and found 
wanting.  Newly planted visions of Indian home rule and self-determination 
beckoned.  However, the new tribal alternative had not yet fully gestated.  
Assimilationists proved a formidable foe.  Collier cornered, compromised several 
of his ideals in order to realize partial success.  Gone was his plan for a court of 
Indian Affairs.  Important goals such as self-government and incorporation as well 
as proposals for adding to the tribal land base were watered down.  The Wheeler-
Howard bill moved through the give and take of the legislative process, altered to 
the point where it was hard to recognize the finished product from the original 
draft.  Forty-eight pages of proposals now pared down to five.  Though greatly 
altered, it passed into law.  Efforts to bring Oklahoma Indians, exempted from most 
of the IRA proposals were far from over. 
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 Chapter 5 
 
Oklahoma’s Newer New Deal 
 
 Franklin Roosevelt’s signature was barely dry on the Indian Reorganization 
Act before John Collier blanketed Oklahoma with a series of six articles widely 
published by newspapers across the state.  Collier, a skilled and frequent user of the 
media, presented the Indian Bureau in a favorable light with Oklahoma Indians.  
Collier’s articles were entitled, “Present Status of Oklahoma Indians.”  They 
surveyed the condition of Oklahoma Indians and elaborated on the efforts being 
made by the federal government to aid them in areas such as land holdings, 
agricultural extension work, education, and medical care.  In an interview, Collier 
expressed his hope that “every tribe would accept the Indian New Deal,” and that 
he “[would] seek to extend its terms to Oklahoma Indians in the next Congress.”1  
Senator Thomas exempted Oklahoma Indians from most provisions of the Indian 
Reorganization Act just prior to its enactment in June of 1934.  Thomas claimed he 
wanted to gain an understanding of the condition of Oklahoma Indians in order to 
develop a legislative proposal that benefited them. Meanwhile, John Collier had not 
given up hope.  If he could build a strong body of support among the Five Tribes, 
perhaps the Oklahoma congressional delegation would reconsider and place the 
state’s Indians fully under the umbrella of the IRA.  Such action aided Collier in his 
efforts to broaden Indian support for the IRA nationwide.   
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True to his word, Senator Elmer Thomas announced a schedule of planned 
visits to all the Indian agencies in Oklahoma in early September, 1934.  On 
September 22, Thomas telegrammed Commissioner Collier, inviting him, “or a 
representative of your office to be present at each meeting.”  Thomas included a 
schedule of seven meetings in the latter half of October and he extended invitations 
to all Indian business committees and “Indians generally.”  Collier wired back 
Thomas, “Delighted you are holding these conferences.  Believe superintendents 
would be best representatives of office.  If possible shall join you myself.”2  The 
conferences were designed to gauge Indian support and collect Indian 
recommendations for the IRA.  Thomas wanted to determine if the IRA was right 
for Oklahoma Indians, or if it needed to be amended.  Collier felt Oklahoma 
Indians should be reversed.   
 On Monday October 1, Collier spoke at the opening of the Indian 
Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia.  Collier directed some of his remarks towards 
Oklahoma and Oklahoma Indians.  He charged, “Oklahoma Indians are suffering 
cruel and devastating wrongs, [and] this subject will become a political 
battleground in the next Congress.”3  Collier also claimed, “Oklahoma interests 
were strong enough to persuade Congress to exclude the Oklahoma Indians from 
the protections and benefits of President Roosevelt’s legislation [the IRA].”  
Finally, Collier took direct aim at the situation in eastern Oklahoma by stating that  
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the IRA “if passed [in Oklahoma] would have done away with the avaricious local 
guardians who fatten upon [Oklahoma] Indians.”4  The Commissioner used this 
national forum to bring media attention to judicial and legal interests in eastern 
Oklahoma.  These groups had successfully lobbied the Oklahoma congressional 
delegation and specifically, Senator Thomas, to have the original bill emasculated 
and at the end of the legislative process, exempting Oklahoma Indians from most 
provisions of the bill.   
Surely, Collier must have realized the degree of ire he would raise in 
Oklahoma from these remarks, although he may have believed he would strengthen 
his efforts to bring Oklahoma Indians under the umbrella of the IRA.  Using 
opportunities such as the Indian Exposition to bring national exposure to the issue 
of the gross exploitation of Oklahoma Indians might garner public support.  In 
1923, Collier engineered a publicity campaign helped to defeat the Bursom Bill. He 
used that tactic again to draw national attention towards Oklahoma.  However,   
Senator Thomas was livid and lashed out at Collier.  He took many of Collier’s 
remarks as a direct affront.  Thomas defended his opposition to the Wheeler-
Howard act stating, “The legislation was designed to primarily perpetuate the 
Indian Bureau and I am against that.”5  Once again, Thomas prepared to spar with 
Collier during the upcoming Oklahoma Indian Congresses.   
 For several days, newspapers across the state grilled Collier.  The Tulsa 
Tribune struck back stating, “There is not a community in Oklahoma where it 
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would be impossible to find white citizens willing to serve on a jury for the trial 
and conviction of any “avaricious local guardian” whom Commissioner Collier or 
his assistants might name to the prosecutors.”6  The Muskogee Daily Phoenix 
wondered “why Collier assumed that Georgians would be interested in problems of 
Oklahoma Indians” and caustically added, “The visionary commissioner evidently 
doesn’t know the difference between members of the Five Tribes and the 
“reservation Indians” he pets and pampers in Arizona, New Mexico, and 
California.”7  Throughout the legislative struggle to enact Indian New Deal 
legislation, the Oklahoma press and specifically the press in the eastern half of the 
state unrelentingly attacked John Collier.  These papers never criticized President 
Roosevelt, They targeted Collier.  He represented an outside threat from 
Washington that jeopardized the relationship between white Oklahomans and 
Oklahoma Indians which for almost fifty years allowed plundering of Indian land 
and resources.  The press served as the mouthpiece of those who benefited.    
Both Senator Thomas and Commissioner Collier attended the first of 
several Indian conferences held in Muskogee on Oct 15, 1934.  Over 2,000 Indians, 
representing the Five Tribes, attended the initial daylong meeting.  Thomas and 
Collier used it partially as a forum for directing verbal barbs towards one another.  
Senator Thomas opened the meeting with lengthy remarks.  He told the Indians that 
he had exempted them from most provisions of the IRA in June of 1934 because 
the original proposal was too bulky; moreover, he did not feel it was right for 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 11. 
7 Muskogee Daily Phoenix, 15 October 1934, 6. 
  
 
124
Oklahoma Indians, and he wanted time to confer with them.  He told the Indians 
the purpose of the meeting was to “advise you what this bill [IRA] proposes for 
you, withholds for you and to see your reaction.”8  Throughout this meeting, 
Thomas directed his remarks to the more progressive groups, usually mixed bloods, 
who were more in favor of assimilation.  Also, he continually emphasized his belief 
that the IRA was “all right for reservation Indians, but it is no good for the Indians 
in Oklahoma who have land and property.”9   At the Pawnee agency, Thomas 
declared, “The Indian problem in Oklahoma is the allotment problem and the 
Indian problem in the West is the reservation problem.”10  Thomas repeatedly 
stressed to the Indians that, “Every line of this bill [IRA] is seeking to get the 
Indians off of their allotments now and back onto a reservation.”11   Thomas 
demonstrated a misunderstanding of the IRA by stressing at all the meetings that in 
order for Indians to “form a corporation, they must surrender their homes and move 
on a reservation.”12  Thomas cajoled the Indians in attendance saying, “If you want 
to go back seventy-five years, petition me to come under this bill [IRA].”13  While 
Thomas stated he believed that John Collier “has the best interests of the Indians at 
heart,” Thomas reiterated several times his belief that John Collier “knows much 
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more about Indians of Arizona, New Mexico and the far West than he knows about 
the Indians of Oklahoma.”14  Thomas made perfectly clear his view of the 
relationship of Collier and the Indian Bureau with Congress.  He stated, “The 
Congress makes the policies under which the Indian Office operates, so the all 
important branch of the federal service is the Congress of the United States.”15 
John Collier took a more defensive posture.  Early in his remarks Collier 
conceded “the Wheeler-Howard law needs to be changed, so it more accurately fits 
the needs of the Five Tribes.”16  Collier argued “we [the Indian Bureau] would not 
care whether the Oklahoma situation was met by fixing up the Wheeler-Howard 
Act a little bit, or by introducing a new act.”17  Collier sensed he was in Senator 
Thomas’s political backyard and proceeded guardedly.  He wanted the support of 
the Oklahoma Indians, but he realized he must also have support of the Senator 
Thomas as well. He realized he might not be able to position Oklahoma Indians 
completely under the umbrella of the IRA, but a partial victory through concession 
and compromise was more palatable than total defeat.  Collier already agreed with 
Senator Thomas to modify sections II and IV of the IRA, dealing with the 
prohibition of removing restrictions on Indian allotments and heirship policies.18  
Collier also admitted that the meaning of the word “reservation” in the IRA needed 
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clarification.  Many, including Senator Thomas and various Oklahoma Indians, 
viewed Oklahoma Indian reservations comprised of tribal lands with individual 
allotments and landless Indians often checker-boarded among private white land 
holdings.  Thomas doggedly held to the belief that individual Indian allotments 
could easily be returned to tribal reservation lands under the IRA.   
One representative from each of the Five Tribes was permitted to make a 
comment.  William A. Durant spoke for the Choctaws.  Speaking to the full bloods, 
Durant argued that “they [the full bloods] have been limited in bringing their 
consensus of opinion to all our law making.”19  He underscored the importance of 
factions within the tribe working together.  In addition to making a call for unity, 
Durant implied a responsibility on the part of the mixed bloods to protect full 
bloods from being taken advantage because of their lack of understanding of the 
IRA.20  Historian Erik Zissu contends mixed bloods tended to “exhibit a strong 
sense of responsibility to their fellow tribesmen [full bloods]. . . . [and] acted to 
lessen the dislocation of their fellow tribesmen.  Operating through the Indian 
Bureau, they recognized an obligation to those tribal members less prepared for the 
challenges of life in Oklahoma.”21 
Joseph W. Hayes of the Chickasaws spoke of the need not to look at 
Oklahoma Indians from the context of reservations but more accurately from the 
sense of an “Indian community.”  Hayes spoke of Oklahoma Indians organizing 
                                                          
19 The Pawnee Jurisdiction Meeting. , 45. 
20 Ibid. 42-44. 
21 Erik M. Zissu, Blood Matters The Five Civilized Tribes and the Search for Unity in the 
Twentienth Century, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 5, 7.   
  
 
127
into communities such as “a county or other [political] sub-division.”22  Hayes’ 
comments focused on an important issue that plagued the process surrounding 
enactment and implementation of the IRA/OIWA.  There existed an ongoing 
conflict among tribal groups, progressives v. traditionals, bureau administrators, 
and members of Congress, legal experts, and even anthropologists as to how best to 
blend Native American political processes with those of white society into a 
functioning system that would promote and protect the interests of all. This conflict 
of various interests and perspectives proved difficult to bridge.  
A brief perusal of the congresses’ minutes reveals clearly the differences in 
thought.  The Seven Clan Society Christians, a Cherokee full blood organization 
boasting 297 members directed a resolution to Senator Thomas.  In it they asked for 
his assistance “in forming a reservation or colony where we can hold our lands in 
common and where we can have a home as we understand the Wheeler-Howard 
bill [Act], to give us that right.”23  John Smith, a full blood Cherokee, stated he 
believed “we hear the voice of the Divine through these gentlemen—Senator 
Thomas and Commissioner Collier,” and “If they can get it right, like we want it, 
we as Cherokees are willing to approve the bill [IRA].”24  Apparently Smith was 
unaware of the disparate viewpoints of Thomas and Collier.  Several Indian 
attendees expressed almost blind support for Collier and his Indian New Deal.    
The Seminoles made a short statement: “If we are asked to place our 
approval upon any legislative program now in the making or to be made in the 
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future, we give notice now that we must have a voice in the initiating of such 
program and a part in its administration.”25  The Seminoles remained the only tribal 
group in Oklahoma that expressed a desire to play a part on both the legislative 
formulation and the administration of federal laws affecting them.   
In Miami, Oklahoma on October 16, Thomas continued his attacks on 
Collier and the Indian bureau.  He chastised Collier for his lack of knowledge and 
understanding of Oklahoma Indians by saying, “if Mr. Collier will [avail himself 
of] the opportunity . . . of learning your problems, your mode of living, your 
wishes, your aspirations, then he and I when we get back to Washington will have 
no trouble in working out the problems for the Oklahoma Indians.”26  Thomas 
slammed the Indian bureau saying, “. . . the Indian Office will always be opposed 
to repealing that law [IRA], because they have a conviction that the government 
can advise and supervise you Indians better than you can do it yourselves.”27  
Thomas repeatedly criticized either Collier or the BIA.  He outlined the chain of 
command for federal Indian affairs, with Collier and the Indian Bureau subservient 
to Congress.  In all the conferences, Thomas encouraged the Indians to follow a 
precise order of communicating to Congress their needs and wishes.  The Indian 
business committee would communicate their desires to the Indian agent who, in 
turn, would forwarded them to the Commissioner and then to the Secretary of the 
Interior and finally to the Indian Affairs Committees in both houses of Congress.  
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Action would be taken by Congress and then communicated back through 
Thomas’s chain of command.  Thomas continually demonstrated a paternalistic and 
deeply assimilationist attitude “There is no reason why Indians can’t be the same as 
everyone else” Thomas believed.28   
As in all the congresses, Senator Thomas encouraged the Indians to 
consider carefully the bill, both among individuals and within business committees.  
Thomas entreated all Indians in attendance to write him in Washington with their 
viewpoints, questions, and proposals.  At this time, both Thomas and Collier 
focused on amending the IRA to make in acceptable with Oklahoma Indians.    
John Collier rebutted most of Thomas’s accusations.  He dismissed 
Thomas’s contention that the IRA was a means of returning the Indians to 
reservations by stating “the use of the word reservation in this bill [IRA] doesn’t 
mean any idea of putting the Indians back on tribal land or on closed 
reservations.”29  He admitted the word “reservation” as used in the IRA was 
confusing and needed to be redefined to mean “neighborhood, community” or 
something of that kind.”30  Collier also conceded, partially at least, that section II of 
the IRA which extended the trust period on allotted lands indefinitely, needed to be 
amended so that Oklahoman Indians would be able to sell and transfer land.  
Collier was concerned about the rising costs to the Bureau to administer heirship 
lands that had been divided to such an extent that many were too small to be  
productively utilized.   
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Again the meeting opened to comments and questions from Indian 
attendees.  The Quapaw, who allotted themselves in the 1890s, expressed concern 
about section 4 of the IRA which outlined organization and incorporation.  In a 
resolution they explained, “This corporation business is so new [we] don’t know 
what it is and what it will lead to.”31  The Quapaws wanted more time to study and 
discuss the IRA. 
By the end of the meeting in Miami on October 16, Thomas and Collier 
both agreed that Oklahoma Indians did indeed need legislation specifically tailored 
for their circumstances.  Referring to the verbal sparring that went on after Collier’s 
caustic remarks about Oklahoma and Oklahoma Indians, Collier opened his 
remarks in Pawhuska by stating, “Some of you have been reading in the 
newspapers . . . that each of us [Thomas and Collier] had a knife and were getting 
ready to cut the throat of the other one, that we came down here for a big fight.”32  
Collier assured the Indians that was not the case.  Both Collier and Thomas now 
reassured Indian attendees that they were in agreement and were working together 
in the best interests of the Indians.  Though their relationship remained guarded, 
Collier and Thomas forged a fragile alliance, which remained intact through 
enactment of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.   
Towards the end of the Pawnee meeting, Indian attendees were given the 
opportunity to express their views or to ask questions. Several such as Owen Tah, a  
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Tonkawa, expressed the idea there was still “much confusion among the Indians 
about this bill.”33  Henry Chapman of the Pawnees expressed the feeling of many 
Indian attendees that more time was needed to look at and discuss various aspects 
of the IRA before they would be ready, one way or the other, to make their decision 
to either support or oppose the bill.  The Kaws remained opposed to extension of 
the IRA to Oklahoma Indians, while the Pawnee business council, named the 
Welfare Association of the Pawnee Tribe, requested “admittance in the Wheeler-
Howard Act.”34  Henry Roberts, a Ponca, indirectly chastised Senator Thomas for 
believing that only Indians on recognized reservations could incorporate under the 
IRA by stating, “Anybody with common sense would know that was the import of 
the bill when drafted.35  Louis McDonald, a member of the Ponca business 
committee, referred to factionalization among the Poncas over the IRA, noting that 
many Poncas verbally attack committee members and disrupt meetings.  McDonald 
referred to a rift developing between the traditional full bloods more progressive 
mixed bloods who opposed.  This character of division was clearly evident among 
many Oklahoma tribal groups as they considered the IRA.   
Collier returned to Washington to handle urgent matters replaced by A.C. 
Monahan the superintendent of the Five Civilized Tribes.  The next meeting was 
held in Concho on Monday, October, 22.  Thomas in his opening remarks repeated 
a favorite phrase, “What is good for the white folks is good for you [Indians] and 
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what is good for you is good for the white folks.”36  Thomas again repeated his 
contention that the Wheeler-Howard Bill applied more to reservation Indians in the 
western states than Oklahoma Indians who Thomas argued “in almost ever respect, 
are the same as white people.”37  Senator Thomas seemed convinced that 
Oklahoma Indians were far ahead of other Native Americans with respect to their 
position on the road to assimilation.  He maintained his belief that Oklahoma 
Indians, their interests and challenges, had little in common with western tribes he 
often referred to as “reservation” Indians.   Thomas also attempted to console the 
Indian attendees with the statement, “You have no enemies in Washington.  They 
are all your friends.”38  In justifying his exempting Oklahoma Indians from key 
provisions of the IRA, Thomas argued, “I do not think the Indians on this 
reservation [Cheyenne Arapaho] would be interested in trying to form a charter to 
go into business of some kind. . . . I know that you are not interested in the 
continuation of boarding schools.39   
Senator Thomas appeared interested in uncovering the desires and needs of 
Oklahoma Indians.  This genuine concern was blunted by a deeply ingrained 
paternalistic and assimilationist attitude towards Oklahoma Indians.  Thomas’s 
legacy seems to reveal a political motivation channeled by white interests.  Thomas 
often displayed a mocking attitude towards the Indians.  During the meeting in  
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Anadarko.  He spoke of Alaska Indians falling under the provisions of the IRA.  He 
told the Indian attendees “you have some new relatives [the Eskimos]. . . . So now 
when you want to go and see your new relatives you can go to Alaska for some fun 
on the ice, chasing polar bears and getting a lot of walrus meat.”40  The Indian 
reaction to these types of demeaning statements is unfortunately not part of any 
known record of these conferences.    
Chief Whiteshirt of the Arapahos discussed factions within his tribe.  He 
argued the older full bloods “retained their original allotments because they are 
more mature. . . .” and know “that the land was the only source of livelihood which 
they could depend on.  The mixed bloods, on the other hand, “were released [from 
restrictions on their allotments], sold their land; consequently, many of them have 
big families with no lands or no money to support their families.”41  Whiteshirt’s 
testimony reflects a variation on a common predicament shared by most Oklahoma 
Indians.  Oklahoma Indians who had been able to hold on to their allotments were 
hesitant to see Oklahoma come under the IRA.  Many shared a common 
misconception that they would lose their land as it was transferred back to 
communal tribal holdings.  Provisions in the IRA, which seemingly rewarded those 
Indians who had ‘lost’ their land holdings, upset many Indian land holders.  Senator 
Thomas seemed to share this misconception.  Many landholders were upset over 
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provisions in the IRA which they believed rewarded those Indians who had “lost” 
their land holdings.  
The Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes attended the last meeting with 
Oklahoma Indians held on October 23, 1934 at the Anadarko agency.  Senator 
Thomas and A.C. Monahan, the assistant Commissioner, also attended this 
meeting.  Senator Thomas, Mr. Monahan, and Congressman Jed Johnston occupied 
the bulk of the meeting time explanations and viewpoints on the IRA.  Late in the 
afternoon, the meeting opened up to statements and questions from the Indian 
attendees.   
Robert Dunlap, a Caddo representative voiced the opinion that the IRA 
might be all right for Indians from other areas of the nation who live on 
reservations, but as far as Oklahoma Indians were concerned, “We have a 
government here. We are under Federal and State laws.”42  Delos Lone Wolf, a 
Kiowa and plaintiff in the Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock Supreme Court decision of 1903, 
strongly protested Oklahoma adopting the IRA or any amended version.  Lone 
Wolf felt it was “60 years too late now that we have got the place where we are 
recognized as citizens of Oklahoma and the United States.”43  Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock had established the right of Congress to abrogate Indian treaties or 
policies over thirty years before Lone Wolf expressed fears even if the bill was 
amended to everyone’s liking: “We cannot tell what Congress will do.  If we  
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suggest some changes they might throw us in the community feature of it and we 
do not want any of that.”44  Lone Wolf’s statement expressed a distrust held by 
many Oklahoma Indians towards the federal government’s Indian policy.  After a 
long history of broken treaties and track record of legislation and Indian policy that 
consistently promoted white expansion at the cost of the Indians, many found it 
hard to believe that the IRA would be anything more than just business as usual by 
the federal government, regardless of how attractively it was packaged and 
presented to them.   
Albert Attocknie, speaking for the Comanches, expressed concern over 
losing educational benefits from boarding schools such as Riverside and Fort Sill, 
fearing they would be closed under the IRA.  Describing Indians, Attocknie said, 
“We are just like little children . . . we do not know what is good for us. . . . 
Maintaining boarding schools “is the best way to solve the Indian problem.”45  The 
temper of Attocknie’s remarks denoted a self-perception of inferiority and 
helplessness, something often found in the remarks of others as well.   
Loretta Fowler writing on this issue speaks of “subordinated peoples in 
colonial and neocolonial situations . . . [who] face actual as well as symbolic 
dominance and their tendency to ideologies that rationalize their position and “may 
come to be unconsciously accepted.”46  The nature of remarks by some of the 
Indian attendees at these Congresses substantiates Fowler’s perceptions.  As soon 
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as Attocknie ended his remarks, he was confronted by James Otipoby, a Kiowa, 
who was critical of Attocknie’s remarks and asked, “Will you kindly tell us where 
you stand.”47  Attocknie made reference to division within the tribal council and 
then commenced a personal attack on James Ottipoby.  Senator Thomas interrupted 
and quickly put an end to the bickering: “Mr. Monahan and I are not interested in 
your fights among yourselves.”48  John Loco, a Fort Sill Apache captured with 
Geronimo in 1886, expressed his opposition to the IRA, believing it was a big step 
backward for Indians. Loco gave an interesting opinion, stating, “I don’t know why 
the government wants to bring us up like white people and then when we come up 
like white people, they don’t like it.”49   
The conferences of October 1934 lacked substantive input from the Indians 
that might help either Senator Thomas or the Bureau to tailor beneficial legislation.  
These meetings were very structured.  Considerable time at each meeting was used 
by Senator Thomas and the Bureau representative, either Commissioner Collier or 
his assistant, A.C. Monahan in explaining the bill and giving their viewpoints.  In 
particular, Senator Thomas seems to have been very concerned with getting his 
viewpoints and feelings expressed.  This left little time for Indian voice.  The pace 
of the meetings was rushed.  The meetings were only one day in length.  Perhaps a 
day and a half or two days might have proven more effective.  In contrast, the 
conferences held by Commissioner Collier in March of 1934, prior to enactment of  
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the IRA, seemed to be structured so considerable more time was spent in not only 
explaining the bill, but in answering concerns of individuals and tribal groups as 
well as gathering recommendations for amendments and changes to the bill.   
Newspapers across the state followed these meetings.  Protecting the white 
status quo, they generally took a negative stance towards Collier and the IRA.  The 
Muskogee Daily Phoenix defended Oklahoma saying “our business, industry, 
courts and law making bodies . . . have done everything for the Indian that Mr. 
Collier now would completely destroy with his fanciful scheme for socializing the 
Indian.”50  In a front page story, the Daily Phoenix disclosed that an unnamed 
agency employee reported on the meeting in Muskogee on October 18: “We all feel 
Collier has put his head in a noose and given it a good yank.”51  The Oklahoma 
City Times reiterated the assimilationist viewpoints of many white Oklahomans: “in 
the long run, they must become Americans in the modern sense.”52  The Tulsa 
Daily World claimed the Indian bureau “persistently ignores the fact that in 
Oklahoma the Indian is a citizen; that the tendency . . . up to now has been away 
from the reservation and dependence to citizenship and independence.53  The 
Okemah Semi-Weekly Herald penned an editorial saying, “Mr. Collier should give 
a sympathetic ear to Mr. Thomas in the interest of common justice.”  The Shawnee 
Morning News confirmed reports that Thomas and Collier had reached agreement 
on several fundamental agreement on several points that previously divided them 
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on support for governmental legislation for Oklahoma Indians.54  The press in 
eastern Oklahoma continued to fulfill its role as the mouth piece for white 
opposition to the Indian New Deal, continuing to focus on Collier as the herald of a 
threat to the dominant and paternalistic relationship Oklahoma whites wished to 
preserve over Oklahoma Indians.   
Shortly after his return to Washington, John Collier took great pains to 
compliment Senator Thomas, at the same time denounce “the newspaper frenzy” 
from Oklahoma, which attacked him and the IRA.  In Collier’s judgment “The 
misrepresentations do not come from the platform, or from the floor where the 
Indians are listening and talking back.  They come from outside the meetings.”55  
Here again Collier often referred to “Oklahoma interests strong enough to persuade 
Congress to exclude the Oklahoma Indians from the protection and benefits of 
President Roosevelt’s legislation.”56  Collier would often refer to “Oklahoma 
interests” who opposed the IRA and OIWA in a general manner, without naming 
specific individuals or groups.  Congressmen Jack Nichols and Wesley Disney, 
representing districts in the eastern part of the state would provide strong 
opposition throughout the legislative process for both the IRA and the OIWA.  On 
November 5, Collier issued a five page paper re-capping concerns expressed by 
Oklahoma Indians regarding various provisions in the IRA.  He answered a number 
of frequently asked questions by many Indians during the Thomas conferences.   
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The bulk of the questions pertained to land issues, government land purchases for 
the Indians as well as the jurisdiction of Indian probate matters.  These concerned 
both individuals and business committees.  In several statements scattered 
throughout the paper, Collier assured the Indians, “Practically nothing in the act is 
compulsory.”57  Stressing the Bureau’s attempts to garner Indian input into the act, 
Collier further remarked “it is the first time that any important legislation affecting 
Indians in which the decision of acceptance or rejection is left entirely with the 
Indians to decide by popular vote.”58  Many Indian groups left the conferences 
leaning towards acceptance of the IRA than before they came, but he also knew 
many had lingering doubts and concerns.  All across Oklahoma, Indian groups 
spent the late fall and winter months of 1934-1935 discussing and debating the 
merits of the IRA, as they felt it would affect their tribal groups.   
 With the November elections in 1934, Oklahomans Elmer Thomas and Will 
Rogers were re-elected by comfortable margins.  In January of 1935, both assumed 
the chairmanships of the Indian Affairs Committees in the Senate and the House in 
January of 1935.  Senator Thomas worked closely with Congressman Will Rogers 
and drafted a bill they felt would give Oklahoma Indians the benefits of the Indian 
Reorganization Act while at the same time accommodating the uniqueness of 
Oklahoma Indians.  Senator Thomas had exempted Oklahoma Indians from most 
provisions of the IRA, fearing it would place them back on reservations.  He clung  
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to the belief that Oklahoma Indians were further along the road to assimilation than 
other tribal groups across the nation.  During the congresses he and Commissioner 
Collier held in Oklahoma, in October of 1935, Thomas’ thinking shifted towards 
support for John Collier and the Indian New Deal.  During this time, Collier wisely 
remained in the background as the Oklahoma congressional delegation drafted the 
Thomas-Rogers Bill.   
On February 27, 1936, Thomas and Rogers formally introduced their 
proposal to Congress.   Just a few days before, Rogers discussed their proposal 
before the annual convention of the Oklahoma Education Association in Tulsa.  
There he touted their proposal as “Oklahoma’s Newer New Deal” for the state’s 
Indians.59  Jimmie Rogers, a full blooded Creek remarked, “We not only want a 
New Deal, but we also could use a square deal.“60  “The bill is the result of 
conferences between the Indian Bureau and the Oklahoma delegation in 
Congress.”61  In order to secure passage, this proposal, known as the Thomas-
Rogers Bill, this proposal underwent an arduous eighteen-month struggle.  
 The original draft of the Thomas-Rogers Bill was seven pages in length.  
Section 2 addressed the issue of restrictions.  It established two categories based on 
blood quantum.  Those with fifty percent or more Indian blood belonged to the 
first-degree group.  Their land and property continued to be held in trust by the 
Secretary of the Interior, with the president authorized to extended restrictions 
indefinitely.  Removal of restrictions applied to those with less than fifty percent 
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Indian blood.  A procedure was established for a competency commission to meet 
every four years and review the situation of every Indian in second-degree status to 
determine if the individual Indian was capable of managing his affairs.  If so, their 
restrictions could be removed and a patent in fee issued.  They could then to sell 
their land without restrictions.  The proposed bill also allowed for land purchases 
by the Secretary of the Interior.  These land purchases could be either for additions 
to tribal holdings and therefore communal in nature, or for individual Indians as 
well.  Held in trust by the Secretary, the purchased lands and would be exempted 
from Oklahoma jurisdiction and taxes.  These provisions became the subject of 
intense debate during the congressional hearings.    
 Section eight, considered by Collier to be of utmost importance, also proved 
to be one of the most controversial portions of the proposed legislation.  This 
section, applying specifically to the Osage and the Five Civilized Tribes, 
transferred jurisdiction over land, property, and probate matters for restricted 
Indians of the first degree from the Oklahoma county courts to the Secretary of the 
Interior.  It also prohibited the appointment of legal guardians for any Osage or 
Five Tribe member of the first degree.   This section wreaked havoc with the legal 
and grafting professions in eastern Oklahoma.  Their response was immediate, 
intense, and enduring through the balance of the legislative process.  Section eight 
created a battlefield throughout the legislative process.   
 Sections twelve re-established the right of Oklahoma Indians to organize. 
Section twelve outlined procedures for establishing constitutionally based tribal 
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governments, similar to provisions in the IRA.  Sections thirteen and fourteen 
authorized the creation of an Oklahoma Indian Credit Corporation with an annual 
appropriation of $2,000,000.  These loans were made available to either chartered 
cooperatives and associations, or individuals.  Finally, section seventeen removed 
the exemption to all benefits to the IRA imposed by Senator Thomas.  This allowed 
Oklahoma Indians access to the $10,000,000 revolving credit fund for Indian 
chartered corporations.   
 The Indian Bureau, along with Senator Thomas and Representative Rogers, 
made a substantial effort to get copies of their proposal into the hands of individual 
Indians as well as tribal business committees.  Several tribal groups passed 
resolutions either supporting or condemning the Thomas-Rogers bill.  The 
Choctaw-Chickasaw Protective League sponsored a meeting to discuss the bill.  
Over two thousand Indians attended the day long session held in Ardmore and 
unanimously “passed a resolution requesting the Oklahoma [congressional] 
delegation to support and urge its immediate passage.”62   
The original Thomas-Rogers bill utilized the concept of blood quantum in 
determining whether or not Oklahoma Indians fell under restricted allotments. The 
use of blood “as a basis for racially identifying Native Americans and 
distinguishing them from the national body” became institutionalized with the 
Dawes Act of 1887.63  Blood quantum became a measuring tool applied to many  
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aspects of federal Indian policy.  White society incorporated this concept into their 
ideology, which underscored their perspective of and interaction with Native 
Americans.   
The use of blood quantum divided Indians into two groups based on their 
percentage of Indian blood, sometimes benchmarked at fifty percent and often at 
twenty five percent.  Those Indians with a greater percentage of Indian blood were 
often determined to be incapable or incompetent to conduct legal or commercial 
affairs due to factors such as their inability often to speak, read, or write English 
and their lack of understanding or experience with white society.   Those Indians 
with a lesser percentage of Indian blood were determined to be competent or 
capable of handling their own affairs.  Tied closely to race, blood quantum was 
used by the federal government to “control access to economic resources,” while 
whites used it as “a justification for economic exploitation and territorial 
expansion.”64  
 The Burke Act of 1906 and McCumber amendments offered later in the 
year introduced the concept of blood quantum into federal policy with Oklahoma 
Indians.  These two measures established the classification system used to 
categorize Oklahoma Indians as competent or incompetent, restricted or non-
restricted.  Over time, this would evolve into the provisions included in the first 
draft of the Thomas-Rogers Bill.  Historian Erick Zissu rightfully argues, “In no 
small measure, an individual’s blood quantum affected his future.”65  Depending on 
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his blood quantum, some Indians were allowed to sell or lease their land as they 
saw fit, while those deemed incompetent because of a high degree of Indian blood 
fell under protection of the Department of the Interior.  White oil, timber, coal, and 
land speculators used abundant resources and exerted so much effort against this 
group in order to acquire control over their land and its resources.   
Not all Oklahoma Indians fit conveniently into the pigeon holes of 
competency or incompentency, restricted or not restricted.  E. K. Labelle, a three 
quarter blood Sioux from Hominy, Oklahoma, explained to Senator Thomas that as 
an automobile salesman he had “sold more Buick automobiles than any other 
individual in the State of Oklahoma—yet your bill renders me an Incompetent 
Indian with all my restrictions as I was the day I was born or the day I was 
allotted.”66  The blood quantum guidelines proposed in the Thomas-Rogers Bill and 
contested by many white interests, also found opposition with a number of 
progressive Oklahoma Indians, such as Labelle, classified as incompetent, would 
remain opposed to that section of the bill.  Charles Curtis, a Kaw, was declared 
incompetent, having his allotment held in trust by the federal government.  
Ironically, he was former vice president under Herbert Hoover, and sponsor of the 
1898 act which bears his name.   
Blood quantum permeated the thinking of many Native Americans as well.  
The traditional-progressive dichotomy discussed throughout this study is imbued 
with elements of this ideology.  The Arapaho opposed the bill, as did the business 
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committees for the Pawnee, Ponca, Kaw, Otoe, and Tonkawa tribes.  In a joint 
resolution the latter five tribes expressed the sentiment “our Indian people do not 
feel that they are capable of handling such a large undertaking.”67  Other groups 
expressed similar thoughts as well.  These groups felt that many of their tribe 
lacked “business ability in handling their own individual matters.”68  James Kahdot, 
chief of the Pottawatomies, expressed support for the bill yet revealed a deep 
division within the tribe, the business committee opposed to the Thomas- Rogers 
Bill and the majority of tribal members favored its passage.    
As with efforts to secure passage of the Wheeler-Howard Bill in the 
previous spring, most white opposition to the bill came from eastern Oklahoma.  L. 
R. Heflin of Fairfax complained that the Thomas-Rogers Bill deprived Oklahoma 
of much needed tax revenue.  With the federal government purchasing land, 
thereby increasing tax exempt tribal holdings, Heflin argued that counties affected 
“would have no schools at all.”69  Other whites decried the loss of Oklahoma tax 
revenue.  A major factor in Senator Thomas’s original opposition to the Wheeler-
Howard Bill was this very issue.  However, John Collier demonstrated that the 
impact would be minimal to any specific area, as these land purchases would be 
spread out across the whole of Oklahoma.  Senator Thomas eliminated this 
objection utilizing his own entrenched assimilationist beliefs.  He rationalized that 
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a small short term loss in any state tax revenue would be more than offset by the 
taxes that self sufficient Oklahoma Indians paid.   
The legal community in eastern Oklahoma strongly objected to the Thomas-
Rogers Bill.  Several county bar associations, including Pittsburg, Caddo, and 
Osage adopted formal resolutions signed by their memberships condemning the 
proposed legislation.  The Wagoner Chamber of Commerce described the bill as a 
“direct assault on the judiciary of Oklahoma.”70  James I. Howard, a Pawhuska 
attorney, told Thomas “I am writing as a friend . . . in order that I may tell you just 
what the situation is down here . . . . that you will lose nine out of every ten friends 
that you have in this county.”71  Osage County judge, L. F. Roberts, in a letter 
marked “personal”, chastised Senator Thomas: “Your friends and citizens of Osage 
County are amazed at your introduction of the present pending Indian bill. . . . We 
trust that you will . . . see to it that the bill in its present form is killed.”72   Thomas 
responded to judge Roberts arguing that the proposal affected only a small portion 
of Oklahoma’s overall population.  Roberts replied back to Thomas in a terse note 
saying, “I desire to call your attention to the fact that the population of Oklahoma is 
2,396,040 people and it is not necessary in order to protect 150,000 people to injure 
more than two million.73  The legal community remained adamantly opposed to 
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section 8 of the proposal, which transferred control of most land issues, including 
probate matters, from Oklahoma county courts to the Secretary of the Interior.    
Several Oklahoma Indians wrote to Senator Thomas giving their 
perspective on the proposed Thomas-Rogers Bill and the Oklahoma legal 
profession.  J.W.B. Nichols, a Choctaw, stated “They [lawyers] think this bill if 
passed will deprive some of them of grafting what little the Indians have left.”74  In 
a letter signed by “An Osage Indian” the writer spoke of the “many” attorneys in 
the small town of Pawhuska where most of their practice “is being guardian, 
attorney or handling suits filed against or between Indians.”75  The writer counseled 
Thomas, “Of course under these circumstances you will understand that the Bar 
would be against taking any Indian business out of the county court where you can 
get an order of court for most anything under the sun, including unreasonably large 
Attorney fees.”76  In a letter to J.E. Sixkiller of Stillwell, Senator Thomas exposed 
his understanding of the reasons for the legal profession’s stance on the bill.  
Thomas revealed, “The opposition to the bill comes entirely from persons who 
have been living off of the Indians all these years.”77 
On April 5, both houses of the Oklahoma state legislature passed 
resolutions condemning the proposed Thomas-Rogers bill.  Members in both 
houses conducted verbal assaults directed towards John Collier.  State senator, Al 
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Nichols, brother of Congressman Jack Nichols, declared on the senate floor, “He 
[Collier] looks like one of those Egyptian mummies and all he knows about Indian 
affairs is what he found out by reading James Fennimore Cooper’s books.”  
Equally as profound, Senator Claude Briggs declared “all Collier knows about 
Indian affairs is something he read in a book,” while Senator Henry Johnston 
decried the Commissioner’s “innocent ignorance” of Indian affairs.78  It is 
worthwhile to note that all of these critics hailed from the eastern half of 
Oklahoma.        
Samplings of Oklahoma newspapers just prior to the commencement of 
hearings for the Thomas-Rogers Bill exuded a great deal of opposition to the bill.  
The Muskogee Daily Phoenix editorialized “the danger to Oklahoma’s tax 
situation” with passage of the bill and concluded that the Thomas-Rogers Bill was 
“a distinct disappointment.”79  The Tulsa Daily World referred to the Thomas-
Rogers Bill as “a back-door attempt at the thing which was attempted a year or so 
ago” and warned its readers that “the plan of the Thomas Bill is to take away a 
considerable portion of state sovereignty.”80  The Okmulgee Daily Times heralded a 
familiar theme that “if enacted into law, would turn back the hands of time many 
decades and would again make Oklahoma Indians wards of the government as 
though they were mere children.”81  Finally, The Okemah Daily Leader, in an 
editorial entitled “Dangerous Indian Legislation,” took an assimilationist stance and 
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announced the Thomas-Rogers Bill “tends to undo all the careful work that has 
been done for forty years in training the Indian for citizenship.” 82  
Once again, Joseph Bruner, a full-blooded Creek from Sepulpa and 
president of the American Indian Federation, led the organized Indian opposition to 
the bill.  Bruner denounced Commissioner Collier and again argued the Indian New 
Deal and specifically the Thomas-Rogers Bill were a step backward for all Native 
Americans.  Bruner claimed to speak for forty Oklahoma tribal groups.  The Osage 
responded to Bruner’s claim in a council meeting called by Chief Fred Lookout.  
Lookout exclaimed, “We, members of the tribal council of the Osage are angry 
because a Washington newspaper [interviewing Bruner] said that the Osages are 
one of the forty tribes demanding the elimination of ‘Collier and Collierism.”  John 
J. Matthews, an Osage and noted native historian and a spokesman for the council 
angrily denounced Bruner saying, “No one has the right to speak for the Osage 
Indians but the tribal council and the Chief or their accredited representatives.”83  
At least with the Osage, Bruner’s methods backfired on his attempts to garner 
Indian opposition to the Thomas-Rogers Bill.   
Because of Bruner’s sustained vocal attacks, both Thomas and Rogers 
delayed committee hearings for their proposal.  Representative Rogers stated, “I am 
waiting for all the Oklahoma Indians to thoroughly digest provisions of the bill and 
for some of the present heat to die down before taking any further action.”84   
                                                          
82 The Okemah Daily Leader, 7 April 1935, 4.  
83 The Tushkahomman, 9 April 1934, 2.  
84 The Tushkahomman, 26 March 1935, 2.  
  
 
150
Hearings on the Thomas-Rogers Bill finally began in the Senate in early April of 
1935.  The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs conducted hearings from April 8 to 
April 11.  The initial meeting consisted of all members of the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee.  Since the proposed bill applied only to Oklahoma Indians, Senator 
Thomas quickly relegated the remaining meetings to a subcommittee consisting of 
himself and Senator Frazier of North Dakota and Senator Donahey of Ohio.   
 During these hearings, a number of Oklahoma Indians representing various 
tribal groups testified.  Many brought resolutions from tribal committees to be read 
into the record.  Most favored the legislative proposal.  Some suggested various 
amendments.  Roly Canard, a Creek chief, announced that the Creeks supported the 
Thomas-Rogers Bill.  When asked about any opposition, Conrad said the only 
opposition he was aware of was from white lawyers who were bitterly opposed to 
section 8 of the proposal which transferred jurisdiction on probate matters from 
Oklahoma courts to the Secretary of the Interior.85 
Several Indian groups opposed any new Indian legislation and sought a 
return to treaties negotiated a century earlier.  Ned Blackfox, a Cherokee from 
Oaks, reported that a committee of the Cherokee Emigrant Indians decided, “Our 
wants is a treaty, which was made in December 29, in 1835, and 1836 and 1846.  
This is our own treaty and we can not exchange with any other laws.”86  Blackfox 
was referring to the New Echota treaty of December 29, 1835.  The factionalism 
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generated by the New Echota treaty affected Cherokee politics and society for 
generations.87   
 Joseph Bruner appeared before the committee on Thursday April 11, 1935.  
Bruner quickly launched into an attack on other Creeks who had testified before the 
committee: “They were selected by manipulations of Collier henchmen through 
[the] Muskogee Indian Office.”88  Bruner proceeded to launch into a diatribe on the 
illegality of Creeks who had testified.  Senator Thomas cut him short saying, “I 
doubt if the committee will be very much interested in the local politics among the 
Creek Tribe.  If you will get down to the bill as soon as you can, please.”89  
Congressional patience with Bruner waned as he repeatedly used committee 
hearings as an opportunity to criticize most other individuals and groups, other than 
the American Indian Federation associated with Indian affairs.  In particular, 
Bruner aimed much of his verbal venom at the BIA and Commissioner Collier.  
 Grady Lewis, a Choctaw and one of their tribal attorneys, presented some 
challenging testimony.  Lewis announced that the Choctaws strongly endorsed the 
Thomas-Rogers Bill, subject to incorporation of a few minor amendments.  Lewis 
also strongly condemned federal Indian policy in Oklahoma since statehood in 
1907.  Lewis viewed Oklahoma Indians as “suspended between two evils, the 
crookedness of the county court, and the incompetency of the Indian Office.”  
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Lewis compared the conditions of the Choctaw decades before statehood with the 
present saying, “Our people are bordering on professional paupers and beggars . . . 
and it is a deplorable condition, when it is considered that those selfsame Indians a 
hundred years ago maintained their own government and did a fairly good job of 
it.”90  Lewis expressed the need for many Indians to remain under the guardianship 
of the federal government, saying, “The Indian is not a good business man, he can 
not learn the white man’s standards of value.”91   A few days later, The 
Tushkamman reported on Lewis’s gripping testimony concerning the deplorable 
situation of Oklahoma Indians and made an urgent plea: “If the Thomas-Rogers 
Bill does not appeal to you, in Heaven’s name draft another which will remedy the 
intolerable conditions.”92   
               G. B. Fulton, tribal attorney for the Osage, testified before the Senate sub 
committee in April of 1935.  He spoke of the opposition to the proposed Thomas-
Rogers Bill by the Osage County Bar Association and referred Senator Thomas to 
their resolution condemning the bill.  Thomas pushed to get Fulton’s opinion.  
Finally Fulton testified, “As I understand it the chief objections would be that under 
the Thomas-Rogers Bill all estates would be administered by the [federal] 
government . . . which would deprive those attorneys of large and sometimes 
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exorbitant fees.”93  This bold statement verified the deplorable practices by some 
probate lawyers in eastern Oklahoma and the threat they felt by the proposed bill.   
 The Senate hearings ended on April 11, 1935.  The debate over the Thomas-
Rogers Bill continued unabated in Oklahoma.  In an editorial, the Indian paper, The 
Tushkahomman, spoke of opposition to the bill saying, “opposition to the 
enactment of this bill is coming from individuals and groups of people who are 
working for their selfish interests and not for the welfare of the Indians” and 
singled out “certain units of the Bar Association in the state.”94  County judge W.H. 
Blackbird wired Senator Thomas stating that the Thomas-Rogers Bill “will 
practically destroy the jurisdiction of county courts in Indian matters and will take 
away . . . the administration of big estates and result in Indian funds being taken out 
of the state.”95   Mrs. W. V. Krier, a Creek, wrote Senator Thomas expressing her 
support for the bill.  In response to, mainly white interests, who claimed the bill 
would take the Indians back fifty years, Mrs. Krier decried, “I’m sure the majority 
of Indians would gladly go back to the days before allotment . . . .”  She also 
believed that Indians needed protection from the federal government: “And we 
need to be in a position to exercise some authority about the handling of our 
affairs.”96  Milford Growingham, a Shawnee from Avery, expressed his opposition 
to the bill based on the oft-held mistrust of the Indians towards the federal 
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government.  Growingham, claiming to speak for “lots of Indians around Shawnee” 
said, “They say and tell us there is something behind all this dealing.  Many still 
can’t understand it clearly.  They hate to lose all the land they have.”97  The Indian 
Rights Association, which strongly favored the Thomas-Rogers Bill, described the 
situation in Oklahoma by using a statement Senator Burton K. Wheeler, co-sponsor 
of the IRA, made in 1929 during a Senate sub-committee meeting: “There are only 
two classes of people in Oklahoma, the Indians and those who live off the 
Indians.”98  
 On April 22, 1935, the House Committee on Indian Affairs, chaired by 
Representative Will Rogers began hearings on the Thomas-Rogers Bill.  These 
hearings proved much more argumentative and contentious than the Senate 
hearings.  Oklahoma Congressman, Jack Nichols, though not a committee member, 
was allowed to participate in questioning witnesses.  Congressman Nichols was the 
brother and law partner of Oklahoma state senator Al Nichols, who gave such an 
eloquent castigation of John Collier on the Oklahoma state senate floor in early 
April.  Nichols asked Chairman Rogers to sit in on the hearings claiming, “I have 
more Indians in my congressional district than any other Congressman.”99  Nichols’ 
legal background served him well as he skillfully “worked” witnesses in attempting 
to extract testimony favorable to his viewpoints on the proposed bill.  Nichols  
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represented white interests from eastern Oklahoma, many of them lawyers, judges, 
and guardians who had profited from legal dealings involving the sale of Indian 
allotments and probate matters.  This group remained adamantly opposed to 
sections within the bill which proposed changing the manner in which restrictions 
were applied or removed.  They especially opposed section eight which took 
jurisdiction over these matters out of the hands of local Oklahoma courts and rested 
it with the Secretary of the Interior.  Nichols led opposition to the bill during the 
house hearings and proved instrumental in having either objectionable sections of 
the bill amended or removed from the proposal.   Because the Thomas-Rogers Bill 
affected only Indians in Oklahoma, most members showed little interest in the 
proceedings and followed the lead of the Oklahoma members.  By this time, many 
in congress viewed Indians “as a particularly western problem in much the same 
way that African Americans were viewed as a “southern” responsibility.100  Many 
left their support or opposition up to the Oklahoma delegation and voted whichever 
way they sided.    
 With the biased attention of Congressman Nichols devoted to almost every 
person testifying, contention prevailed at the hearings.  The first two Indian 
witnesses were Roly Canard of the Creeks and Grady Lewis representing the 
Choctaws.  Nichols attempted to get them both to agree to the gist of a question he 
asked: “Is it your opinion that a man—that the Secretary of the Interior—1500 
miles away from the Indians of Oklahoma, more likely a man who is not even a 
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lawyer . . . is in better shape to determine the heirs of a decedent in Oklahoma than 
are the county courts of Oklahoma?”101   Throughout these hearings, Nichols 
doggedly contended, “That there is not an emergency in Oklahoma calling for 
legislation that would take away from the courts of Oklahoma their jurisdiction 
over these matters [probate].”102  Threatened loss of control by Oklahoma county 
courts over Indian probate matters remained the critical issue for opposing white 
interests in eastern Oklahoma.   
 On Monday April 29, 1935 Lawrence E. Lindley, representing the Indian 
Rights Association, testified.  The IRA offered strong support for the bill with the 
exception of provisions that established the degrees of blood quantum as a 
determining factor over the issue of removing restrictions.  Lindley testified “it 
carries these provisions (namely, for competency commissions and the rapid 
removal of restrictions of Indians of less than one-half degree Indian blood) that 
past experience has shown are most effective ways of separating Indians from their 
land.”103  Others, giving testimony, criticized these provisions.  Many felt it 
represented a continuation of governmental policies which so effectively 
contributed to the loss of Indian land to whites.   
 Joseph Bruner, president of the American Indian Federation, gave brief 
testimony.  Alice Lee Jemison, Bruner’s secretary and a former member of the 
Board of Indian Commissioners dissolved by Collier in 1933, read a statement from 
Bruner.  In it Bruner characterized the Thomas-Rogers Bill as “a wandering, 
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ramifying, communistic “scheme” and voiced his complete opposition to the bill.  
He concluded, “I am opposed to the so called “Thomas-Rogers Bill” for Oklahoma 
Indians; mainly it bristles with Collier and Collierism.”104   
 Oklahoma Congressman Wesley Disney, who represented Osage county, 
also testified before the House committee.  Disney exerted a strong voice of 
opposition to the Thomas-Rogers Bill throughout the legislative process.  He 
expressed resistance to the bill stating, “The [state] legislature passed a resolution 
against this bill . . . . Nineteen bar associations passed resolutions against it.  Any 
number of chambers of commerce have passed resolutions against it.  Public 
sentiment in eastern Oklahoma is solidly against it.”105  More importantly, Disney 
based his opposition on the views of former Oklahoma Congressman, William 
Hastings.  Hastings, now retired from Congress, strongly opposed the IRA for 
Oklahoma Indians and expressed opposition to certain provisions in the Thomas-
Rogers Bill.  Disney claimed that because John Collier and Senator Thomas had 
never lived in eastern Oklahoma, “They are not entitled to have their judgment 
balanced against that of Mr. Hastings as to this bill, [and] as to eastern 
Oklahoma.”106  Disney continued to oppose sections of the bill and in conjunction 
with Congressman Nichols effectively forced a major restructuring of the bill.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
103 Ibid., 72. 
104 Ibid,., 81-82. 
105 Ibid., 154. 
106 Ibid., 154. 
  
 
158
Congressman Disney would later conclude, “I see lots of good coming from killing 
the bill and no harm.”107   
 John Collier opened the hearings with a lengthy explanation of the specifics 
of the Thomas-Rogers Bill.  He answered numerous specific questions concerning 
the mechanics of it.  As mentioned above, he had been in attendance at most of the 
hearings, offering explanations and clarified technical points from time to time 
from the audience.  During later questioning by Representative Usher Burdick of 
North Dakota, Collier discussed the widespread Indian support for the proposed 
change in jurisdiction for probate matters in the Thomas-Rogers Bill.  Collier noted 
that “before the Senate committee came representatives of tribe after tribe of 
Oklahoma Indians, 28 of them in all, to testify that they were satisfied that their 
affairs were being expeditiously, economically, and justly handled under the 
probate system of the Interior Department.”108  During most of the house hearings, 
entrenched assimilationist thinking opposed reform proposals as Congressmen 
contended with John Collier’s administrators and bureaucrats.   
 Outside of the instances listed above, few Indian voices were heard during 
the House hearings.  Many Indians testified before the Senate hearings in early 
April, but most could not financially afford to stay in Washington during the weeks 
between hearings or afford a second trip back to Washington from Oklahoma.  
Opposition congressmen, especially Jack Nichols and Wesley Disney, absconded 
most of the time expressing their opposition or occasionally grilled witnesses who 
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offered support.  A great deal of their blame for past failures of federal Indian 
policy fell upon the Indian Bureau.   Finally, John Collier served as a convenient 
target for attacks: the opposition characterized his proposals as a step back in time 
for Oklahoma Indians.   
 On Thursday May 9, Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes appeared before 
the House committee.  Ickes offered a strong endorsement of the proposed bill.  He 
stated, “The bill before your committee reverses the heartless policy established by 
Congress in 1908.”  Ickes also claimed, “The Oklahoma Indians themselves are 
unanimously in favor of this measure.”  Ickes also took a swipe at the opposition to 
the bill when he testified “. . . the opposition seems to be confined to . . . a fraction 
of the legal profession, who have directly profited through the mass of frivolous, 
wholly unnecessary Oklahoma Indian litigation. . . .We are asking that they 
[Oklahoma Indians] be protected from the rapacity of a small group of 
unscrupulous lawyers.”109    
 At the last session of the hearings, on Wednesday, May 15, Congressman 
Nichols made a lengthy formal statement rebutting much of Secretary Ickes 
testimony given on May 9.  Nichols refuted Ickes claim of the majority of 
Oklahoma Indians supporting the proposed Thomas-Rogers Bill.  Nichols claimed, 
“I have in my files letters from dozens and dozens of Indians telling me of the 
opposition to this bill by the Indians in its present form.”110  In closing, Nichols 
charged the Thomas-Rogers Bill as an attempt by Secretary Ickes “to bring under 
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the control of the Secretary of the Interior . . . those six tribes [the Osage and the 
Five Civilized Tribes] over which he does not now enjoy complete and full 
control.”111   
 As the House hearings drew to a close, it was evident that the bill in its 
present form would not pass without significant amending.  In spite of the 
widespread support among Oklahoma Indians as measured by their testimony in 
both the Senate and House hearings and the numerous resolutions sent to Congress 
by tribal councils, the combined efforts of an organized and vociferous opposition 
led by Congressmen Nichols and Disney, utilizing the support and reputation of 
former Oklahoma Congressmen W. W. Hastings proved overwhelming.  On May 
10, 1935, the Thomas-Rogers Bill was tabled over strong objections from chairman 
Rogers.  The Thomas-Rogers Bill was dead.112 
 In June of 1935, Senator Thomas, working with John Collier, drafted a new 
version of the Thomas-Rogers Bill.  By July 29, Thomas introduced the new bill to 
the Senate, drastically revised in order to please opponents and secure passage. 
Gone was the blood quantum designation.  Gone was section eight that transferred 
jurisdiction over probate matters from Oklahoma county courts to the Secretary of 
the Interior.  The bill included streamlined and eased procedures for allowing the 
secretary to remove restrictions.  The make-up of competency commissions was 
altered to include one Indian member from the involved tribe, along with the local 
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superintendent, and a member appointed by the Secretary.  In short, “the amended 
bill returned the Indians to state court jurisdiction and liberalized the provisions for 
declaring Indians competent which would speed the lifting of restrictions . . . . The 
welfare, economic, and organizational aspects of the original bill remained.”113  
This new version passed the Senate in mid August.  The bill moved over to the 
House for consideration.  Congressmen Nichols and Disney objected to the new 
version and kept the bill from consideration for the remainder of the session.   
In November of 1935, Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William 
Zimmerman, spent a week in Oklahoma touring the Indian agencies with 
Congressman Rogers.  Touted as a fact finding mission “to determine sentiment of 
Oklahoma Indians on the Thomas-Rogers bill now pending before the House of 
Representatives,” considerable effort was expended in urging individuals and 
business committees to let Oklahoma House members know of their support for the 
bill.  Both Zimmerman and Rogers exuded optimism that the revised bill would 
pass the House in the next session.  Congressman Rogers predicted that the bill 
would pass “in some form during the next session of Congress.”114   
 In April of 1936, the House Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings on 
the revised version of the Thomas-Rogers Bill.  These hearings dragged on into 
June as Congressman Disney led vociferous ongoing opposition.  Disney, not a 
member of the committee, made his presence felt.  Disney requested an 
amendment, exempting the Osage from the bill.  He justified the proposed 
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amendment stating, “The Osage Nation . . . is so different and independent from the 
rest of the state that I think it would be a serious mistake to put Osage county in 
this bill.”115  On June 11, Disney motioned to have Osage County exempted from 
the bill.  Once it was approved by the committee, Disney announced he would now 
support the bill.  Exercising their voice, the Osage Tribal Council sent a telegram to 
the committee “requesting that the Osages not be exempted from the bill.”116  
Obviously, Disney did not listen to his Indian constituency on this measure, but to 
white business and legal interests.  The remaining two days of hearings covered 
minor points within the bill.  These were agreeably ironed out and the bill was 
favorably reported out of committee on June 15.   The next day, the House passed 
the bill.  The Senate passed the House version on June 18 and on June 26, 1936; 
President Roosevelt signed the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act into law.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Revival 
 
On the evening of June 27, 1936, Senator Elmer Thomas sent a telegram to 
John Hugh Chambers of Tulsa which read, “Oklahoma General Welfare Bill passed 
both Houses before Congress adjourned and was signed by the President on 
yesterday.  It will become effective immediately.”1 Senator Thomas, like others 
closely involved with the passage of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, expected 
rapid implementation of its terms and programs.  John Collier, Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, claimed the OIWA would allow Oklahoma Indians “to put an end to 
the wastage of their assets, which has resulted in the loss of more than nine-tenths 
of their lands and . . . reduced more than 50,000 of their number to landlessness and 
abject poverty.”2  From enactment in June 1936 until the early 1950s when federal 
Indian policy turned a sharp corner and entered the termination era, implementation 
of the OIWA focused on land purchases, credit, and the reestablishment of tribal 
governments.     
It became apparent soon after enactment that application of the OIWA 
meant various things to the groups involved.  As the burden of the Great 
Depression wore on, a conflict between issues of relief versus reform became quite 
evident in Oklahoma Indian affairs.  Government leaders including John Collier  
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and Senator Thomas seemed concentrated more on long range reforms with 
measures designed to foster fundamental changes in Indian culture and lifestyle and 
its relationship to the dominant white culture. On the other hand, many Oklahoma 
Indians focused on relief measures.  For them, day-to-day life remained a 
formidable struggle.  In 1936, many Oklahoma Indians hoped the OIWA would 
resolve immediate concerns such as food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and 
schooling for their children.  
Subsistence agriculture represented the economic lifestyle of many 
Oklahoma Indians.  Oklahoma Indians in the western half of the state also suffered 
from the effects of the persistent drought during the 1930s, the Dust Bowl.  In 
1934, agricultural extension workers reported that many western Oklahoma Indians 
“were unable to get a garden and they are now suffering from the lack of food as 
well as water and feed for their livestock.”3  In 1935, destitute and starving 
members of the Five Tribes received 198,000 pounds of canned goat meat from the 
southwest along with 27,000 pounds of canned beef and 17,093 head of “relief” 
cattle distributed by the federal government.4  In 1936, another extension report 
stated, “The Cheyenne and Arapaho Central Farm Chapter . . .  voted to discontinue 
their [annual agricultural] fair this fall due to the fact that they would have nothing 
to exhibit.”  The report continued, “At the Ben Buffalow place, the dust was so bad  
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that dust from 6 to 18 inches filled his yard and the floors of the house were 
covered until you could not tell whether there were rugs on the floor or not.”5  
Many Oklahoma Indians looked to the OIWA as an immediate answer to their 
problems, especially through the loan programs established under provisions in the 
OIWA.  
During the latter half of the 1930s, as the Indian Bureau struggled to 
activate programs under the OIWA, the depression and drought continued to 
devastate Oklahoma Indians throughout the state.  Alfred Harper from Wewoka, 
Oklahoma wrote Senator Thomas in the fall of 1936 decrying, “I have six children 
in the public schools . . . that I shall have to take out for lack of clothing.”6  Angie 
Whitthorne, a Chickasaw requested governmental funds and wrote, “We Indians 
are in great need and many are almost starving.”7  The Oklahoma congressional 
delegation continued to receive an ongoing flood of letters from destitute and often 
starving Indians requesting help from the federal government.  Senator Thomas 
telegrammed President Roosevelt declaring, “[state and local] relief agents refuse 
to extend benefits to Indians stating that they should look to [the] Indian office for 
relief.”  Thomas requested a “liberal allotment of funds be made direct to the Indian 
Bureau for use in relieving distress among our Indians wards.”8    
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Local political pressure to aid Oklahoma Indians targeted Senator Thomas, 
a chief architect for the OIWA.  Immediately following the 1936 elections, E. H. 
Labelle, the Chairman of the Indian Division of the Oklahoma Democratic state 
central committee, wrote Thomas and counseled, “You know Elmer these Indians 
are not to be forgotten after the way they came to the front for the national ticket in 
the last election. . . So let’s see if we can get some thing done as soon as we can 
before it gets too cold.”9   Labelle was referring to immediate relief measures such 
as work, food, and even cash payments to help Oklahoma Indians through the 
coming winter.  The Oklahoma congressional delegation led by Senator Thomas 
pressured the White House and other departments within the executive branch as 
well as private charities such as the Red Cross for immediate assistance.  The army 
provided boots and a variety of out of date clothing to Oklahoma Indians.  
Additionally, some government foods commodities such as canned meat, milk, 
coffee, butter, and cheese were also made available.  These actions effected a 
mitigating of the dire situation of many Oklahoma Indians over the winter months 
of 1936 and 1937, but certainly did not eliminate them.10 
 Immediately following enactment of the OIWA, a great deal of 
correspondence from Oklahoma Indians flooded the offices of Oklahoma 
congressmen and bureau officials.  Their letters demonstrated a wide variety of 
misunderstanding concerning its programs, many letters were from individual  
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Indians requesting information and loan applications for all manner of purposes.  
For example, J.L. Nadeu, a Chickasaw from Lexington Oklahoma, wanted to 
purchase a home.  William Zimmerman, Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
responded, “At the present time no rules or regulations have been issued by the 
Secretary of the Interior for the loaning of funds under this act [OIWA] to the 
Indians of Oklahoma.”11  The Bureau expended a great deal of effort responding to 
these inquiries.  The OIWA was designed to address issues such as land 
acquisition, supplying credit for economic undertakings, tribal incorporation for 
business pursuits, and the reestablishment of tribal governments.  The BIA could 
only inform Oklahoma Indians that any loans under the OIWA had to meet 
requirements for short-term investments for primarily agricultural endeavors by 
either individuals or small-incorporated groups.  It was obvious that Oklahoma 
Indians needed to be educated on the programs and benefits of the OIWA.  Also, it 
became evident the Bureau needed time to organize and establish procedures for 
awarding and administering loans as well as the other programs such as land 
purchases, educational benefits, and tribal reorganization.  This type of ongoing 
bureaucratic wrangling served to delay implementation of the OIWA.  Congress 
enacted the legislation, but the BIA administered the programs, and implementation 
moved slowly as the Bureau developed understanding of the OIWA's programs, 
developed policies and procedures, and placed administrators.    
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In August of 1936, just a month after enactment of the OIWA, the solicitor 
of the Interior Department filed a court case to obtain a ruling on the “type of 
organization required of borrowing tribesman.”  The Bureau had to work through 
legalities procedures established between the IRA and the OIWA.  Both legislative 
acts applied to Oklahoma Indians.  The OIWA provided loans for individuals, co-
operatives, and credit associations formed by ten or more Indians.12  However, 
funds channeled from the revolving loan fund established under the IRA had to be 
initially directed through incorporated tribes, who in turn could make loans to 
individual Indians or incorporated groups.13  A. C. Monahan, superintendent of the 
Five Tribes reported, “If tribal incorporation is demanded, a delay of a year or more 
is likely before the money actually reaches the Indians.  If the simpler organization 
into groups is sufficient, the money will begin to flow within a few weeks.”  The 
case clarified the issue by allowing eligible individuals or associations to receive 
loans directly from the government without those funds passing through the hands 
of incorporated tribes.  Unfortunately, Monahan’s prediction of quickly funding 
loan programs proved wrong.  The first loans under the IRA/OIWA did not occur 
until mid 1937, almost a year from its enactment.14  The wheels of bureaucracy 
turned  slowly.   
                                                 
12 Act of June 26, 1936, 49 Stat. 196.  
13 Unidentified newspaper clipping, 12 December 1936, contained in the Elmer Thomas 
Collection, Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, Box 21. 
14  The IRA and the OIWA were closely connected.  As discussed earlier, Oklahoma 
Indians were initially exempted from most provisions of the IRA when it was enacted in June of 
1934.  However, when the OIWA was enacted two years later, Section 13 and 14 of the bill placed 
Oklahoma Indians under all provisions of the IRA.  Hence, the author will often refer to the 
IRA/OIWA when both are implied.  In a Senate hearing in Muskogee in October of 1937, John 
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 To compound matters, the first appropriations represented only a fraction of 
Congress’s originally authorized amounts for both bills.  Under the IRA, the total 
amount authorized was $12,500,000 per year, including $250,000 for Indian 
organization, $2,000,000 for land purchases, $10,000,000 for the revolving credit  
fund, along with $250,000 for educational loans.  However, the amount actually 
appropriated only totaled $3,825,000, with $150,000 allocated for Indian 
organization, $1,000,000 for land purchases (Oklahoma Indians would share 
$350,000), $2,500,000 for the revolving credit fund, and $175,000 for educational 
loans.15  Continued under funding of Indian New Deal programs inhibited their 
effectiveness and long range impact.   
As early as February 1935, Commissioner Collier warned of an impending 
“attack against the authorized appropriations for implementing the Wheeler-
Howard Act,” conducted by “important cattle interests, timber interests, oil 
interests, and other substantial corporate and regional interests antagonized by 
those features of the Act which safeguard Indian property, and which give the tribes 
some measure of control over their own property.”16  Collier feared, “Some 
intervention by the President will be necessary if the new program for Indians . . . is 
not to be crippled, or possibly even killed.”17  Many in Congress understood little 
of the plight of Native Americans.  Outside of sparsely populated western states, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Collier stated “. . . the two acts, the Indian Reorganization Act and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare 
Act, hang together.” 
15 The Tushkahoman, 21 May 1935, 3. 
16 John Collier to Harold L. Ickes, 15 February 1935, contained in the papers of John 
Collier, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma, Reel 15.  
17 Ibid. 
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few congressmen included Indians in their constitutioncies.  They tended to follow 
the lead of those legislators from western states, such as Oklahoma, who possessed 
significant Indian populations.  The political bent of many western legislators often 
steeped in assimilation ideology, yielded to pressure from ranchers, miners, timber 
and ranching interest carried a lot of weight.   Collier's warnings suggest a 
conspiracy of private interests attempting to exert their influence.  The experience 
of Oklahoma Indians, as discussed in earlier chapters, bears this out. 
Meager appropriations meant limited ability to implement the IRA/OIWA 
as it was designed.  Congress granted no increases in funding for administrative 
expenses of the BIA.  This meant that “existing personnel [would] continue to carry 
the heavy administrative responsibility without much hope of increasing local 
staffs.”18  D’Arcy McNickle claims, “Congress was never fully committed to the 
ideas embodied in the Indian Reorganization Act.”19     
Congress was not alone in its tepid support.  The Bureau of the Budget and 
even John Collier himself shared some of the blame.   With respect to land 
purchases, Collier requested only $1,000,000 of the congressionally authorized 
$2,000,000 in 1936 and 1937.  By 1940, only $4,000,000 for land purchases had 
been appropriated.  In 1938, the Bureau of the Budget slashed a request for the full 
$2,000,000 annual appropriation to $500,000.20  By 1938, only $1.1 million dollars 
                                                 
18  Ibid. 
19  D’Arcy McNickle, “Four Years of Indian Reorganization,” Indians at Work, December 
1938, 11. 
20 Lawrence C. Kelly, “The Indian Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality”, 
Pacific Historical Review, 23 (Fall 1975), 308. 
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had been placed into the revolving loan fund.    Inadequate funding of both the IRA 
and the OIWA severely constrained their effectiveness in Oklahoma.  
 However, the issue of support for the IRA/OIWA also brings to question  
the indifference exhibited by many Oklahoma Indians for its various programs.  
Only a small minority took advantage of the economic development aspects of the 
act.  Several Indian credit associations dissolved shortly after they organized 
because even the small amount of funding they offered was not utilized.  An 
examination of this aspect will be presented later in this chapter.    
By 1936, when the OIWA was enacted, the political headiness of the first 
and second hundred days of Roosevelt’s first term all but evaporated.  The 
“changing political climate of the late 1930s,” characterized by growing opposition 
from a congressional coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats, 
coupled with the severe recession of 1937, and the backlash from FDR’s court 
packing scheme, all served to dampen the “active phase of the New Deal,” 
including programs under the Indian New Deal.21   
The recession of 1937 also contributed to the withering of New Deal 
programs, including the IRA/OIWA during the late 1930s and early 1940s.  The 
recession fostered a period of uncertainty and confusion as to the stability of the 
economy.  Historian Alan Brinkley argues that during this economic slowdown, 
many New Dealers “repudiated some of the impulses . . . prominent in the early 
New Deal.”  According to Brinkley, these “impulses” included moving away from 
                                                 
21 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform 3-4. 
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promoting “government sponsored social welfare programs.”22  As industrial 
production slowed, unemployment once again soared, and the markets declined 
sharply during 1937 and into 1938.  Many in government questioned the ability of 
the New Deal to lead the country out of depression.  
Roosevelt’s plan to pack the federal court system with New Deal leaning 
judges served as a lightening rod around which disparate interests to the New Deal 
coalesced.  This event helped to bring conservative Democrats and Republicans 
together in a coalition that opposed much of FDR’s domestic agenda.  Montana 
Senator Burton K. Wheeler became a leader in this group.  Wheeler originally co-
sponsored the proposal, which became the Indian Reorganization Act.  Shortly after 
its introduction, Wheeler opposed both Collier and the proposal bearing his name, 
the Wheeler-Howard Bill.  Having never read the bill before its introduction, 
Wheeler spoke against the proposed Indian court system and the idea of a 
constitutional government replacing tribal councils.  During 1937, Wheeler 
strongly denounced FDR’s court packing scheme: “it is a sham and a fake liberal 
proposal. . . . It merely places upon the Supreme Court six political hacks.”23   
Wheeler’s opposition to John Collier and the Indian New Deal extended into the 
1940s.  By 1943, Wheeler joined with Elmer Thomas and other western senators in 
calling for repeal of the Indian Reorganization Act and the removal of John Collier 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 6-7. 
23 Burton K. Wheeler, Yankee from the West, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962), 314.   
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as Indian Commissioner.24  “Like other western progressives, [Wheeler] 
represented an older hostility to centralized power.”25 
 The inexperience on the part of many Oklahoma Indians in dealing with the 
BIA contributed to the difficulty of implementing the IRA/OIWA.  Many harbored 
negative memories of dealing with the Indian Bureau.  Full bloods or traditionals 
often eschewed contact with white society by choosing to practice subsistence 
agricultural in isolated rural areas.  Some Indians became disheartened with the 
delay and “red tape” they experienced in attempting to obtain loans under the 
OIWA.  W.M. Blackhawk from Stillwater complained that “the Indian bill of 
Oklahoma is not worth the paper and time in which [sic] it taken the U S senate to 
wright [sic] it out, there is not one dog gon [sic] thing in the bill in whitch [sic] will 
benefit the Oklahoma Indian what so ever [sic]. . . . the Indian bill of Oklahoma 
should be thrown in the fire furnish [sic] and burnt, it’s a disgrace and no good.”26 
 For many, the credit division of the BIA seemed to move very slowly.  On 
April 23, 1937, Raymond Kemp wrote to Senator Thomas requesting his 
assistance.  Kemp reported, “Some two or three months ago we Indians organized a 
                                                 
24 In May of 1943, the Senate Indian Affairs Committee chaired by Senator Elmer Thomas 
announced its recommendations based on an extensive survey of conditions among Native 
Americans.  Their report called Senate Report 310 demonstrated intense congressional opposition 
against John Collier and the programs of the Indian Bureau.  Its recommendations read like a 
preview of the termination era and include a freeze in hiring for the Indian Bureau, the transfer of 
Bureau functions to various federal agencies or in the case of education and probate matters to the 
states, all with the long range goal of eliminating the Indian Bureau.  
25 James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal the Growth of the 
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1938, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 
116.   
26 W.M. Blackhawk to the Senate Appropriations Committee, 12 December 1936,  
contained in the Elmer Thomas Collection, Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 
OK, Box 55. 
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credit association . . . to the present we have had no reply from our application.”27  
Assistant Indian Commissioner, William Zimmerman, responded to an inquiry 
from Senator Thomas stating the Johnston County Credit Association’s application 
was under “was under consideration, but with “over forty applications [and] “with 
our limited staff it is impossible to act on the same as quickly as we would like.”28  
John McCracken asked what was holding up approval for the Nowata County 
Indian Credit Association.  Again, Zimmerman responded, “The bylaws which 
were to be submitted for approval have not yet been received by this office.”29  
Reduced staffing at the BIA contributed still another ongoing obstacle in the path 
of implementation.     
Haskell Paul, an attorney representing the Chickasaws, wrote to Elmer 
Thomas asking for his help in determining the status of the application for the 
Garvin County Credit Association.  He also asked a number of questions:  “How 
long do you think it will likely be? . . . what degree of blood will be eligible?  Is 
any one at present, authorized to solicit applications for these loans?”30  Like many, 
including Indians and legal professionals such as Paul or even Senator Thomas, no 
one commanded a clear idea of how to implement the OIWA, including the agency 
charged with that responsibility, the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  Additionally, 
unclear, competing, and often opposing viewpoints within and between the 
                                                 
27 Raymond H. Kemp to Elmer Thomas, 23 April 1937, contained in the Elmer Thomas 
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28 William Zimmerman to Elmer Thomas, 3 June 1937, contained in the Elmer Thomas 
Collection, Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, Box 10. 
29 William Zimmerman to Elmer Thomas, 17 August 1937, contained in the Elmer Thomas 
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legislative and executive branches compounded an already difficult situation.  
During the legislative process, little foresight was given to funding and 
mechanisms to implement the law.  This short sightedness on the part of both 
Congress and the bureau delayed its implementation.   
In October of 1937, Collier spoke to Oklahoma Indians at two meetings 
held to determine Indian concerns with the implementation of the OIWA.  Besides 
land purchases, the topic that generated the most Indian concern was credit.  Collier 
fielded a wide variety of questions on different aspects of the credit programs.  
Many asked about the limited congressional appropriations for the various 
programs under the IRA/OIWA, especially low funding for credit operations.  
Collier explained that many in Congress were leery of credit programs for Native 
Americans based on their low levels of repayment on $9,000,000 worth of loans 
over the preceding fifteen years to Native Americans, the so-called industrial 
reimbursable loans.  He affirmed that only $3,000,000 had been repaid.  Collier 
continued by describing a wait and see attitude by Congress.  If repayment levels 
on loans made under the IRA/OIWA remained initially high, then Congress would 
be more likely to increase appropriations to these programs.  He put the solution for 
limited appropriations squarely on the Indians who would participate in the credit 
programs.  He referred to the small appropriation as a “demonstration” and said, “It 
is enough to use in proving to Congress and to . . . the President that Indians can 
take loans, make productive use of loans, and pay them back, and then there will be 
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no trouble in getting more money, in any reasonable amount.”31  Collier may have 
been attempting to explain why appropriations were so low an effort to motivate 
Oklahoma Indians towards greater fiscal responsibility.  Had more thought been 
given to the feasibility of establishing a revolving loan program for tribal groups 
whose previous track record of repayment was lack luster, especially in light of the 
dire economic circumstances experienced by most Oklahoma Indians during this 
time.  During this period, they needed grants, not loans.   
 It was evident that a number of challenges prevented a prompt and full 
implementation of the OIWA.  Many Oklahoma Indians were concerned with the  
immediate challenges of day-to-day life.  The depression and the drought of the 
1930s hit Oklahoma Indians extremely hard.  Many simply did not understand the 
legislative substance of the IRA and the OIWA.  Legal and administrative hurdles 
in the channeling of IRA funds into OIWA programs had to be bridged.  Most in 
Congress shared little interest in Indian affairs or appropriations to fund Indian 
programs.  Staffing shortages in the Indian Bureau spelled delays in the approval of 
charters for credit associations and loan programs.  Additionally, many in the 
bureau were career administrators steeped in assimilationist thinking.  Much of the 
IRA/OIWA represented a radical departure from the objectives many had spent 
their careers attempting to achieve.  From the 1880s to 1933, a driving objective to 
assimilate Indians into American society prevailed.  All that changed with John 
Collier and the Indian New Deal.  New Deal measures such as the IRA and the 
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OIWA conflicted with their operational experience, contributing to a somewhat 
uncooperative attitude on the part of some bureaucrats.  Finally, the inexperience 
and in many cases the negative experiences of Oklahoma Indians in dealing with 
the BIA would prove inhibiting factors towards implementation.  
 Ben Dwight, a bureau field agent out of the Muskogee office, discussed 
implementation of the OIWA in an article in Indians at Work in June of 1937.  
Explaining the workings of the OIWA, Dwight called for a new mind set on the 
part of Okalahoma Indians.  Explaining that the OIWA was not designed as a quick 
fix measure, Dwight counseled, “The program is . . . . not a mere relief measure; it 
is not an emergency plan. . . . [I]t is a permanent long-time program, which will 
extend over a number of years, even generations. . . .The individual must think in 
terms of a permanent program rather than about one merely meeting present 
emergencies”32   In discussing credit programs, Dwight said, “They [Indians] must 
accept and assume a large measure of responsibility for sound credit operations.”33  
Dwight argued that if the OIWA was going to be successful, it had to be recognized 
that its programs should not be looked on as quick fixes, but as long term in scope. 
Dwight also echoed the counsel of John Collier, stressing Oklahoma Indians must 
demonstrate responsibility with credit loans.   
In October of 1937, daylong meetings held in Shawnee and Muskogee 
explored many of the issues surrounding implementation of the IRA/OIWA.  
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Attending these meetings were Senator Thomas, Oklahoma Congressman Will 
Rogers, John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the Oklahoma Indian 
agency superintendents.  Over 500 Oklahoma Indians, representing nineteen tribal 
groups from the western half of the state, also attended the first meeting held in 
Shawnee on October 13.  Senator Thomas, chair of the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, conducted both meetings.  
 Thomas introduced the meetings by declaring, “It is a meeting to try and 
understand the wishes of the Indian citizens.”34   Thomas organized these meetings 
in a similar fashion to the meetings he held three years earlier in October of 1934, 
after he had exempted Oklahoma Indians from the IRA enacted in June.  In his 
opening statement, Thomas flattered Indian attendees saying, “We want to know 
what you want, and then we want to know what you don’t want. . . . If you citizens 
don’t get what you want, it will be largely because you have not advised your 
member of the House and Senate.”35  Thomas seemed to offer a clear invitation for 
Indian participation.  Thomas made an opening statement, followed by the 
attending Oklahoma congressmen, including Lyle Boren, Wesley Disney, William 
Hastings, and Will Rogers.  Legislators and bureaucrats maintained a polite but 
patronizing tone towards Indian attendees during these meetings.  Permission to 
make a short statement or ask questions fell to a representative from each tribe. 
Most questions focused on specific aspects of the major programs offered by the 
IRA/OIWA, regarding land purchases, credit, and tribal organization.  Some voiced 
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concerns over appropriations for the IRA/OIWA and the seemingly slow progress 
in the implementation of programs under the bill.  
At the Muskogee meeting, on October 14, Commissioner Collier made a 
revealing statement as he encouraged Oklahoma Indians to organize tribal 
governments.  Collier spoke of how during the allotment period, tribal governments 
“were dissolved by Congress. . . . Indians couldn’t be good Indians unless they 
were unorganized Indians.”  Now the federal government was attempting to “. . .  
extend to the Indian the white man’s opportunity to organize and operate through 
organization principles.”36  According, to historian Alison Bernstein, many Indians 
complained that Collier was “superimposing white political organization on tribal 
structures.”37  Additionally Senator Thomas preached that tribal organizations 
“give official sanction to [tribal] activities, where heretofore it has been wholly 
unofficial.38    The Curtis Act of 1898 and the Five Tribes Act of 1906 emasculated 
Oklahoma tribal governments.  Between that time and the enactment of the OIWA 
in 1936, many Oklahoma tribal groups established business committees or problem 
committees charged with dealing with only a specific issue.  Legally, these types of 
quasi Indian governmental bodies were not officially recognized by the federal 
government, even though the Bureau would work with them to implement and 
administer programs.  Ben Dwight, a Choctaw and Muskogee agency employee 
explained, “Up to this time these organizations have existed by courtesy, we will 
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say, of the bureau . . . . They had no legal recognized standing in the law.”39  
Bureau officials promoted the idea that tribes organizing under the IRA/OIWA 
could now be legally sanctioned by the federal government.   An integral part of the 
IRA/OIWA, the reinstitution of tribal government marked a major shift in direction 
for federal Indian policy. 
The tribal organization program of the IRA/OIWA remains its brightest 
legacy.  It came at a time of transformation for many Oklahoma Indians.  As life in 
American society became more commercial, urban, and technological, these 
accelerating forces filtered down to Indian life as well.  This began during the 
1920s and intensified during the 1940s with World War II.  Tribal organization 
provided the mechanism that allowed Indian tribes to begin to take control of their 
own destiny.  Just because a tribe did not organize under the IRA/OIWA did not 
mean they remained untouched by the transformation.  Eventually, almost every 
tribe organized in some manner for political and economic advancement.   
Several Indian representatives expressed confusion over funding for land 
purchases.  They believed that loans from Indian credit associations financed land 
purchases.  John Collier explained that money from credit associations was to be 
lent to either groups or individuals for mainly agricultural enterprises.  “The credit 
money is not the money for buying land.”40  Both the IRA and the OIWA 
established funded programs separate from other programs for land purchases.  
Congress appropriated only $2,000,000 for land purchases under the IRA and 
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OIWA and out of that amount; only $350,000 was earmarked for land purchases in 
Oklahoma.  Collier mused this was a very small amount measured against the need 
and at that rate the Bureau “will be making very slow progress toward the revesting 
of homeless [Oklahoma] Indians with land.”41 
One of the foremost objectives of the IRA/OIWA was to reverse the 
damage inflicted on Indian land holdings by the allotment policy.  The first two 
sections of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act dealt with Indian land issues.  Section 
1 outlined the procedures to be used by the Secretary of the Interior in acquiring 
land for Oklahoma tribal units.  Section 2 gave the Secretary preference in 
purchasing any restricted Indian land that might be put up for sale.42  Allotment in 
Oklahoma began in the 1890s with passage of the Curtis Act in 1892.  From then 
until 1933, tribal land holdings in Oklahoma plummeted from 15,000,000 acres 
down to 1,500,000 acres, a loss of ninety percent.  By 1933, the vast majority of 
Oklahoma Indians were landless.  The unavailability of land for such a large 
percentage of Indians living in an agriculturally based subsistence society was a 
recipe for an economic and social disaster outlined earlier. Over the history of the 
IRA/OIWA, this effort to restore Indian land base met with only minimal success.  
Because of that fact, landless Oklahoma Indians were unable to benefit from 
various programs of the OIWA, especially financing for agricultural projects 
designed to develop income and thereby raise the participant’s standard of living 
and independence.   
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Collier firmly believed that increasing Indian land base was at the core of 
any program designed to help the Indians.  He shunned the idea of assimilating 
Native Americans into white society.  His ideas embraced the “objective of self-
sufficiency based on land . . . .the Indian can become self-supporting without 
competing, on the one hand, with white industrial labor or, on the other hand, with 
white commercial agriculture.”43  Embracing the concept of pluralism, Collier 
defined assimilation: “Assimilation, not into our culture but into modern life, and 
preservation and intensification of heritage are not hostile choices, excluding one 
another, but are interdependent through and through.”44 Native Americans would 
become part of American society though separate from the dominant white 
majority, thereby preserving their tribal culture and heritage.    
The IRA authorized an annual appropriation of $2,000,000 for land 
purchases.  Collier lamented that at that level it would require twenty years to 
restore 2,000,000 acres to the Native American land base.  He recognized that 
progress in the area of land restoration would be very slow.  However, over the 
next thirty years from 1934 to 1976 Congress appropriated just under $6,000,000 
for land purchases.  $4,000,000 of that amount was appropriated in the first five 
years of the IRA.  After 1951, requests for land purchases ceased.  With the funds 
                                                                                                                                                    
42  Act of June 26, 1936, 49 Stat. 196. 
43 Theodore W. Taylor, Report on Purchase of Indian Land and Acres of Indian Land in 
Trust 1934-1975, (Washington: American Indian Policy Review Commission, 1976), 22. 
44 Collier, From Every Zenith, 216. 
  
 
183
appropriated nationwide, 595,157 acres were actually acquired nationwide by 
1976.45   
With respect to Oklahoma, under the IRA/OIWA tribal land bases increased 
by less than 36,000 acres at a cost of just over $510,000.  Most of this added 
between 1935 and 1946 lay on the eastern side of Oklahoma.  Evenly distributed 
among the Five Tribes, 30,703 acres were suitable only for grazing, not 
agriculture..  No additional land purchases took place in Oklahoma after 1946.46  
The inability of the Collier administration to increase significantly the land base of 
Oklahoma tribes was one factor, limiting the success of other objectives of the 
OIWA as well, since so much of the act revolved around land.     
However, issues other than the lack of sufficient appropriations would also 
influence the success of agriculturally based programs of the IRA/OIWA.  As 
mentioned above, requests from Native Americans for land purchases decreased  
significantly during the late 1930s and 1940s.  Some attribute this drop to a 
transformation in Oklahoma agriculture during the 1940s.  Angie Debo claimed, 
“Mechanization and large scale operations have displaced the small farmer, both 
Indian and white. . . .Since about 1940, it has become impossible to rehabilitate and 
Indian family starting with nothing.  This is a circumstance beyond the control of 
the Indian service.”47  Like the rest of the nation, mechanization and technology 
transformed Oklahoma agriculture.  This allowed for increased production while at 
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the same time reducing productions costs.  Increasingly agricultural operations 
grew in acreage.  Farming became more capital intensive.  These changes sounded 
the death knell for many small Oklahoma farmers, both white and Indian.  During 
this period, many Oklahoma Indians moved from subsistence agriculture to 
unskilled wage labor, leaving rural areas for nearby towns or urban areas 
throughout the state.  During the war years, many Oklahoma Indians moved to 
areas throughout the West and worked for defense contractors.   The relocation 
program of the post war years also created an emigration of hundreds of Oklahoma 
Indians from continually depressed remote agricultural areas to urban areas such as 
Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Muskogee, Lawton.  This migration even extended to cities 
such as Denver, Chicago, Dallas, Phoenix, or Los Angeles.  With the advantage of 
hindsight, scholars, such as Alison Bernstein and Angie Debo questioned the 
efficacy of land acquisition as a major plank in the Indian New Deal.   
During the first half of the twentieth century, the United States transformed 
rapidly from an agricultural and rural orientation to an urbanized industrial society.  
In many ways, land acquisition for agricultural pursuits seemed to move Indians in 
the opposite direction from the flow of American society, thereby guaranteeing a 
continued dependence on governmental assistance as they struggled with 
subsistence agriculture.   Alison Bernstein argued “Indian land could not provide a 
basis for economic survival for most tribes. . . .[due to] overexploitation of soil, 
range, and timber.  A majority of Indians lacked the capital to acquire the seed, 
fertilizer, equipment, and livestock needed to revitalize their land-based 
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economy.”48   This described the situation of many Oklahoma Indians during this 
time.  A small minority of Oklahoma Indians tenaciously held on to allotments 
were often isolated on their small eighty to one hundred and sixty acre plots while 
surrounded by white neighbors.  As Angie Debo corroborated, many full blood 
members of the Five Tribes lived a hand to mouth existence often squatting on 
inaccessible plots in the hill country of eastern Oklahoma, with little desire to 
change.  Many intentionally chose that lifestyle in order to remove themselves from 
contact with whites and maintain their cultural heritage.   
 Reinstituting tribal governments utilizing constitutionalism was certainly a 
central feature of the IRA/OIWA. Tribal organization has proven the most lasting, 
influential, and sometimes the most controversial aspect of the IRA/OIWA.  The 
architects of the IRA and the OIWA considered tribal organization second in 
importance only to resolving the Indian land issue.  John Collier considered the 
philosophy underscoring Indian self-rule as “consonant with American realities and 
American values and ideals.”49  As discussed earlier, dissolution of Oklahoma 
tribal governments began in 1892 with passage of the Curtis Act and was 
completed by 1907 with Oklahoma statehood.  The OIWA helped Oklahoma tribal 
groups to reverse that situation, by reinstituting tribal governments and utilizing 
constitutionalism.  It was a central feature of the IRA/OIWA.  Oklahoma   
reinstituted tribal government, albeit in a different manner than before.   
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The Thomas-Rogers Act devoted only a short paragraph to reorganization.  
It simply stated, “Any recognized tribe or band of Indians residing in Oklahoma 
shall have the right to organize for its common welfare and adopt a constitution and 
bylaws,” subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior.50  Unlike the IRA, the 
OIWA allowed tribes to incorporate as a recognized corporate body, with approval 
by “a majority vote of the adult members of the organization voting.”51  Finally, 
only organized tribes were allowed to participate in the revolving credit fund.   
Reestablishment of tribal government is somewhat of a misnomer.  Though 
believed to have been formally dissolved in the years before statehood, tribal 
governments continued to function albeit in reduced scope and often from the 
shadows.  Angie Debo argued with the dissolution of tribal governments, “it was 
apparent from the beginning that there was certain unfinished business requiring 
the signature of tribal officers. . . . [involving] the disposal of tribal lands, 
representing various lingering tribal interests, and [a] liaison relationship” with the 
federal government.52    By the time tribal organization became possible under the 
IRA/OIWA in the latter 1930s most Oklahoma tribes maintained some form of a 
functioning government.  The Cherokee, Choctaw, Seminole, and Creek nations 
had a principal chief while the Chickasaw had a governor appointed by the 
President.  Most tribes maintained some form of a tribal council or business 
committee.  In 1909, the Creek principal chief under direction from local bureau 
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officials failed to call the legislative Creek council into session.  Disgruntled 
council members and other tribal leaders “met in a rump session, which they 
termed the “Creek Convention.”  The “Creeks refused to abandon their tribal 
government and political life.”53  They continued to meet regularly until 1934 when 
Commissioner Collier allowed them to hold elections, resulting in the election of 
Roly Cannard as principal chief.  He was subsequently appointed by the president 
which gave “legal sanction” to his election by the Creek people.54  The incubating 
idea of majority rule challenged the traditional idea of consensus decision-making 
within some tribal groups.  The IRA/OIWA did not establish or reestablish tribal 
governments among Oklahoma Indians.  This important legislation provided self-
determination a significant step in the evolutionary process already underway. 
Tribal organization under the IRA/OIWA required of two procedures.  First, 
a tribal constitution was written and ratified.  After the tribal constitution was in 
place, the tribe then issued a charter of incorporation.  The terms, constitution, and 
charter warrant definition.  A constitution represented a  written instrument through 
which sovereign power is distributed and the powers and duties of the government 
within a polity are determined.  A charter is a written instrument creating and 
defining the right of the tribal government to exist and exercise the powers of a 
corporation.  A charter establishes the rights and responsibilities of a corporation in 
its dealings with the outside world.55   Under the OIWA, an Oklahoma tribe could 
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“organize for its common welfare and to adopt a constitution and bylaws, under 
such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe.”56   The 
Secretary also issued the charter for incorporation, which placed the corporation 
under the laws of the state of Oklahoma and allowed the tribe to participate in the 
revolving credit fund established under the OIWA.  A major criticism by many 
tribal groups referenced the required approval of the Secretary of the Interior for 
the establishment of tribal constitutions.  The American Indian Policy Review 
Commission argued this requirement “exemplifies the paternalism and lack of 
trust” in a bureau controlled relationship “which will not recognize the fact that 
Indian nations are capable of governing themselves.”57  While the idea of tribal 
groups organizing for home or self-rule represented a major change in direction for 
federal Indian policy, the paternalistic attitude on the part of the federal government 
continued.   
The majority of Oklahoma tribal groups did not organize under the 
IRA/OIWA.  Eighteen Oklahoma tribes, mostly from the western part of the state,  
accounting for 13,241 members organized under the IRA/OIWA.  Of that group, 
thirteen also established charters of incorporation.  None of the Five Tribes 
boasting the bulk of Oklahoma’s Indian population organized under the 
IRA/OIWA.  Angie Debo explained this rejection.  Of all tribal groups in 
Oklahoma; the Five Tribes were “subjected to large scale exploitation that 
disrupted their economic and cultural life and drove many back into the hills and 
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timber.”58  These groups eschewed white society and its institutions. Three Creek 
towns and the Keetoowah band of the Cherokee, comprising a total population of 
only 1248, were the only exceptions.59  Historian Kenneth Philp observed, ‘The 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act did not receive a very favorable reception from the 
more than 100,000 Indians in Oklahoma.”60  With an estimated Indian population 
in Oklahoma in 1940 of 120,000, just a little over ten percent were members of 
organized tribal units.  What accounts for the limited involvement by Oklahoma 
tribal units in this aspect of the IRA/OIWA?   
Loretta Fowler, a critic of New Deal constitutions, focused on the evolution 
of tribal government before, during, and after the enactment of the IRA/OIWA, and 
she has been critical of Indian New Deal constitutions.  She argued, “Generally 
these constitutions were written by [BIA] personnel with little interest in or 
sympathy for tribal perspectives on political and legal relations.  Constitutions and 
by-laws that suited the Bureau were imposed on the tribes.”61  Fowler believed 
local political traditions were not considered to any real degree when IRA/OIWA 
constitutions were formulated.   However, records show that at least in two 
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instances in Oklahoma, local traditions of tribal groups were considered and 
exerted tremendous influence on the organization process. 
 In the spring of 1937 as the McIntosh County Indian Credit Association 
was being organized, Bureau officials discovered that “old Tribal Towns of the 
Creek Confederacy were still in existence, [causing] considerable consternation 
within the Oklahoma branch of the Indian service.”62  “The talk of ancient social 
units and customs disturbed them [the Bureau].”63   A “town” was not a tribe or a 
band as specified as a basis for organization under the OIWA.  However, after 
much study and legal wrangling, the solicitor of the Department of the Interior 
decided that a Creek town would “constitute a recognized band.”64  This bridged a 
hurdle and allowed Creek towns to organize under the IRA/OIWA.  Eventually 
three Creek towns adopted constitutions and charters of incorporation under the 
OIWA.  It is worth noting that one of these towns, the Kowasati Tribal Town, 
preserved in its constitution “some of the traditional Creek customs . . . such as 
hereditary town offices and matrilineal membership and modes of adoption.”65  
Along with the Keetoowah, they remain the only tribal groups of the Five Tribes to 
organize under the OIWA.  These customized constitutions fly in the face of 
premises by scholars such as Loretta Fowler and Kenneth Philp that IRA/OIWA 
constitutions were cookie cutter in nature and forced on tribal groups by the BIA.  
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In his study, Opler implies that other Creek towns could possibly have been 
organized under the OIWA had experts such as Felix Cohen remained in the field 
to resolve unique and often complex situations preventing groups such as the Creek 
towns to organize.  Instead, regular Bureau employees shunned situations, feeling “ 
that more than one approach to the problem of organization was just a burden and a 
harassment.”66  
The Keetoowah or UKB maintained a history as a faction in the Cherokee 
tribe dating back hundreds of years.  At various times, factions within the Cherokee 
such as the Nighthawks and the Seven Clan Society claimed affiliation with the 
Keetoowah Society.  In September of 1905, the Keetoowah formed a political 
entity known as the Keetoowah Society, Inc.  During the debate promoting passage 
of the Wheeler-Howard Bill in March of 1934, the Keetoowah supported passage 
while the Cherokee tribe had opposed the bill.  Ironically, the Keetoowah were 
denied the ability to organize under the IRA/OIWA in 1937.  Subsequently, it was 
discovered that while the Five Tribes Act of 1906 dissolved the governments of the 
Five Tribes, the Keetoowah Society was not specifically mentioned, a 
congressional oversight.  This oversight created a legal gray area which took a 
decade for federal courts to resolve.  In August of 1946, congress passed a measure 
both recognizing and allowing the Keetoowah to organize under the IRA/OIWA.  
In October of 1950, the United Keetoowah Band of the Cherokee Indians of 
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Oklahoma (UKB) formally organized under the OIWA as its constitution was 
ratified by the members.67         
Scholars attributed a wide variety of factors for the limited involvement by 
Oklahoma Indians in the tribal organization aspects of the IRA/OIWA.  James 
Olson and Raymond Wilson believed an important factor John Collier 
underestimated was the “diversity” and “intensity” of factionalism among many 
Oklahoma tribal groups.68  Olson, Wilson, and others contended that Collier’s 
experience with the Navajos and Pueblos during the 1920s provided him a context, 
one of fairly harmonious and close knit tribal relations.  They argued Collier may 
have applied that model to all tribal groups as well.  Oklahoma tribal groups often 
did not fit that model, many being rife with factionalism.  A case in point involved 
the Sac and Fox tribe, which is representative of the same controversies found 
within other tribes as well.  The issue involved a battle for control of the business 
committee by factions within the tribe.  A river running through Sac and Fox land 
divided the tribe into northern and southern groups.  There were also progressive 
and traditional elements in the tribe that were often at odds with each other.  A 
tribal member, Manda Starr, wrote to Superintendent Perkins referencing an 1846 
treaty whereby, “the half breed members . . . promised not to meddle in [tribal] 
affairs,” and “to sit back and let the full blood[s] handle [tribal affairs].”69  These 
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divisions sometimes created what seemed like havoc within tribal council and 
business committee meetings.   
F.E. Perkins, agency superintendent, reported one meeting “ended in 
pandemonium and chaos.”70  The tribal business committee headed by a forceful 
and domineering chairman, Frank O. Jones often compounded the situation.  Jones 
was often accused of strong-arm tactics and of controlling elections for the business 
committee.  Through the business committee, Jones had dominated Sac and Fox 
tribal affairs for several years.  He viewed the possibility of the tribe organizing 
under the OIWA as a severe threat to his power and position.  Jones fought 
doggedly but lost the battle when the Sac and Fox adopted a tribal constitution in 
December of 1937.  Kenneth Philp proposed the IRA/OIWA “frequently intensified 
existing factionalism.  Tribal constitutions led to bitter disputes over who would 
control newly established tribal governments.”71 
For many in tribal groups, especially the more traditional full bloods, 
organization proposed by the OIWA seemed alien.  Often the traditional practices 
of tribal governments differed radically from those which accompanied IRA/OIWA 
organization.  The concept of using consensus characterized the tribal heritage of 
many groups in reaching decisions.  Respected and considered in a lengthy process 
that to a decision unanimously supported.  Under the IRA/OIWA, voting and 
majority rule replaced the process of reaching consensus.  Introduction to 
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“elections, rules of parliamentary procedure, constitutions, and other features of 
Western political tradition,” forced tribal groups “to undertake a major 
reorganization of their social, cultural, and political relations.”72  White forms of 
government forced upon the Indians caused many to feel little consideration for 
their indigenous political heritage.  Tribal governments under the IRA/OIWA 
“appealed primarily to younger and more educated Indians, while others felt the 
IRA/OIWA “superimposed white political structures on tribal structures,” which 
tended to “disrupt traditional decision-making patterns.”73 Progressive groups 
within a tribe found it much easier than traditionals to adjust to the new 
governments formed under the IRA/OIWA and consequently often  dominated 
them.     
 Carter Blue Clark argued that some Oklahoma Indians scorned 
reorganization under the IRA/OIWA because they felt too much direction and 
control from the federal government in this process. According to Clark, during the 
1930s the Bureau imposed tribal constitutions and “arbitrarily set up tribal 
councils.”74  Clark believed the 1930s unveiled “an intensification of federal 
manipulation of tribal authority.”75  He specifically pointed out that “The federal 
government appointed the principal chief of the Five Tribes until 1969, and in 
effect, appointed the entire tribal government, since the principal chief also 
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appointed the tribal legislature.”76  Loretta Fowler concurred with Clark: 
“Constitutions and by-laws that suited the Bureau were imposed on the tribes.”77   
Duane Champagne questioned the legitimacy accorded some tribal governments by 
members claiming “many reservation Indians have not internalized the primacy of 
political commitments to centralized IRA governments over other political and 
cultural allegiances.”78  This situation was noticeable among traditionals who 
feared for their political voice in tribal affairs as progressives came to dominate the 
councils of governments organized under the IRA/OIWA.  Kenneth Philp pointed 
out that many Indians did not support the IRA/OIWA because “it simply did not go 
far enough in the direction of self-rule.”79  Many felt too much power over tribal 
affairs was left in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior with “all important 
tribal council decisions” being subject to “administrative review by the 
secretary.”80  This issue would be at the heart of the struggle for self-determination 
during the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 The ability for groups to organize tribal governments under the IRA/OIWA 
marks a major shift in Indian policy for Oklahoma Indians.  When tribal 
governments were dissolved at the turn of the century, Oklahoma Indians lost the 
right to govern themselves.  Shadow governments did continue to operate within a 
number of tribal groups, but their effectiveness was severely limited.  A generation 
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passed before the right of self-government was restored.  The Bureau actively 
encouraged tribal groups to organize, a complete about face in Indian policy.  By 
the 1930s, this forced a generation of tribal members only vaguely familiar with 
tribal governments onto center stage.  The new tribal governments replaced Indian 
political concepts such as consensus rule with non-Indian ideas such as voting, and 
majority rule causing uncertainty on the part of Native Americans.  This situation 
coupled with other factors such as distrust of the federal government, the impact of 
the depression and drought on Oklahoma Indians, the complex path required for 
organization, and the ongoing paternalistic attitudes of governmental officials 
contributed to low participation by Oklahoma Indians in the organization programs 
under the IRA/OIWA.  However, tribal groups, whether organized or not, were 
nudged in the direction toward more effective tribal governments in order to deal 
effectively with the challenges and opportunities of the new age ushered in by 
WWII.   
 A second major tenant of the OIWA was to furnish credit for 
Oklahoma Indians.  Funding would allow Oklahoma Indians to embark on the road 
towards self-sufficiency with financing for various agricultural operations and 
expansion, both individual and tribal.   However, funds to administer the OIWA 
were not available until late August of 1937, over a year after its enactment in June 
of 1936.  The bill passed Congress at the end of the fiscal year and after 
appropriations had been approved by Congress for the coming 1936 fiscal year.  
John Collier explained, “We didn’t get our first dollar until the 21st of August 
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[1937] . . . . We didn’t have money to even print forms.”81  Again, limited funding 
prove to be an ongoing factor, analogous to rationing of a limited food or fuel 
supply 
Collier mentioned that while waiting for appropriations, the BIA 
streamlined loan application forms from fourteen to four pages and established 
procedures for local approval for individual loans rather than by the Secretary of 
the Interior’s office in Washington.  Thomas W. Hunter, a county judge and a 
Choctaw from Hugo, presented a tribal resolution supporting the OIWA but decried 
the lack of funding to establish functioning credit associations.  Hunter stated, “I 
have talked with a number [credit associations] in eastern Oklahoma.  I found them 
without expenses to operate “in order to work the plan [OIWA] out . . . we must 
have operating expenses to do it with.”82  Rolly Canard, a Creek chief stated, “I feel 
that we [the Creeks] are a forgotten people. . . . It has been 16 months since this act 
[OIWA] was legislated, and [no] . . . actions have ever been presented to us.”83  
Charles Grounds, a Seminole expressed the frustration of many Oklahoma Indians 
when he said, “When you have a drought, clouds will come together.  They will 
darken up.  You will hear a lot of thunder.  You will see a lot of lighting, but no 
rain.  What we want is some rain.”84 
Under the IRA/OIWA, there were four methods available to extend credit to 
Oklahoma Indians.  They were direct loans to individuals, organized tribes or 
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bands, cooperatives, or Indian credit associations.  The BIA decided credit 
associations were the preferred method.85 Section four of the OIWA authorized 
Indian credit associations.  Simply stated, ten or more Indians, as determined by 
tribal rolls, could petition the Interior Department for a charter as a local 
cooperative association formed for the purposes of credit administration.  An 
extensive and often time-consuming application procedure monitored and approved 
by the BIA was followed.  By 1938, there were 24 Indian credit associations 
operating across Oklahoma.  
With congressional appropriations providing only a fraction of the amounts 
authorized by the IRA/OIWA, the bureau focused on insuring that the limited 
available credit be directed to where it could do the most good.  An administrative 
bulletin from the Oklahoma credit office counseled field personnel that “credit 
funds should go largely to those Indians who do not have other sources of credit 
open to them.”  Blood quantum was used to determine eligibility for loans.  The 
Bureau assumed that full bloods would be more in need of assistance than mixed 
bloods.  “We feel that Indians with a greater degree of Indian blood should be 
favored over those of a lesser degree.”86  In establishing eligibility for programs, 
section 19 of the Thomas-Rogers Act defined an Indian as a member of a federally 
recognized tribe or a descendent, “and shall include persons of one-half or more 
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Indian blood.  Lastly, the bureau strongly counseled field agents “not [to] confuse 
relief with credit. . . . Broadly speaking, relief clients would not be suitable credit 
clients [sic].”87    
By late 1937, limited appropriations offered at least a partial breath of life 
for several Oklahoma Indian credit associations.  On December 13, 1937, Senator 
Thomas informed the Murray County Indian Credit Association that their request 
for funding for $15,000 had been approved by the bureau.88  The Grady County 
Indian Credit Association was granted a start-up fund of $15,000 in January of 
1938.89  Later, in the spring of 1938, the Oklahoma County Indian Credit 
Association also was approved for $15,000.90  During 1938, similar funding was 
also allocated for other Oklahoma Indian credit associations, such as Ponotococ, 
Washington, Rogers, and Grady counties, to name a few.  
A. C. Monahan, a regional coordinator for the bureau sent to Commissioner 
Collier a report discussing “principal activities in the Indian Service in the 
Oklahoma-Kansas area” for the 1937-1938 fiscal year.  With respect to credit 
activities, Monahan reported that loans totaling $683,000 for 35 Indian credit 
associations had been approved.    Loans to 107 individuals totaling $56,260 had 
also been approved.  Four economic cooperatives had been charted and one had 
received a loan of $2800.  Finally four tribal corporations had received loans of 
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over $63,000 under the OIWA, These tribal corporations made 31 loans to 
individuals totaling a little over $15,000.91   
While several Indian credit associations were able to begin operations 
during late 1937 and early 1938, many others were not.  In January of 1938, the 
BIA turned down a charter request by the Creeks because “the Creek Indians held a 
Creek Council in Sapulpa and disapproved the Thomas-Rogers Bill.”92  
Compounding the situation in Wagoner County was the issue of several tribal 
groups living in the same county.  Bureau policy allowed the establishment of 
Indian credit associations on a county basis.  Bureau records showed the Creeks 
exclusively occupied Wagoner County.  However, part of the Cherokee nation was 
located in Wagoner County as well.  This created an issue with respect to the BIA’s 
desire to see appropriated funds for credit organizations flow through tribal 
organizations, but with two tribal groups in the same county, a roadblock emerged.  
In late August, Thomas Halfmoon wrote to Senator Thomas stating that the 
Washington County Credit Association, duly formed, had applied for $25,000 six 
months earlier.  They had heard nothing from the bureau and were “very anxious to 
help the needy Delawares in Washington County who are very anxious to get loans 
for farming and cattle raising.”93  
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Richard Colbert, the secretary treasurer for the Pontotoc Indian Credit 
Association, voiced several concerns shared by many Indian credit associations in 
Oklahoma.  Colbert referenced a complaint by Arthur Talbert, the president of the 
Love County Indian Credit Association in a letter to Senator Thomas that 
complained of “the delay in obtaining loans through the Credit Associations set up 
under the Thomas-Rogers Act applicable to Oklahoma.”94  Colbert placed blame 
squarely on the shoulders of the BIA, claiming the “technicality, and strict 
requirements prescribed by the Department, which the borrower must under go to 
qualify to obtain a loan.”95   
In addition to limited funds to loan, most of the Indian credit associations in 
Oklahoma also suffered from the lack of funding for operating expenses.  Section 
six of the OIWA allowed for a $2,000,000 appropriation for loans and the expenses 
of administering loans.  Richard Colbert spoke of the need for “a small allowance 
to aid the officials who are directing the business of the Indian Chartered 
Organizations.”96  Under the OIWA, credit associations borrowed the money at one 
percent interest. They loaned the funds at a three percent interest rate.  The two 
percent difference was to cover expenses of the credit association.  However, 
because of the small volume of loans, the two percent margin for expenses often 
proved totally inadequate.  Colbert voiced a common complaint of those who 
served on Indian credit associations.  Many spent long hours in administering 
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various aspects of the credit associations and received no remuneration or even 
money for expenses such as travel.  Colbert explained “we are unable to function 
properly when we are forced to undergo double duty for association and our own 
battle for existence.”97  This situation forced those Indians selected to serve and 
manage credit associations into the situation of doing volunteer work.  Colbert 
believed that Congress was to blame for not “simplifying the rules and regulations” 
and not appropriating sufficient funding for loans and operating expenses.  
Unfortunately, this issue was never completely resolved.   
The BIA’s farm extension service came to play an important and multi-
faceted role in administering credit.  As some funding became available in late 
1937 and early 1938, the Bureau decided that all loan requests, regardless of their 
origin, “should clear through the respective district [bureau] offices.”  In addition, 
“the farm agent should originate the loan and procure verbal approval” from the 
district office.98  Commissioner Collier stressed the idea of decentralizing the 
Indian service and charging local offices and staffs with work closely with local 
Indian people.  Collier believed “the future of the Indian under the Indian 
Reorganization Act and the New Deal generally, are deeply involved in the success 
or failure of area plan[s].99 
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Farm agents served as middlemen between Indian farmers and bureau 
officials.  Most came from a farming background and usually possessed some 
college training in agriculture.  They coupled their own experience and education 
into helping the Indians in their district.  Working closely with a number of Indian 
farmers in their districts, they would advise them in the best use of their land, crop 
selection, fertilizer, livestock, equipment, canning, 4H work for Indian youth, and 
marketing.  Agents knew the Indians in their districts and often developed a 
trusting relationship with them.  As late as 1947, the bureau was still being 
counseled to utilize the extension service.  Dr. Laura Thompson, a sociologist and 
Collier’s second wife, stated in a study on the IRA, “The research indicates that the 
work of the various Indian Service divisions in rendering services to Indians is 
effective . . . at the local community level.”100 
Extension agents serving in the front line helped to implement the credit 
programs of the OIWA.  Many of the Oklahoma Indians who would take advantage 
of credit programs were those who found other doors of credit opportunities closed 
to them.  Angie Debo claims many Oklahoma Indians possessed “economic 
ineptitude, during this time period.”101  They had little experience with economic 
factors such as credit, banking, business plans, forecasting, marketing, contracts, or 
accounting procedures.  They were often more traditional in their lifestyle and lived 
in remote areas.  Farm agents would prove instrumental in educating, training, and 
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guiding Indians along the various steps of the credit cycle.  One case study 
followed a Creek farmer over a ten year period.  He progressed from renting forty 
acres to owing 120 acres with a tractor rather than a mule and a new solid home for 
his family.102 
The records of three extension workers operating out of the Shawnee Indian 
Agency are representative of the work of other agents across the state.  In 
December of 1937, these agents held eight meetings with 309 in attendance to 
explain credit loans available under the OIWA.  During January of 1937, seven 
meetings were held to explain credit loans while two meetings were held to help 
organize credit associations.  The report for March showed three credit associations 
were formed, and one meeting was held to explain tribal organization.  During 
October of 1937, the Shawnee Indian Agency Extension Office held thirteen 
meetings to explain loan procedures, establish tribal organization committees, and 
facilitate farm planning for credit applications.103     
Agents would often work with individuals and cooperatives on a long-term 
basis to help insure their success.  The Lyons Indian Cooperative Association 
located near Stilwell represented one such group.  This group of eight Cherokee 
full blood families formed a cooperative under the OIWA and received a loan for 
$2800 to cover start-up operating expenses through the Adair County Indian Credit 
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Association in 1938.  Located in eastern Oklahoma, most Indian land was 
extremely hilly and had been rendered virtually useless by overgrazing and poor 
timbering practices by previous white lessees, leaving a thin rocky soil that quickly 
eroded.  This Indian cooperative was guided by Herbert Kinnard, an agricultural 
extension agent who determined that strawberries would grow in this type of soil 
and terrain.  Kinnard worked closely with this group for the life of the cooperative.  
In addition to guiding the group through the loan application procedures, Kinnard 
also taught the group such things as how to prepare the soil and plant the berries, 
“how to pick the berries, how to sort them, how to pack and even taking the Indians 
to market with him so as to know how to market their berries, [and] how to keep 
records and cost accounts.”104  At the end of the first year, this cooperative was able 
not only to pay the loan off in full, it also distributed an average of $600 to each of 
the eight member families of the cooperative, a dramatic achievement when it is 
considered that the average annual income of a Cherokee hill family at that time 
was $54.  At the same time, the average income for Indians across the United States 
was $500, while for whites the average annual income was $2,300.105  This 
cooperative operated until 1946 when it was disbanded and the members opened 
their own operations.106  By 1950, Kinnard estimated approximately 300 Indian 
families were involved in individual strawberry growing operations around Lyon, 
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Oklahoma.  Even with only partial funding, credit provisions of the OIWA helped 
promote a wide variety of agricultural undertakings by both individuals and 
cooperatives growing cotton, peanuts, wheat, truck gardening, raising horses, beef 
and dairy cattle.  Angie Debo conducted the only survey dealing specifically with 
the impact of the OIWA on Oklahoma Indians and stated “rehabilitated families 
constitute only a small percentage of the needy population.”107  
There were a number of issues that would continue to plague the Indian 
credit program well into the mid-1950s when the Bureau disbanded last Indian 
credit associations in Oklahoma.  The ongoing problem of limited congressional 
appropriations for funding and the small percentage of Oklahoma Indians who 
possessed land remained paramount.  The lack of familiarity and experience on the 
part of many Indians with respect to loan and commercial activities, seemingly 
endless delays in application and bureau paperwork and reporting processes, 
remote location, and the need to resolve immediate issues of food and proper 
shelter, relief measures, were perhaps the most common concerns of many 
Oklahoma Indians.   
However, other issues contributed to the problem.  James Kahdot, chief of 
the Citizen Band of Pottawatomi Indians, expressed the problem of favoritism on 
the part of members of the business committee.  Kahdot complained “this Indian 
Loan Business will never amount to anything with the present setup as those that 
are not popular with these People [the business committee] can’t get no [sic] 
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benefits.”108  Albert Attocknie, Chairman of the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache 
Council, discussed at length in a letter to the Commissioner, the factionalism 
between two tribal groups: “Group No. 1,” who might be referred to as the 
progressives and “Group No. 2,” which Attocknie claimed to represent, or the 
traditionals.  He claimed, “The Credit Associations have made almost no loans to 
the Group No. 2 Indians because of their incompetency and age, when thousands of 
dollars of federal funds have been . . . loaned through credit associations almost 
entirely to the Indians of Group No. 1.”109  This gulf between traditionals and 
progressives is evident in all programs of the IRA/OIWA. 
In the western half of the state, the old Oklahoma Territory, the loan 
programs under the OIWA were not as popular.  There was much less credit 
activity in the west with the plains tribes than in the east with the five tribes.  
Several credit associations were dissolved in the late 1930s or early 1940s due to 
lack of demand for their services.  The Bureau dissolved the North Canadian Indian 
Credit Association in 1942.  In 1945, the Southern Sac and Fox Indian Credit 
Association were dissolved.  During its eight-year life, it had been approved 
initially for a loan fund of $10,000, but had loaned only little over $4,800.   
 In 1956, Angie Debo interviewed Edward F. Ellison who served over 
twenty years as a land management supervisor with the bureau at both the 
Anadarko and Concho agencies.  Ellison offered interesting insights in explaining 
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differences between eastern and western Oklahoma Indians.  Many of the tribal 
groups located in the western half of Oklahoma had been moved there from the 
Great Plains.  Often they had little if any agricultural heritage.  Also, compounding 
the situation, Ellison claimed, was the transformation that took place in farming in 
western Oklahoma between 1934 and 1940.  During this time, farming became 
increasingly mechanized.  At the same time, prices on agricultural commodities, in 
particular wheat, dropped, while the cost of living went up.  Agriculture in western 
Oklahoma responded to this situation by producing more.  Indian farms and 
ranches based on eighty and 120 acre allotments of 1934 gave way to the 160-acre 
plus farm of the 1940s.  Ellison claims, “The Indian people did not have the 
management ability to cope with the situation.”110  Many would leave farming for 
wage labor and as WWII approached, many would find work outside Oklahoma in 
various defense related industries located throughout the American West.  The 
declining numbers of western Oklahoma Indians involved in agricultural would 
continue into the 1950s.  Ellison claimed in 1950 there were 648 Cheyenne and 
Arapaho directly involved in farming.  By 1956, that number had declined to “not 
more than 40.”111  During the 1950s, the price of agriculture land in Oklahoma 
increased, which served as an incentive for many Indians to sell their land holdings 
and move either to town or from the area.   
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A shortage of extension farm agents was also a factor in inhibiting credit 
activities.  For example, just five agents staffed the area of the Five Tribes.  In a 
letter to Oklahoma Congressmen, Jed Johnson, Commissioner Collier stated, “The 
main reason for the slowness of credit activities in Grady County is that the farm 
agent has seven other counties to cover.”112  Farm extension agents, a critical link 
in the Indian credit process, would remain in short supply.  As the nation drew 
closer to war in the late 1930s, appropriations to a number of programs such as 
farm extension programs were slashed and that funding was channeled into defense 
appropriations.  In the early 1950s, the responsibilities of farm extension agents 
would be transferred from federal to state responsibility.  This action severed the 
valuable local link between the Bureau and many Indian farmers.  The extension of 
credit to Oklahoma Indians for agricultural undertakings affected only a small 
percentage of the Indian population.  Statistics show that in the Five Tribes area, 
between the 1937 and 1950, 2358 loans “. . . had been made in the amount of 
$1,632,191.89 to 1,566 families,” out of an estimated 13,825 families or just a little 
over ten percent.113  Out of these 13,825 families, seventy percent depended in part 
on agricultural income this seventy percent could not obtain adequate financing 
through regular commercial institutions other than revolving credit under the 
IRA/OIWA.114  It must be remembered that by 1933, the vast majority of 
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Oklahoma Indians were landless.  Credit was available only to individuals or 
groups of Indians who either still possessed their allotments or held clear title to 
land holdings.  Relaying success stories can be dramatic, but those stories pale in 
light of the small minority of Oklahoma Indians who benefited from these credit 
measures.  Oklahoma Indians lost 90 percent of tribal land holdings between the 
1890s and 1933, or approximately thirteen and one half million acres.  The land 
purchase program under the OIWA failed to place significant amounts of land back 
into tribal holdings because of limited appropriations.  As previously discussed, 
only 36,000 acres were purchased and added to tribal land bases under the OIWA.  
The inability of the IRA/OIWA to increase significantly Indian land base coupled 
with the overall transformation of Oklahoma farming to mechanization and larger 
operations helped to close the door of opportunity for many Indian farmers.  
 Much of the thinking underscoring the IRA/OIWA was based on the 
premise that agriculture would serve as the economic base for Oklahoma Indians.  
This thinking seemed flawed from the beginning.  Coupled with the need for land 
was also the need for credit to finance agricultural undertakings.  Once again, 
limited congressional appropriations failed to provide the necessary capital needed 
to enhance Indian agriculture in Oklahoma.  While some Oklahoma Indians 
benefited from emphasis on farming, they constituted a dwindling minority.  The 
vast majority of Oklahoma Indians were landless and the IRA/OIWA did little to 
change that situation.  From the political standpoint, few Oklahoma tribal groups 
organized under the IRA/OIWA.  None of the Five Tribes adopted IRA/OIWA 
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constitutions.  However, the influence of the IRA/OIWA in this area helped to 
foster awareness on the part of many Oklahoma Indians that tribal governmental 
organization provided the means whereby tribal groups could face the many 
challenges confronting them, promote the well being of their members, and protect 
their cultural heritage as they entered the post WWII age.   
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   Conclusion 
 
In analyzing historical events, there often appears a tendency on the 
part of many to utilize a simple binary standard in determining success or 
failure.  This tendency seems to hold true for scholarly focusing on the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.  Some, such as Elmer Thomas and John 
Collier, hoped the OIWA would prove a panacea for the problems facing 
Oklahoma Indians.  Others, such as Joseph Bruner, believed the act set back 
the cause of Indian reform and also that of Oklahoma Indians.  Historians 
who have studied the IRA and the OIWA seem divided as well.  This 
dissertation concludes the truth lies somewhere in the middle, in the gray 
area between success and failure.  The OIWA can be credited with a 
positive impact on Oklahoma Indians in some areas, but at the same time 
falling short of intended objectives in others.   
In evaluating the impact of the OIWA, statistics paint a picture of 
limited success.  A miserly 36,000 acres were added to the Oklahoma tribal 
land base.  Most of that land was determined marginal for agriculture 
purposes.  Only a little over ten percent of eligible Oklahoma Indians took 
advantage of OIWA loan programs.  Finally, only eighteen Oklahoma tribes 
organized under the OIWA, with just thirteen of that group incorporating 
for tribal economic growth.  These tribal groups represented only about ten 
per cent of the Indian population in Oklahoma.  Outside of three Creek 
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towns and the Keetoowah, none of the Five Tribes, representing the 
majority of Indian population in Oklahoma, organized under the OIWA.  
These statistics seem to point to indifference on the part of Oklahoma 
Indians, leaving a mediocre legacy for the OIWA.     
Compounding a discussion of the legacy of the OIWA are factors 
often difficult to measure or categorize.  However, these “intangibles” must 
be included in any evaluation.  This dissertation examines key ingredients, 
which flavor the story of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act.  While there 
may be other influencing factors, the following includes major elements.  
They include John Collier, an emphasis on Indian land and agriculture, 
changing demographics, factionalism, a hostile Congress, white interests, 
the failure to economically revitalize tribes, and ideological battles. 
John Collier remains the towering figure still looming over the 
Indian New Deal.  Collier led the charge for drastic reform in federal Indian 
policy.  As Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Collier remained at the fore 
front through the legislative enactment and implementation phases of both 
the IRA and the OIWA.  The IRA/OIWA was a concerted effort by John 
Collier to employ progressive principles of social engineering to answer 
Indian needs.  Collier referred to his objectives and policies during the first 
several years of the New Deal as a “laboratory of ethnic affairs.”1  
Accepting the concept of cultural pluralism, believed the continued 
existence of American Indians depended on the organization and 
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incorporation of tribal groups to insure political and economic survival.  
Collier proved a controversial figure in Roosevelt’s New Deal.  He spent 
much of his time struggling to implement his proposals often against a 
Congress and bureaucracy steeped in assimilation and vehemently opposed 
to his “radical” approach to Indian affairs.  Congressional opposition 
fostered by an alliance between conservative Democrats and Republicans 
led to his stepping down as Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  After his 
resignation in 1945, Collier almost singlehandedly dictated the record of the 
Indian New Deal, which remained unquestioned for almost a quarter of a 
century.    
The ideas manifested in both the IRA and the OIWA percolated in 
the minds of John Collier and other reformers during most of the 1920s and 
the early 1930s.  As discussed, Collier claimed that during the 1920s, he 
formulated the major planks of the Indian New Deal, which ended 
allotment, provided for tribal organizations, economic development, and 
cultural preservation.  The initial Indian Reorganization bill was conceived 
and birthed within the walls of the Department of the Interior in the offices 
of administrators and reformers such as Secretary Ickes, Commissioner 
Collier, and solicitors Nathan Margold, and Felix Cohen.  This proposal 
introduced in Congress as the Wheeler-Howard Bill in early 1933 
underwent a substantial makeover as provisions were introduced, debated, 
amended, or dropped.  The clash between Collier and legislators such as 
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Senators Thomas and Burton K. Wheeler and Representative Wesley 
Disney resulted in a shortened proposal with a much narrow focus than the 
original forty eight page omnibus bill.  As the bill worked its way through 
the legislative process, ten Indian congresses here held across the country, 
including five in Oklahoma.  Tribal groups were invited and thousands of 
Indians attended.  The proposed bill was explained to the Indian attendees, 
discussed, questions answered and recommendations noted, all in a tightly 
orchestrated format. 
Indians exercised a voice, during the legislative process, however it 
was questionable the degree to which that voice was audible.  These 
congresses were designed to garner support of Indians for a proposal 
already formulated by white administrators and legislators; they allowed 
little opportunity for substantive input from Indians.  It is clear from the 
minutes of these meetings as well as House and Senate committee hearings 
held during the legislative process that other factors seemed to also muffle 
Indian voice.  They included a paternal attitude edged with racial 
undertones on the part of white legislators, the lack of Indian experience in 
promoting their interests within the white political realm, and the focus by 
many Oklahoma Indians on quick fixes to alleviate dire economic situation, 
rather than long term changes in the course of Indian policy.  This same 
formula would be repeated later with five congresses held for Oklahoma 
Indians just prior to introduction of the Thomas-Rogers Bill in early 1935.   
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As demonstrated in this study, Indian focus remained at the tribal 
level.  Creeks spoke for Creeks, Kiowas for Kiowas.  Lacking at this time 
was any meaningful attempt on the part of Oklahoma Indians to organize an 
intra tribal voice or pan Indian response to federal legislators and 
administrators.  The idea that Indians could reach across tribal lines and 
work together to achieve common interests was in its infancy during this 
time period.  The influential National Congress of Americans or NCAI did 
not organize until 1944.  There were of course organizations such as the 
Indian Association of Oklahoma and the American Indian Federation, but at 
this time these organizations had not evolved to the level of sophistication 
where they had honed either operating skills or the trust of Indians to be 
considered as a means to produce effective results. 
  The IRA/OIWA allows for individual as well as tribal 
participation.  Additionally, and unlike previous Indian policy, participation 
in the OIWA’s tribal organization and economic programs was not 
mandatory, both individual Indians and tribes could elect to participate or 
not.  These differentiations are important.  They cracked open a door for 
Indian participation and input into the formulation and implementation of 
federal Indian policy and programs.  This door would be pushed open 
further in the following decades and culminate in the self determination 
movement of the late 1960s and 1970s.  Oklahoma Indians, as previously 
mentioned, mirrored Indians nationwide with respect to limited involvement 
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in IRA/OIWA programs, including tribal organization and chartering, and 
participation in economic loan programs.  Some point to the low level of 
involvement by Oklahoma Indians and tribal groups in both loan programs 
and tribal reorganization as evidence of the failure of the OIWA.  This 
dissertation concludes that low participation could actually be a sign of 
success.  Oklahoma Indians took advantage of choices offered to them by 
the act and chose not to participate.  It is recognized that many Oklahoma 
Indians and tribal groups based their decision not to participate on the 
grounds they were not consulted as the measure was being formulated.  
Regardless, of the factors which influenced Indian participation, the fact 
remains for the first time they could make that decision for themselves.   
Also discussed in this study, the historic relationship between the 
federal government and Oklahoma tribal groups has been difficult and at 
times strained.  That relationship had also proven unique from that with 
other tribal groups.  Contributing factors included removal, the Civil War, 
reconstruction treaties, and the rapid loss of Indian land and resources 
following implementation of the allotment policy in Indian Territory in 
preparation for statehood during the last decade of the nineteenth century 
and the first of the twentieth century.  These events and circumstances 
became part of Oklahoma Indian heritage and memory.  It left a bad taste in 
the mouths of many Oklahoma Indians for federal Indian policy.  The 
records of the IRA/OIWA are filled with examples of mistrust and 
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uncertainty on the part of many tribes during the enactment and 
implementation of the IRA/OIWA.  
Many Oklahoma Indians were reticent to embrace another federal 
proposal such as the IRA/OIWA based on a preceding track record of 
empty or broken promises by the white government coupled with what 
Indians saw as unfettered support of white expansion into and exploitation 
of their land and resources.  Traditionals often eschewed contact and 
involvement with whites or their institutions.  Some wanted only their plot 
of land and to be left alone.  On the other hand, many progressives had 
assimilated to a degree by incorporating white social and economic 
practices.  This group strove to better their economic situation by increased 
land holdings and exploitation of resources such as timber and minerals 
along with other economic endeavors.  Many of this group opposed the 
OIWA because they viewed it as a step backward to the reservation era and 
tighter government regulation of Indian land.  They viewed the IRA/OIWA 
as a major step backward and a threat to the economic success they 
struggled to build.  Joseph Bruner, a Creek, was the outspoken and informal 
Indian leader for this viewpoint.  Bruner achieved remarkable success in 
real estate, insurance, and the oil business in eastern Oklahoma.  He viewed 
Collier’s Indian New Deal as a formidable threat and became a vocal critic.  
Interestingly, Bruner sought to promote his viewpoints and garner Indian 
support through a pan Indian organization, the American Indian Federation.  
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However, Bruner’s caustic opposition to John Collier and the Indian New 
Deal may have diminished support.  Oklahoma Indians either supported or 
opposed the bill for a variety of reasons.     
With respect to tribal governments, Loretta Fowler, although 
claiming that IRA/OIWA constitutions were often forced on Oklahoma 
tribes, also believes these governments gave individual members a 
mechanism to challenge tribal leaders and thereby increasing political 
involvement by the tribe as a whole.  Business councils gained more control 
over the hiring of agency employees, the allocation of tribal funds, and 
economic development.  These governments helped gain tribes more access 
to government funds and control over their resources.2  The reestablishment 
of tribal governments transformed the political world both internally and 
externally in the ways members resolved issues with the outside world and 
most importantly with an enhanced standing with the federal government.  
As discussed previously, most tribal government had been abolished in 
Oklahoma by the turn of the century.  The introduction of constitutional 
representative government guided by Oklahoma Indians had to gain 
experience and success in channeling political interests and tensions 
through these new mechanisms, before they could sustain them.    
Carter Blue Clark pointed to another change wrought by the 
IRA/OIWA.  He believed the reestablishment of tribal governments and 
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incorporation kindled a “revival of long-dormant tribal self-rule.”3  Tribal 
members and groups, whether they supported or opposed the IRA/OIWA 
were swept along by powerful currents of change, which this legislation, in 
part, helped to promote.  A transformation of tribal politics, both internally, 
in the way tribal members interacted and sought solutions to shared issues 
and problems, and externally in the manner the tribes interacted with the 
outside world, governments, business, and society in general began to 
change during this time.  As Oklahoma Indians and tribal groups took a 
more proactive stance, they began to exercise a voice and demand a larger 
share of control over their future.  This transformation evolved over a 
period of time.  The IRA/OIWA provided the mechanism for a 
constitutional representative government, but this new system had first to be 
incorporated into the Indian mind set.  This kind of deep change did not 
occur overnight, but evolved over a longer period of time.  These factors 
coupled with others mark the origins of the self-determination movement 
that would blossom in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s can be traced 
back to the New Deal and World War II eras.  Clark is correct in that the 
emerging spirit of tribalism fostered by the Indian New Deal “fed later 
Indian nationalism that erupted in the militancy of the 1960s.”4  However, it 
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was only one of several important factors, contributing to the 
transformation. 
As with all Americans, World War II proved a transforming 
experience for Oklahoma Indians.  Many had become disenchanted with 
“federally managed economic development and tribal self-rule” that seemed 
unable to improve their economic situation.5  Approximately twenty five 
per cent migrated from tribal areas during World War II.6  Many would find 
employment in war related industries scattered throughout the West.  They 
sent money back home that proved to be an economic shot in the arm for 
many remaining Indians.  Almost 6,000 Oklahoma Indians would serve in 
the armed forces during the war.7  By 1945, many returning Oklahoma 
Indian veterans “possessed a wider knowledge that made them capable of 
leading tribes into a new era of assertion of tribal sovereignty and heritage 
in the postwar period.”8  Veterans were not satisfied with returning to the 
status-quo.  Alison Bernstein quotes historian David Nash, “Before the war 
the American Indian was America’s outsider. . . . Assimilation seemed far 
fetched,” and she concludes arguing, “By war’s end, Indians were part of 
the American political process, their economic, social, and cultural status 
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irrevocably altered by the conflict.”9  The nation as a whole was 
transformed by the depression, the war, and its aftermath.  Oklahoma 
Indians were certainly part of that transformation. 
 Clark claims the IRA/OIWA changed the focus on Indian policy 
from achieving assimilation through agriculture to achieving “assimilation 
through . . . constitutions and corporate charters.”10  This assertion warrants 
closer scrutiny.  Much of the OIWA was based on Indian land, formally 
ending the allotment policy in Oklahoma, land purchases to augment tribal 
land base, and credit programs to promote viable agricultural enterprises.  
Agricultural and resource development served as the foundation for the 
IRA/OIWA.  John Collier believed the enhancement of Oklahoma Indians’ 
economic standing through agriculture, farming and ranching, would serve 
to increase their voice, politically and socially.  This effect coupled with 
protection of Indian cultural heritage would place them in a stronger 
position to mingle with white society, while at the same time insuring their 
cultural survival.  Its success was based on the success of Oklahoma Indian 
agriculture.  Collier viewed tribal organization and charters as modern day 
tools necessary to channel political and economic forces to promote the 
success of Oklahoma Indians on the agricultural realm.   
Collier’s vision with its foundation steeped in agriculture and the 
Indian small family farmer ran counter to the trends in American agriculture 
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10 Carter Blue Clark, “The New Deal for Indians,” 80. 
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becoming evident during implementation of the IRA/OIWA.  It is important 
to remember that the vast majority of Oklahoma Indians were landless.  As 
the depression gave way to World War II, agriculture was transformed.  
Prices for agricultural commodities, grains as well as livestock were in a 
state of decline from WWI on.  American farmers responded in a two 
pronged fashioned.  The size of farming operations increased and coupled 
with technological improvements, agricultural production increased while 
labor costs decreased.  Agriculture became more capital intensive.  Indian 
allotments of 80 to 120 acres became increasingly difficult to generate a 
profit.  Small farms could not compete with larger commercial operations.  
Some Oklahoma Indians still practiced subsistence agriculture during this 
period.  Some generated a little cash by raising a few acres of cotton or a 
few head of livestock to sell.  Many supplemented their income by 
producing railroad ties or fence posts, if their land was blessed with timber.  
During this period, many Oklahoma Indians drifted to agricultural labor on 
larger nearby farms and ranchers often owned by whites or into wage labor 
in nearby towns and cities.  Agriculture declined as a dominant factor as the 
country became more industrialized and urban.      
An ongoing ideological debate buffeted the enactment and 
implementation phases surrounding the OIWA.  This struggle was also 
evident with the IRA on a national basis.  In examining the IRA, Elmer 
Rusco, a political scientist, built upon four schools of thought, which 
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underscored federal Indian policy at this time.11  These four are forced 
assimilation, administrative reform, the tribal alternative, and termination.  
The Dawes or Allotment Act of 1887 instituted assimilation as the 
backbone of federal Indian policy.  Native Americans would enter the 
American mainstream as prosperous self sufficient farmers.  Allotment was 
introduced the Five Tribes in Indian Territory with the Curtis Act of 1896.  
By the 1920s, many realized the allotment policy had proven a tremendous 
failure.  Allotment both nationally and especially in Oklahoma had the 
opposite of its desired objective of assimilating Indians into American 
society.  Instead Native Americans lost bulk of their land holdings, with 
Oklahoma Indians losing ninety percent of their land.  Rather than being 
assimilated, Oklahoma Indians were marginalized even further to the 
fringes of American society.   
During the 1920s and continuing on into the New Deal years, 
administrative reform came to the forefront of the thinking of many 
reformers.  Still grounded in assimilation many began looking for fixes to 
correct the failures of the allotment policy.  Tinkering and repair would get 
federal Indian policy back on track towards the goal of assimilation.  During 
most of the 1920s, a small minority of those concerned with Indian policy 
came to promote the idea that allotment and its destructive impact was 
                                                 
11  For purposes of this discussion, Elmer Rusco’s definition of ideology ,“the 
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beyond repair.  A new direction was needed.  The Meriam Report of 1928 
seemed to substantiate this realization and bolstered the reformer’s efforts, 
by the late 1920s; John Collier became the clarion for this wing of the 
reform movement.  Collier promoted a school of thought that recognized 
the federal government’s trust responsibility towards Native Americans 
while at the same time respecting the right of Native Americans to maintain 
their tribal institutions and cultural heritage.  Dubbed by Graham Taylor as 
“the tribal alternative”, Collier’s vision placed Indians in the white world, 
but not part of the white world.12  He introduced a radical multi-cultural 
approach, which recognized the right of Indian societies to exist, while 
forced assimilation would do away with Indianness.  Collier’s wing of the 
reform movement saw Indians assimilating by mixing, but not melting into 
American society, with their Indianness protected.  
Those schools of thought continued to battle among one another 
over the future of Indian affairs.  Political leaders such as Senators Thomas 
and Burton K. Wheeler along with Congressman Will Rogers exemplified 
the assimilation perspective.  For them, Indians should surrender their 
“Indianess,” adopt white ways and blend into American society.  Like 
Collier and other reformers such as Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, 
they believed, at least for a while, that agriculture was at the heart of any 
solution to the Indian problem.  They spun a little different English to their 
                                                 
12 Graham D. Taylor’s book, The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1980, offers an in-depth analysis of evolution of ideology 
that underscored and impacted the actions of players involved in the Indian New Deal.    
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ideology than did Collier, seeing Oklahoma Indians being incorporated into 
white society, though at an undetermined social, political, and economic 
standing than whites.  Additionally, these legislators, such as Thomas, 
Rogers, and Burton K. Wheeler above all else practiced political 
pragmatism.  Their base of political power rested with their white 
constituencies and campaign contributors.  Most proposals were evaluated 
by exposure to the political winds.   
Senator Thomas and Commissioner Collier clearly represented two 
distinct ideological perspectives.  Thomas’s thinking in particular remained 
an unsettled conundrum of assimilation, reform, and termination, the latter 
being especially evident during the war years and after.  The two struggled 
against each other for dominance of their viewpoints.  The outcome was a 
mongrelized compromise, which included elements of both agendas.  Even 
a driven reformer, like John Collier, remained political savvy enough to 
realize the necessity of compromise during the legislative process.  In the 
face of withering opposition, Collier sacrificed this proposal for 
strengthening the Indian court system in order to save what he believed 
were the more important features of his proposal.   
For the most part, the tribal alternative challenged the status quo of 
assimilation.  Assimilation was strongly rooted in the minds and hearts of 
many involved in Indian affairs, including legislators, administrators, and 
the federal bureaucracy.  Collier and other reformers rallied around the 
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standard of this upstart ideology of the tribal alternative. They waged a 
protracted war against assimilationists.  This struggle would be played out 
on the battle field of administrative reform, that  continued from the 1930s, 
the and into the 1950s, when the fourth school of thought, termination, 
would mark yet another radical course change for federal Indian policy.  
Though the focus of this study ends as the termination era begins, it is 
important to touch briefly on its origins.   
Termination, though based in the thinking of assimilation, took a 
radical approach towards realizing that end.  Assimilation would be 
achieved and the Indian problem resolved by denying the trust obligation 
and eliminating federal services to the Indians, thereby forcing the Indian 
into American society.  The federal government would no longer federally 
recognize Indian tribes nor its responsibility towards them.  Over a period 
of time, services and programs would be dismantled.  Much of this 
responsibility would be eliminated entirely or delegated to the states.  The 
federal government would get out of the Indian business.   
The idea of termination had been debated, to one degree or another, 
for several decades. However, the intensity of the debate escalated from the 
mid 1930s onward as a conservative backlash to FDR’s New Deal began to 
build.  This group composed of disillusioned conservative Democrats and 
Republicans “repudiated some of the impulses . . . prominent in the early 
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New Deal.”13   These “impulses” included moving away from promoting 
“government sponsored social welfare programs.”14  In 1943, Elmer 
Thomas, Burton K. Wheeler and others in Congress, launched a concerted 
attack against the Indian New Deal.  Senate Report 310, issued that year, 
recommended such changes as elimination of “all federal control of law and 
order as specifically applied to Indians,” the “transfer of Indian probate and 
inheritance matters to the states,” the elimination of “all central office 
control of credit funds,” and the elimination of “federal trust over all 
individual Indian lands.”15  In a supplemental report specifically directed to 
Oklahoma Indians, Senator Thomas stated that Senate Report 310 “was 
intended to combat the “back to the reservation plan” of officials and 
persons in high places.”  On the other hand, Thomas’s group “favor[ed] a 
policy wherein the Indians may be permitted to select their own tribal 
councils and that and [their] recommendations . . . be given due and proper 
consideration by both the officials of the [BIA] and by the committees of 
the Congress.”16  Termination would become formally institutionalized with 
the enactment of Public Law 280 in 1953, with disastrous results for many 
Native Americans.     
                                                 
13 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1996),  
14 Ibid., 6. 
15  Congress, Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs,  “Survey of Conditions Among 
the Indians of the United States,” report prepared by Elmer Thomas, 78th Cong., 
1st. Sess., 1943, 19-21.  
16  Congress, Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs,  “Survey of Conditions Among 
the Indians of the United States-Supplemental Report,” report prepared by Elmer Thomas, 
78th Cong., 2nd. Sess., 1944, 1. 
 229 
 
The overall impact of the OIWA on Oklahoma Indians remains 
mixed.  While its short term tangible results remained limited, the long 
range intangible results, though difficult to measure, seem substantial.  If 
one looks at the small percentage of Oklahoma Indians who benefited 
economically from its loan programs, or the miniscule increase of tribal 
land bases, or the small numbers of Oklahoma Indians who lived under the 
umbrella of IRA/OIWA governments, then the impact remains dismal at 
best.  However, if one considers intangibles such as increased participation 
by members in tribal affairs, an intensified and sustained effort to gain 
control of tribal resources, enhanced relations with white business and all 
levels of government, increased cultural pride and tribal self-esteem, and a 
stronger voice in the administration of governmental programs then the 
impact takes on new luster.  The enactment and implementation of the 
OIWA helped place Oklahoma Indians on the beginning of the path towards 
self-determination and a greater role in determining their own future and 
preserving their cultural heritage.   
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Appendix                   THE OKLAHOMA INDIAN WELFARE ACT OF 1936 
 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, that the Secretary of the Interior is 
herby authorized, in his discretions, to acquire by purchase, relinquishment, 
give, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface 
rights to lands, within or without existing Indian reservations, including trust or 
otherwise restricted lands now in Indian ownership: Provided, That such lands 
shall be agricultural and grazing lands of good character and quality in 
proportion to the respective needs of the particular Indian or Indians for whom 
such purchases are made.  Title to all lands so acquired shall be taken in the 
name of the United States, in trust for the tribe, band, group, or individual 
Indian for whose benefit such land is so acquired, and while the title thereto is 
held by the United States said lands shall be free from any and all taxes, save 
that the state of Oklahoma is authorized to levy and collect a gross-production 
tax, not in excess of the rate applied to production from lands in private 
ownership, upon all oil and gas produced from said lands, which said tax the 
Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid. 
 
   Sec. 2.  Whenever any restricted Indian land or interests in land, other than 
sales or leases of oil, gas, or other minerals therein, are offered for sale, 
pursuant to the terms of this or any other Act of Congress, the Secretary of the 
Interior shall have a preference right, in his discretion, to purchase the same for 
or in behalf of any other Indian or Indians of the same or any other tribe, at a 
fair valuation to be fixed by the appraisement satisfactory to the Indian owner or 
owners, or if offered for sale at auction said Secretary shall have a preference 
right, in his discretion, to purchase the same for or in behalf of any other Indian 
or Indians by meeting the highest bid otherwise offered therefor.  
 
   Sec. 3.   Any recognized tribe or band of Indians residing in Oklahoma shall 
have the right to organize for its common welfare and to adopt a constitution 
and bylaws, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior 
may prescribe.  The Secretary of the Interior may issue to any such organized 
group a charter of incorporation, which shall become operative when ratified by 
a majority vote of the adult members of the organization voting: Provided 
however, That such election shall be void unless the total vote cast be at least 30 
per centum of those entitle to vote.  Such charter may convey to the 
incorporated group, in addition to any powers which may properly be vested in 
a body corporate under the laws of the State of Oklahoma, the right to 
participate in the revolving credit fund and to enjoy any other rights or 
privileges secured to an organized Indian tribe under the Act of June 18, 1934 
(48 Stat. 984) : Provided, That the corporate funds of any such chartered group 
may be deposited in any national bank within the State of Oklahoma or 
otherwise invested, utilized, or disbursed in accordance with the terms of the 
corporate charter.   
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   Sec. 4.   Any ten or more Indians, as determined by the official tribal rolls, or 
Indian descendants of such enrolled members, or Indians as defined in the Act 
of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), who reside within the State of Oklahoma in 
convenient proximity to each other may receive from the Secretary of the 
Interior, a charter as a local cooperative association for any one or more of the 
following purposes: Credit administration, production, marketing, consumers’ 
protection, or land management.  The provisions of this Act, the regulations of 
the Secretary of the Interior, and the charters of the cooperative associations 
issued pursuant thereto shall govern such cooperative associations: Provided, 
That in those matters not covered by said Act, regulations, or charters, the laws 
of the State of Oklahoma, if applicable, shall govern.  In any stock or nonstick 
cooperative association no one member shall have more than one vote, and 
membership therein shall be open to all Indians residing within the prescribed 
district.   
 
   Sec.  5.   The charters of any cooperative association organized pursuant to 
this Act shall not be amended or revoked by the Secretary except after a 
majority vote of the membership.  Such cooperative associations may sue and 
be sued in any court of the State of Oklahoma or of the United States having 
jurisdiction of the cause of action, but a certified copy of all papers filed in any 
action against a cooperative association in a court of Oklahoma shall be served 
upon the Secretary of the Interior, or upon an employee duly authorized by him 
to receive such service.  Within thirty days after such service or within such 
extended time as the trial court may permit, the Secretary of the Interior may 
intervene in such action or may remove such action to the United States district 
court to be held in the district where such petition is pending by filing in such 
action in the State court a petition for such removal, together with the certified 
copy of the papers served upon the Secretary.  It shall then be the duty of the 
State court to accept such petition and to proceed no further in such action.  The 
said copy shall be entered in the said district court within thirty days after the 
filing of the petition for removal, and the said district court is hereby given 
jurisdiction to hear and determine said action.   
 
   Sec.  6   The Secretary is authorized to make loans to individual Indians and to 
associations or corporate groups organized pursuant to this Act.  For the making 
of such loans and for expenses of the cooperative associations organized 
pursuant to this Act, there shall be appropriated of the Treasury of the United 
States, t he sum of $2,000,000. 
 
   Sec.  7.   All funds appropriated under the several grants of authority 
contained in the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), are hereby made available 
for use under the provisions of this Act, and Oklahoma Indians shall be 
accorded and allocated a fair and just share of any and all funds hereafter 
appropriated under the authorization herein set forth: Provided, That any 
royalties, bonuses, or other revenues derived from mineral deposits underlying 
lands purchased in Oklahoma under the authority granted by this Act, or by the 
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Act of June 18, 1934, shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States, 
and such revenues are herby made available for expenditure by the Secretary of 
the Interior for the acquisition of lands and for loans to Indians in Oklahoma as 
authorized by this Act and by the Act of June 18 1934 (48 Stat. 984). 
  
   Sec.  8.   This Act shall not relate to or affect Osage County, Oklahoma.  
 
   Sec.  9.   The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to prescribe such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.  
All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.  
Approved, June 26, 1936.1        
                                                 
1 “The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, United States Statutes at Large, 49, part 1, 1967-1968 
(1936). 
